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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents an exposition and 
development of Kenneth Burke's theory of guilt-purification- 
redemption (also referred to as the "redemption drama"), and 
then an application of that theory through a critical 
analysis of Martin Luther King, J r . ’s "I Have a Dream" 
speech. King's speech is treated as the "representative 
anecdote" of the moderate wing of the first phase of the 
civil rights movement. The speech became an authorizing text 
on race relations and provided the movement with an 
articulation of its logic and narrative form.
Usually Burke's theory is seen as positing two primary 
modes of purification of guilt: victimage and mortification. 
This study develops aspects of the victimage/mortification 
family of purificatory modes not previously considered by 
Burke or Burkean scholars. It also identifies and develops 
two other categories of purificatory modes --purification 
through rhetorical transcendence and purification through 
images of change, movement, and dramatic catharsis--which 
have received little attention from Burkean scholars.
In ”1 Have a Dream" King purifies African-Americans of 
guilt by a type of victimage/mortification in which black 
suffering under oppression performs an expiatory function. 
King's major mode of purification, however, is 
transcendence. King purifies black and white guilt by
vi
promising redemption through appeals to unitary, 
transcendent principles which exploit America's most potent 
secular and religious myths. King also effects purification 
through the use of images of change, movement, and dramatic 
catharsis. The metaphoric clusters in the "I Have a Dream" 
speech are also analyzed in order to demonstrate how they 
reinforce the structure of the guilt-purification-redemption 
pattern.
The study concludes with an evaluation of Burke's 
theory of guilt-purification-redemption and an assessment of 
"I Have a Dream" and its legacy. It is concluded that King's 
assimilationist vision as articulated in the "Dream" speech 
transcended the nation's racial divisions, but at the 
expense of eliding the socic-political difficulties of 
achieving such assimilation. The implications of viewing the 
civil lights movement, and race relations in general, 




Overview of the Study 
This study presents a development of Kenneth Burke's 
theory of guilt-purification-redemption, and applies that 
theory to Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech. 
Because of the focus by rhetorical scholars on Burke's 
pentad, his redemption drama has been an often-overlooked 
aspect of his theory. Such studies as we do have of the 
cycle of guilt-purification-redemption have emphasized 
victimage and mortification as modes of purification. This 
study develops aspects of the victimage/mortification family 
of purificatory modes not previously noted by Burke or 
Burkean scholars and identifies and develops other Burkean 
modes of purification--purification through transcendence 
and purification through images of change, movement, and 
dramatic catharsis.
This study argues that King's "I Have a Dream" speech 
may be studied as the "representative anecdote" of the first 
phase of the civil rights movement. The writer maintains 
that the "I Have a Dream" speech derives its rhetorical 
appeal from its enactment of the Burkean redemption drama in 
which pre-existent guilt is symbolically purified through 
(a) victimage and mortification, (b) transcendence, and (c) 
images of change, movement and dramatic catharsis. King's
1
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metaphors are analyzed in order to demonstrate how they 
contribute to the overall drama enacted in the speech.
As one of the most well-know speeches of modern times, 
and as a representative, authorizing text on race relations 
in America, it is crucial that rhetorical scholars 
understand the symbolic inducements from which this speech 
derives its appeal. Because of the near-mythic status this 
speech has taken on in the popular mind, it has influenced 
subsequent thought and discourse on race relations in 
America. Thus, an understanding of the speech as a 
redemption drama allows us to see thought patterns that 
developed from the rhetorical appeals represented by this 
address.
Statement of the Problem
The movement for civil rights for African-Americans 
that took place during the 1950s and 1960s was one of the 
most successful social movements in American history. It was 
"a rare and stunning achievement of liberation" (Graham, 
1990, p. (*52) that forever altered the social and political 
landscape of America. Within a dozen years it toppled a 
system of legal segregation and discrimination against 
African-Americans which had been in place more than half a 
century. The civil rights movement was probably the most 
significant domestic development in post-World War II 
America. Its tactics provided the model, and its success 
provided the inspiration, for the many subsequent social
3
reform movements of the 1960s and 1970s--the student 
movement, the anti-war movement, the women's movement, the 
gay rights movement, and others (Chafe, 1986, pp. 127-128).
While the civil rights movement became the paradigm for 
subsequent social movements, Martin Luther King’s "I Have a 
Dream" speech became the paradigmatic discourse of the civil 
rights movement. Garrow (1986a) called it "the rhetorical 
achievement of a lifetime, the clarion call that conveyed 
the moral power of the movement's cause to the millions who 
had watched the live national network coverage" (p. 284 ).
Gentile (1983) believes the speech "forever 'legitimized' 
the civil rights movement to those whites who had difficulty 
accepting it" (p. 249). The speech has been widely
anthologized and repeatedly excerpted on television to the 
extent that it is probably the most well-known speech in 
American history. Many, if not most, Americans can recite at 
least a few lines from King's famous "dream" sequence which 
climaxes the speech. Leff (1987) calls the speech "an emblem 
of our culture" which has "become part of our lived 
experience." Payne (1989) says the "I Have a Dream" speech 
is a "historical and cultural artifact" (p. 47). The speech 
has become so much a part of the nation's shared experience 
of public discourse that the phrase "the Dream" is often 
used as a short-hand expression for a vision of an America 
of racial harmony and justice. The speech has become woven 
into the texture of American history and mythology, 
partaking of and adding to the great American myth of
4
renewal and rebirth, of a nation where people can transcend 
their past and start over. King's speech gave America a 
vision of itself overcoming its past of slavery* 
segregation, and racial crimes, bringing African-Americans 
into the "melting pot" of American community.
This study examines "I Have a Dream" as the 
"representative anecdote" (Burke, 1969a, pp. 59-61) of the 
first phase of the civil rights movement. The modern-day 
civil rights movement in America involved two general 
phases. Phase one included the campaigns for the elimination 
of overt segregation and the demand for the recognition of 
basic legal rights for African-Americans. This phase 
culminated in the two main legislative achievements of the 
civil rights era, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965. After 1965, phase two of the 
movement shifted from an emphasis on nondiscrimination and 
equal treatment before the law, to a concern with equal 
results in the distribution of economic resources through 
preferential treatment for minorities (Graham, 1990, 456- 
457; Thorton, 1986, 148-151).
The 196 5-66 period marked a watershed for the civil 
rights movement in another respect as well. While the 
modern-day civil rights movement had been riddled with 
organizational and personal rivalries almost from its 
inception in the mid-1950s, these had largely been contained 
and ameliorated through the need to work together for a 
common goal. For the 1963 March on Washington, all five
5
major civil rights organizations--the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the National 
Urban League (NUL), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)--managed to 
pull together and cooperate despite underlying tensions. 
After 1965, however, the disagreements within the movement 
became more intense and more public. SNCC and CORE became 
more radical and were captured by "black power" advocates.
By mid-1966 the movement was publicly splitting apart over 
the "black power" controversy, the advocacy of violence by 
some of its more extreme elements, and the issue of whether 
the movement should be linked to opposition to the Vietnam 
War (Weiss, 1986, p. 54). The movement no longer even agreed 
on fundamental objectives. For the more radical elements of 
the movement the objective of integration gave way to the 
goal of black separatism, and a more collectivist vision 
replaced the ideal of individual liberty and opportunity. 
While never advocating violence or abandoning the goal of 
integration, even Martin Luther King moved in the direction 
of economic collectivism in the last few years of his public 
career (Chafe, 1986, pp. 134-136; Thorton, 19B6, p. 150).
Seeing the civil rights movement as taking place in two 
phases allows us to contextualize the "Dream" speech in its 
proper historical and cultural milieu. While it did not 
articulate the meta-narrative of the movement in its second 
phase, the "Dream" speech did define the metaphysical form
6
of the movement in its first phase. Yet "I Have a Dream” has 
been passed down to subsequent generations as the 
authenticating discourse of "the civil rights movement."
This is because phase one of the movement was equalitarian 
in its ideology and assimilationist in it objectives. Its 
emphasis on individual rights was consistent with 
traditional American values. Yet equality was not achieved 
in phase one of the civil rights movement because of the 
difficulty of overcoming historical divisions not easily 
mitigated. Phase two was shaped by the frustration resulting 
from the failure of the assimilationist model to provide 
immediate results, so it revived a model which emphasized 
black self-empowerment, black identity, and black 
separatism. It is phase one of the civil rights movement-- 
when the fight was against legally sanctioned segregation 
and the goal was integration and equal opportunity--that 
most people mean today when they speak of "the civil rights 
movement." This was the era of the historic battles and the 
great moral victories --the Montgomery bus boycott, the 
student sit-ins, the Freedom Rides, the Birmingham campaign, 
the Selma campaign--that have become enshrined in the annals 
of the movement. This was the era of George Wallace, "Bull" 
Connor, and Jim Clark, who became forever etched in the 
nation's consciousness as personifications of the arch­
segregationist. And this was the era of the now-legendary 
March on Washington, the largest demonstration for human 
rights in the nation's history up to that time, where the
7
movement proved that it could gather over a quarter of a 
million people, black and white, together in a spirit of 
peace and brotherhood without violence, and where King 
delivered his famous speech.
This study argues that "I Have a Dream" captured the 
public imagination so completely that it constructed the 
symbolic syntax from which the nation has drawn its 
subsequent discourse about civil rights. The speech became 
the dominant discursive act that gave the movement its form 
by articulating its focus, purpose, strategy, myths, and 
language. But as a result of its success the speech's 
message has come to be treated as axiomatic or creedal, 
instead of as a text still open to analysis and criticism. 
Its images are appealed to, its logic is seen as 
authorizing, and its narrative is viewed as the only proper 
patn for race relations in America. In short, it has become 
a powerful piece of American mythology in its own right. 
This has resulted in some reluctance on the part of 
rhetorical scholars to criticize the speech as they would 
any other speech, to analyze it for its shortcomings as a 
model for race relations, and to point out how its reliance 
on secular myth and religious imagery causes King’s vision 
to depend on a traditional conception of national identity 
and purpose that has become increasingly inadequate, since 
the social and cultural changes of the 1960s, to sustain 
communal cohesion and guide social reform. Thus, most 
studies of this speech seek mainly to praise its greatness
8
and ascertain the techniques of its rhetorical appeal (one 
exception is Hariman, 1909).
Therefore, the purpose of this study will be to answer 
the following questions:
What is the message/form1 of this speech? In other 
words, to what underlying symbolic inducements are auditors 
responding? What are its myths? What authority, hierarchy, 
and order does it invoke and evoke? What conflicts and 
contradictions does it attempt to transcend and how?
Why did this particular message/form emerge from the 
competing voices on civil rights to capture the public 
imagination? What competing voices did the speech mute or 
ignore?
What are the shortcomings of this message/form? What 
are its limitations and contradictions? What thought 
patterns does it encourage and discourage? What learned 
dysfunctions does it produce?
What is the legacy of the speech? In other words, to 
what degree did the success of the speech's message/form 
contribute to the civil rights movement's eventual failure 
to achieve its goals beyond the dismantling of legal 
segregation?
Finally, what will the answers to the above questions 
reveal about the short-term and long-term effects of a 
successful, totalizing rhetoric of assimilation? Does the 
need to transcend differences in such a discourse always 
result in an elision of the practical difficulties of
9
achieving assimilation? Are there other means available to a 
rhetor under such circumstances; i.e., can real, bitter, 
long-term divisions of race, class, religion, etc. be 
transcended by being integrated under a higher good without 
ignoring the socio-political difficulties of effecting such 
assimilation?
Review of Relevant Literature 
I will divide the literature review into two sections: 
(1) studies dealing exclusively with the "I Have a Dream" 
speech, and (2) all other studies of King's rhetoric.
Studies .DecLliag ..Exclusively with "1 Have a Dream"
Considering its significance, relatively few rhetorical 
scholars have attempted a thorough analysis of the "I Have a 
Dream" speech. Alvare2 (1988) argued that the speech adopts 
the characteristics of the black Baptist sermon, with its 
dialogue form, use of common knowledge (from the Bible, a 
black spiritual, and secular texts), and its use of figures 
of speech such as antithesis, extended metaphors, 
periphrasis, and anaphora. Miller's (1989) study also 
emphasized the effect of the black folk pulpit on King's 
ideas and persuasiveness in this speech. He argued that the 
black folk pulpit traditions of voice merging and self­
making (incorporating common knowledge from the Bible or 
other sources into one's text, thus assuming the persona of 
the source), and typological epistemology (drawing parallels
10
between Biblical events and current events) enabled King to 
"reanimate stereotyped expressions" (p. 26). Cox (1989) 
examined the speech as a reconstitution of the concept of 
"public time" for social change in response to the 
"gradualism" advocated by white moderates. In a response to 
Cox, Hariman (1989) argued that King's sense of urgency came 
primarily from the leadership struggle that was occurring 
within the civil rights movement (p. 207). He maintained
that while King may have established that the time had come 
for legislative action, the speech "also suggested that 
civil disobedience and the radical demand for social 
transformation had become untimely, out of synch with the 
American Dream" (p. 216).
In terms of unpublished studies,2 Leff (1987) argues 
that King's metaphorical pattern shifts from an up/down 
orientation in the first half of the speech--where King is 
describing existing conditions of inequality--to an 
orientation that uses images of things on an even or level 
plane in the second half of the speech, where King envisions 
the attainment of equality. Patton (1988) finds the speech 
reflects essential features of orality by employing a form 
of preaching known as kervgma in which the preacher is seen 
as presenting the revealed word of God. No doctoral 
dissertation has been devoted exclusively to the "I Have a 
Dream" 3peech, or to the 196 3 March on Washington at which 
the speech took place. McGregor's (1965) master's thesis was 
devoted exclusively to the "I Have a Dream" speech, but more
11
than half the thesis actually dealt with the historical 
background, the speaker, and the event. McGregor used a neo- 
Aristotleian methodology to conclude that King's speech was 
effective because his ideas were historically grounded, the 
speech was adapted to the audience, King demonstrated an 
ability to use argument and visual imagery, and he displayed 
good delivery (p. 122).
Qther Studies of King's Rhetoric
A review of the literature reveals only a handful of 
articles on King's speaking have been published by 
rhetorical scholars. Newsom and Gorden (1963) discussed a 
1961 mass meeting of members of the black community in 
Atlanta at which King spoke. The authors explained the 
rhetorical situation and described how King's speech 
prevented a potential split between the cautious elders of 
the black community and younger blacks who wanted to move 
faster on desegregation. Donald Hugh Smith (1966) described 
the events that sparked King's emergence as a civil rights 
leader during the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-56. He also 
demonstrated how King's speech at the first mass meeting 
inspired the boycotters by linking their efforts to larger 
issues of democratic justice and Christian morality. Scott 
(1966) analyzed the impact of the "black power" movement on 
King's rhetoric by investigating his 1966 president's 
address to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. 
Scott concluded that the speech shows King merged some of
12
the moderate implications of black power--the need for black 
pride and the emphasis on economic and political power--into 
his own themes of love and nonviolence. In his discussion of 
King's final speech, "I've Been to the Mountaintop," Osborn 
(1989) provided what he called a "'critilogue', a critical 
excursion" through the speech designed "to illustrate and 
create a sense of living presence." Wenzel (1989) 
maintained that Osborn's treatment is "more eulogistic than 
analytical, more epideictic than critical." Wenzel analyzed 
King's conclusion in the "Mountaintop" speech not as a 
premonition of his own death, as it is often seen, but as an 
impromptu correction to the audience's concern with King's 
personal importance to the struggle. Miller (1988) argued 
that rhetorical scholars have failed to understand King’s 
persuasiveness because they have not sufficiently taken into 
account the influence of the black folk pulpit on his 
rhetoric. King's "Letter from Birmingham Jail" has received 
the most attention from rhetorical scholars (Bosmajian,
1967; Fulkerson, 1979; Lee, 1991; Mott, 1975; Snow, 1985). 
Gravlee (1987) demonstrated that there are many similarities 
in wording between King's "Letter from Birmingham Jail" and 
his "I Have a Dream" speech.
While numerous unpublished doctoral dissertations have 
been written about King, very few are rhetorical analyses. 
Most examine his philosophy, theology, or social thought 
(see Pyatt, 1986, pp. 97-102; Garrow, 1986a, pp. 741-7<*8). 
Those dissertations investigating King from a rhetorical
13
perspective include: Warren's (1967) study of King’s 
pastoral speaking style, which examined King's invention, 
arrangement, style, delivery, and memory as displayed in his 
sermons; Sloan's (197B) analysis of King's strategy of 
nonviolent resistance as examined through the rhetoric of 
sit-ins, mass marches, freedom rides, and other nonverbal 
tactics; and Keele's (197 2) examination of King's rhetorical 
strategies of definition, refutation, justification, 
exhortation, and alignment. Donald Hugh Smith's (1964) 
doctoral dissertation examined King’s use of verbal and 
nonverbal techniques during the Montgomery bus boycott, the 
Birmingham campaign, and the March on Washington. As a 
rhetorical critic who was present at the March on 
Washington, Smith's description of the events of the day and 
the reaction to King's speech are useful to this study.
In summary, only four dissertations have concentrated 
on King's rhetoric, and none have been devoted exclusively 
to the "I Have a Dream" speech. No published article on 
King's rhetoric has employed Burke's theory of guilt- 
purif ication-redemption, which this study uses (although a 
convention paper, discussed in the next section, uses it to 
analyze King's "Eulogy for the Martyred Children"). In 
addition, no work on this speech has gone beyond an article- 
length analysis of King's inventional choices or 
identification of the rhetorical patterns and appeals the 
speech employs. While my analysis does not attempt to refute 
the thesis of any of the above-mentioned studies of the
14
"Dream” speech--in fact, all, to one degree or another 
reinforce my arguments--it does go beyond these studies to 
identify the basic structure of the speech as a guilt- 
purif ication-redemption drama, and to examine the 
implications of King's use of this rhetorical form.
Methodology
This study will employ the theories of Kenneth Burke. 
Specifically, it will develop and employ his theory of 
guilt-purification-redemption (sometimes referred to as the 
"redemption drama"). However, Burke's redemption drama is 
part of his larger dramatistic system, which this study will 
also be drawing upon. Therefore, before discussing the 
redemption drama it is necessary to introduce Burke's theory 
of dramatism.
Dr^amatism
Burke (1969a) termed his overall methodology dramatism. 
because "it invites one to consider the matter of motives in 
a perspective that, being developed from an analysis of 
drama, treats language and thought primarily as modes of 
action" (p. xxii). Motive is a key concept in Burke's 
theory. Human action does not have absolute meaning in and 
of itself. We explain our actions in terms of motives. To 
explain one's conduct in terms of a particular motive is to 
adopt the orientation accepted by one's social group. Since 
motives are shorthand explanations for situations, an
15
analysis of motives is an analysis of human behavior. Since 
motives are lingusitically constructed, an analysis of 
motives requires an analysis of language (Burke, 198 4b, pp. 
19-36). Burke (1968b) defines dramatism as "a method of 
analysis and corresponding critique of terminology designed 
to show the most direct route to the study of human 
relations and human motives is via a methodical inquiry into 
cycles or clusters of terms and their functions" (p. 445).
Burke's (1966) critical system revolves around his 
definition of the human being as "the symbol-using animal" 
(pp. 3-9) and his notion that to use language is to engage 
in "symbolic action" (p. 63). Human beings are distinctively 
symbol-using creatures whose actions and interactions are 
carried out through the exchange of symbols. When human 
beings use symbols, they are involved in "action." &ct is 
thus the key term of dramatism, from which related concepts 
derive. For there to be an act, there must be an aeent. 
Similarly, there must be a scene in which the agent acts, 
through some means or agency. involving some purpose (Burke, 
1968b, pp. 445-446; 1969a, p. x v ). Act, agent, agency,
scene, and purpose are the five key terms of the dramatistic 
pentad, corresponding to the journalistic questions what, 
w ho, h ow, where, and w h y .
Dramatism is particularly suited to a study of King's 
rhetoric. A3 Burke has noted, the concept of dramatism is 
drawn from literature. Literary drama involves conflict, or 
agon, between good and bad. The conflict is resolved in some
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manner which leaves the situation changed from the status 
3UQ._3Ute. but in the process certain principles of good and 
bad are upheld, amended, or destroyed. King, like Gandhi 
whose tactics he adopted, realized that nonviolent social 
protest is basically an art form which requires the staging 
of dramatic moral confrontations with the enemy (Colaiaco, 
1988, p. 2), the purpose of which is to win sympathy to 
one's cause while revealing the immorality of the opponent's 
position (see Garrow, 1978, pp. 220-231; M. L. King, 1958, 
pp. 216-217; 1986, pp. 7-8). In other words, King
orchestrated "sociodramas," staged struggles "between good 
and bad principles of social order" (Duncan, 1968, p. 3k).
In social dramas actors struggle to uphold, destroy, or 
change principles of social order by seeking "to control 
symbols that are already powerful, or to create new symbols 
that will make orderly relationships that cannot be made 
orderly through the use of traditional or sacred symbols" 
(Duncan, 1968, p. 64). As Griffin (1969) has noted, "To 
study a movement is to study a drama, an Act of 
transformation, an Act that ends in transcendence, the 
achievement of salvation" (p. 462).
Although Burke has never provided a synthetic 
explanation of all of the elements in the methodology of 
dramatism, Conrad (1984) maintained that dramatistic 
criticism involves three steps: first, a statistical 
analysis of terms involving an inductive search for the 
dramatic alignment of the work; second, the search for the
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representative anecdote; and third, pentadic analysis. The 
first and third steps will be developed further in the 
course of this study (see chapter three), but since I am 
arguing for the treatment of King's "I Have a Dream" as a 
representative anecdote, I will consider this concept now.
Representative Anecdote
Burke (1969a) wrote that dramatism "involves the search 
for a 'representative anecdote' to be used as a form in 
conformity with which the vocabulary is constructed" (p.
59). There is some debate among Burkean scholars as to 
whether a representative anecdote is a particular discursive 
act representative of a larger body of discourse or an 
underlying narrative form embedded within the discourse. 
However, Madsen (1990) maintains that the representative 
anecdote can be both act and form (pp. 4-5). If a particular 
discursive act can be shown to be representative of a larger 
body of discourse, then the underlying narrative form or 
synecdochal narrative embedded in that act is tautologically 
representative of the larger body of discourse. Thus, this 
study treats King's "I Have a Dream" as representative of a 
larger body of civil rights discourse (that of the moderate 
wing of the first phase of the civil rights movement) and 
seeks the underlying representative anecdote (synecdochal 
narrative) which constructs the speech.
Drawing from Burke's own writings and other studies of 
Burke's concept of representative anecdote, Madsen (1990)
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posited three criteria for determining if an anecdote is 
representative: (1) human action and symbol use, (2) scope,
and (3) reduction (pp. 11-14). The first criterion is that 
the representative anecdote must reflect human action and 
choice instead of sheer motion or physical relationships 
(Conrad, 1964, p. 98). Since humans respond to symbols, a 
truly representative case of human motivation must be 
linguistic. This criterion eliminates nonsymbolic, 
deterministic, and mechanistic representations of human 
action such as conditioned reflex or a railway terminal, 
which Burke (1969a) rejects as representative anecdotes for 
human motives and communication respectively (pp. 59, 326- 
327). Secondly, the representative anecdote must possess 
scope, that is, it "must be supple and complex enough to be 
representative of the subject matter it is designed to 
calculate" (Burke, 1969a, p. 60). If an anecdote is to be 
truly representative of a larger constellation of discourse, 
it must faithfully reflect that discourse by incorporating 
"many or most of the terms or particulars of I that] 
discourse into its plot, dramatis personae, etc." (Brummett, 
1984b, p. 5). The third criterion of reduction requires that 
the anecdote must be synecdochic (Burke, 1969a, p. 326), in 
that it is a "microcosm" that represents the "macrocosm" of 
the larger discourse (Madsen, 1990. p. 13). It is a 
"summation" (Burke, 1969a, p. 60), a synecdochic 
substitution that contains the fundamental symbols of the 
essential dramatic conflict embodied in the larger discourse
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(Conrad, 1981, p. <i6 ) . The critic would relate "all 
incidents" of the discourse "to one organizing principle 
that prevails throughout the diversity of detail" [emphasis 
in original] (Burke, 1969a, p. 259).
King’s speech obviously meets the first criterion for 
representativeness in that it is a symbolic act. The second 
and third criteria are scope and reduction. The 
representative anecdote must have scope in that it is 
"supple and complex enough" to be representative of the 
entire discourse under study, yet it must also be reductive
"in that it is broadly a reduction of the subject matter"
(Burke, 1969a, p. 60). In other words, it must
synecdochically contain the essential elements of the
discourse. "I Have a Dream" serves well as a representative 
anecdote for the first phase of the civil rights movement. 
The speech is the summation of the movement’s goals 
articulated by its chief moderate spokesman. It is an 
extremely condensed piece of discourse which synecdochically 
presents the narrative of a nation founded upon the promise 
of freedom and democracy, the failure of the nation to live 
up to that promise "insofar as her citizens of color are 
concerned," and the future redemption of the nation through 
the extension of that promise to all its people. In other 
words, it symbolically enacts, from inception to resolution, 
the dramatic conflict between justice and injustice for 
African-Americans. The speech is a sociodrama between good 
and bad, with good winning in the end. Furthermore, the
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speech is a compact distillation of King's thought. There 
was actually very little new material in the "Dream" speech. 
As this study will demonstrate, the speech essentially 
restated ideas that were basic, recurring themes of King's 
rhetoric. These topoi . often in the same language, can be 
found in speeches and writings dating back as far as the 
beginning of King's public career (see chapter two). After 
examining King's speeches to various audiences over the 
course of his career, Lucaites and Condit (1990) concluded 
"that 'I Have A Dream' is truly representative of King's 
rhetoric" (p. 21, n. 7).
Guilt-Pur ificat ion-Redemotion
This study argues that the underlying message/form, the 
representative anecdote, of King's "I Have a Dream" speech 
is a symbolic enactment of Burke's guilt-purification- 
redemption drama. Burke's redemption drama is a secular 
version of the Christian drama of sinful humans achieving 
salvation through the atoning sacrifice of Christ. This form 
is especially applicable to the rhetoric and ideas of King, 
a Christian preacher who became a secular spokesperson.
Burke (1968a) noted that "form is a way of experiencing" in 
which the mind follows a process "amenable to it" (p. 143). 
Thus, "form is the creation of an appetite in the mind of 
the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite" 
(Burke, 1968a, p. 31). Therefore, the guilt-purification- 
redemption form allowed King to serve his ends of getting
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whites to accept equal justice for blacks by arousing their 
latent guilt and then providing them with a way to expiate 
that guilt. (King often spoke of the strategic importance of 
arousing the conscience of and establishing a sense of guilt 
in white America. See Clark, 1963, p. 42; M. L. King, 1986, 
p. 358.) It is an exchange in which whites provide socio­
economic justice for blacks in return for black absolution 
of white guilt. This exchange allows blacks to maintain 
dignity by giving something they have more of than whites 
(moral authority) for something whites have more of than 
blacks (socio-economic-political authority). King had 
adopted an idea common in Judeo-Christian thought, but 
especially salient for American blacks because of their 
shared experience of slavery and discrimination; that is, 
that the history of suffering and oppression endured by 
African-Americans had, in a sense, purified them, made them 
more morally virtuous than their oppressors, and had thus 
provided African-Americans with a Christ-like mission to 
redeem their oppressors (Cone, 1986, p. 26; Fullinwider, 
1969; M. L. King, 1958, p. 63; Oates, 1982, p. 290). (This 
theme is developed more fully in chapter four.) The motto of 
King's organization, the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC), was "To Redeem the Soul of America" 
(Fairclough, 1987, p. 32). King often said that the goal of 
the civil rights movement should be "redemption and 
reconciliation" (M. L. King, 1957a, p. 30; 1958, p. 102;
1986, p. 8), and his vision of the redeemed society, which
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he called "the beloved community," was "the organizing 
principle of all of King's thought and activity" (Smith and 
Zepp, 1974 , p. 119).
Burke's redemption drama is a much overlooked aspect of 
his dramatistic theory. Burke does not actually present the 
full-blown theory in toto anywhere in his writings, but 
aspects of the theory are spread throughout most of his 
major works. Foss, Foss, and Trapp (1985) brought together 
the strands of the theory in their overview of Burke's ideas 
(pp. 178-182), and Rueckert’s (198 2) study of Burke 
discussed the theory as well (pp. 46-47, 104-109, 133-134). 
Duncan's (1962) review of Burke's dramatistic theory 
contained a discussion of Burke's concept of redemption 
through victimage (pp. 121-135).
There have only been a few applications of the guilt- 
purif ication-redemption model. Eurke's (197 3) study of 
Hitler's Mein Kamof demonstrated how Hitler used the Jews as 
scapegoats in promising German redemption (pp. 191-220). 
Brummett (1981) has examined how certain Burkean modes of 
purification--scapegoating, mortification, and 
transcendence--are manifested in some examples of 
presidential campaign rhetoric. Elwood (1989) demonstrated 
how Philip Morris Magazine uses dramas employing victimage 
and mortification to purge smokers of their guilt over 
smoking. Mechling and Mechling (1983) argue that the anti­
sugar discourse of the 1970s moves through a pollution- 
guilt-purification-redemption scenario in which purification
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is effected through mortification and victimage. Only one 
study has applied this theory to the rhetoric of Martin 
Luther King. In her study of King's "Eulogy for the Martyred 
Children," a speech eulogizing the girls killed in the 
bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in 
Birmingham, Alabama only a few weeks after the March on 
Washington, Orr (1990) argues that King portrayed the girls 
as martyrs who died in a holy crusade, making their death an 
act of victimage for the purpose of redeeming the South and 
giving birth to a new order.
Generally, Burke's theory has been seen as offering two 
primary means of purifying guilt: victimage and 
mortification (Brock, 1980, p. 351; Foss, Foss & Trapp,
198 5, p. 180; Rueckert, 1982, p. 146). While Burke never 
says these are the only means of achieving purification, he 
usually cites one or the other as the means of absolving 
guilt, and often treats victimage and mortification as a 
pair (Burke, 1966, pp. 435, 478; 1970, pp. 190, 223, 248). 
Most of the studies reviewed above discuss redemption as 
taking place through victimage and/or mortification. Other 
Burkean means of symbolic purification--purification through 
transcendence and through images of change, movement, and 
dramatic catharsis--have been almost totally ignored by 
rhetorical critics. This study identifies King's use of 
purificatory images of change, movement, and dramatic 
catharsis, but the most important mode of purification in 
King's speech is transcendence. Therefore, one purpose of
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this study will be to develop and apply the theory of 
purification through transcendence.
Ma_t.aehsr.if. -A n alysis
One other critical method, metaphoric analysis, will 
also be employed. King's speech is dense in metaphor. In 
order to attain a proper understanding of the speech, and to 
see how King's choice of metaphors contribute to his larger 
dramatic enactment, his metaphors must be studied.
Therefore, chapter five uses contemporary metaphoric theory 
to analyze King's metaphors for the meaning they bring to 
the text and to demonstrate how they reinforce the guilt* 
purification*redemption form. Since an analysis of a social 
drama should seek to determine the role the discourse 
assigns to audience members as actors in the drama (Duncan, 
1968, pp. 161-162), I also employ the concept of "the second 
persona." In his essay on the second persona Edwin Black 
(1970) maintained that audiences "look to the discourse they 
are attending for cues that tell them how they are to view 
the world." A speaker's choice of metaphors can provide 
indications about the role the discourse provides for the 
audience (pp. 113, 119). An analysis of how King's metaphors 
constitute the audience as actors in the social drama of the 
civil rights movement will reveal a pattern of metaphorical 
meaning which reinforces King's use of transcendence and 
secular/religious mythology.
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Organization of the Study
Chapter One: Introduction. This chapter provides 
background information relevant to the study. The following 
matters are addressed in this chapter: (a) an overview of
the study; (b) the statement of the problem; (c) the review 
of the relevant literature; (d) the methodology used in the 
study; (e) the organization of the study; and (f) the 
significance of the study.
Chapter Two: Agent and Scene. This chapter describes 
the intellectual influences upon the agent, Martin Luther 
King, which are manifested in the act, the "I Have a Dream" 
speech. The section on agent also demonstrates how the ideas 
employed in the "Dream" speech were recurring themes 
employed by King since the beginning of his public career. 
The discussion of the scene examines the context in which 
the act took place by describing: (a) the historical scene;
(b) the intermediate scene; (c) the immediate scene.
Chapter Three: Act. This chapter commences the analysis 
of the speech itself as a redemption drama in which the 
audience’s pre-existent guilt is symbolically purified.
After discussion of the audiences addressed by, and the 
reaction to, the speech, the chapter describes how King's 
symbolic response to the scene takes the form 
(representative anecdote) of Burke's guilt-purification- 
redemption drama. The statistical and cluster analysis, and 
pentadic ratio analysis of the speech, are also here 
presented. Finally, the guilt phase of the redemption drama
26
is described through a discussion of Burke's theory of guilt 
and a demonstration of how pre-existent guilt is 
symbolically manifested in King's address.
Chapter Four: Purification and Redemption. This chapter 
discusses the methods by which King's speech symbolically 
purifies the audience of their guilt. It describes: (a)
purification through victimage and mortification; (b) 
purification through transcendence; and (c) purification 
through images of change, movement, and dramatic catharsis. 
Finally, the temporary state of redemption to which King has 
brought his audience is discussed.
Chapter Five: Metaphoric Analysis. This chapter 
analyzes King's metaphors to determine how his choice of 
metaphors help constitute the message/form of the speech. 
After a brief history of the theory of metaphor 
demonstrating the role of metaphor in meaning-creation, 
three metaphoric clusters are examined: (a) the
"check/promissory note" cluster; (b) the dark/light cluster; 
and (c) the "dream" cluster.
Chapter Six: Evaluation of the Theory of Guilt- 
Purification-Redemption. This chapter discusses what the 
study has revealed about the usefulness of the guilt- 
purif ication-redemption methodology. Here I: (a) analyze
Burke's theory of guilt; (b) consider what new information 
this study has provided about the Burkean modes of 
purification, and suggest what other modes of purification 
rhetorical scholars should look to develop and apply; and
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(c) examine how the guilt-purification-redemption model 
functions as a cultural form of experience.
Chapter Seven: Evaluation of "I Have a Dream" and Its 
Legacy. This chapter presents the findings of this study in 
regard to the significance and legacy of the "I Have a 
Dream" speech by explicitly addressing the questions asked 
earlier in this chapter.
Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Suggestions for Further 
Research. This chapter summarizes the findings of the study 
and presents suggestions for further research.
Significance of the Study
This study will be significant in two respects: the 
first methodological, the second historical-critical. First, 
while Burke's guilt-purification-redemption model has been 
partially developed and aspects of it have been applied, the 
model has not been fully developed and applied. Most studies 
concentrate on victimage and/or mortification as modes of 
purification. This study will examine other modes of 
purification indicated by Burke, but not developed by Burke 
or Burkean scholars. Purification through images of change 
and movement, and the purificatory effect of dramatic 
catharsis in rhetorical discourse, have not been examined by 
rhetorical scholars. In addition, the very common and 
significant rhetorical technique of transcendence has not 
received as much study as it deserves, nor has its use as a 
means of absolving guilt been fully explored.
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Secondly, this study will provide the first complete 
critical-inventional analysis of arguably the most 
influential speech of the civil rights movement. King's "I 
Have a Dream" speech has been widely praised, but not 
thoroughly examined. This study will reveal the sources of 
its effectiveness and assess King's rhetorical choices. 
Understanding the sources of this speech's effectiveness 
will increase our understanding of the rhetorical success of 
the first phase of the civil rights movement and aid in a 
comprehension of the speech's lasting impact on American 
culture. It will allow a critical evaluation of the ideas 
which proved so persuasive in ending legal segregation and 
securing long-denied basic civil rights for African- 
Americans , while providing an assessment of the long-term 
implications of those rhetorical choices.
Wenzel (1989) argues that rhetorical critics should not 
"stand in awe of a speech just because it occupies a 
prominent place on the canvas of history. Rather, we should 
endeavor to understand it and evaluate it on its own terms, 
as a response to a particular situation" (p. 179). This
study seeks to analyze the speech as a response to a 
particular historical-political situation, but also 
endeavors to understand why the speech has become iconized 
by being extracted from its historical-political context and 
turned into a mythic, and almost-sacred, text.
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NOTES
^-While form and content can be abstracted from one another 
for purposes of study, any thorough consideration of content 
necessarily entails a consideration of form. See Burke 
(1969b, p. 65) and Duncan (1962, p. 320).
2 A conference on the oratory of Martin Luther King, 
jointly sponsored by the Speech Communication Association 
and the King Center for Nonviolent Social Change, was held 
in Atlanta in 1988. The conference was titled, "The Power of 
the Spoken Word: The Oratory of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr." 
It included a symposium on the "Dream" speech, but the 
papers have not yet been published. My attempts to obtain 
copies of the papers dealing specifically with the "Dream" 
speech have met with little success because the papers are 
currently being edited for publication in book form by the 
University of Alabama Press. The published volume should 
appear in early 1993. I have obtained only one paper from 
this conference, Patton (1988).
CHAPTER 2
AGENT AND SCENE
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first 
section discusses Martin Luther King as agent. Here I will 
describe the major intellectual influences on King's 
thought. King's philosophy and theology developed from a 
merging of the black church tradition with white Protestant 
liberalism. The "I Have a Dream" speech reflects these 
influences. This section also demonstrates that much of the 
speech, especially the "dream" sequence, is a rearticulation 
of ideas King had been expressing since early in his public 
career. The second section, the discussion of scene, will 
describe the historical, intermediate, and immediate scene 
in which King's speech took place.
Agent--Intellectual Influences 
The. Black Church
Scholars' understanding of the sources of King's ideas 
has been undergoing revision of late (see, O'Brien, 1988). 
Most early studies of King's thinking (Ansbro, 1982; D.H. 
Smith, 1970; Smith & Zepp, 1974) emphasized the influence of 
Protestant 1iberalism--especially the social gospel and 
personalism that King was exposed to in his graduate studies 
at Crozer Theological Seminary and Boston University--and 
the influence of Gandhian nonviolence. However, more recent
30
31
scholarship has acknowledged the early and central role of 
the black Southern Baptist church tradition in shaping 
King's ideas (Baldwin, 1984-1985; Cone, 1984, 1986; Miller, 
1992). The later influences of liberal Protestant theology 
and western philosophy gave "respectable" intellectual 
underpinnings to a world-view first nurtured in the 
Biblically-based black church tradition, and gave King the 
vocabulary to translate black theology to white America 
(Garrow, 1986b; Miller, j.992, pp. 58-66).
Due to African-Americans' history of slavery and 
oppression, the black church has not developed a systematic 
theology as can be found in the white Christian tradition. 
Instead, black theology has been manifested in sermons, 
songs, and the stories of slavery and oppression (Cone, 
1984, p. 417). The central theme of black theology has been 
the hope of freedom and reconciliation into a community of 
goodwill (Cone, 1984; Garber, 1974-1975). King called this 
the "Beloved Community," saw it as synonymous with the 
Kingdom of God, and depicted it in his theme of the "dream" 
(Cartwright, 1989; Cone, 1986, p. 22; Zepp, 1989, pp. 207- 
220). The African-American religious tradition has also 
emphasized the dignity and worth of all human beings, and 
seen God as a personal and loving God who takes an interest 
in the plight of His children (Baldwin, 1984-19B5, pp. 98- 
101; also, see M. L. King, 1981, p. 83). When King 
encountered the social gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch and 
the theology of personalism in his graduate studies, he
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discovered the theological justification for the Beloved 
Community in the tradition of white Protestant liberalism. 
When combined with the American democratic tradition of 
equality, freedom, and justice, King's vision of the Beloved 
Community achieved a religious/secular synthesis with strong 
appeal to Americans of all races and religions.
The Social Gospel
King acknowledged the influence on his thinking of the 
social gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch (M. L. King, 1958, p. 
91; 1986, pp. 345-346). The social gospel was a reaction to
the stress on individual morality and redemption in orthodox 
American Protestantism of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Rauschenbusch argued that 
individualistic theology undervalued the social role and 
responsibility of religion. He taught that the Kingdom of 
God is collective, and that the individual is redeemed 
through participation in a redeemed and moral social order, 
which he termed the "beloved community" (Rauschenbusch,
1907, pp. 67-70; 1960, pp. 126-127). Rauschenbusch (1907)
stressed the importance of the Old Testament prophets as 
exemplars of this view of religion because of their emphasis 
on public, as opposed to private, morality, and their 
sympathy with the oppressed (pp. 1-44). The Old Testament 
prophets sought "the social redemption of the nation"
(Rauschenbusch, 1960, p. 24).
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King's speeches and writings abound with references to 
the prophets. He extolled Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Jeremiah 
for speaking out against injustice and oppression (Ansbro, 
198 2, p. 166). His favorite prophet was Amos, whose line 
"But let judgment run down as waters, and righteousness as a 
mighty stream" (Amos 5:24) King used often in his own 
speeches (1557b; 1963a; 1986, p. 216), including the "I Have
a Dream" speech. The "Dream" speech also incorporated a line 
from Isaiah (40:4) when King described his "dream that one 
day every valley shall be exalted, every hill and mountain 
shall be made low, the rough places will be made plain and 
the crooked places will be made straight, and the glory of 
the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it 
together" (1963d, p. 725-726). In his "Letter from 
Birmingham City Jail," King (1986) compared his own mission 
to that of the Old Testament prophets (p. 290). The 
influence of the idea of collective redemption permeates the 
"Dream" speech and is connected to the concept of the 
Beloved Community, which will be examined shortly, but 
earlier speeches by King also speak of the need for the 
"salvation of the world" (1957b) and the "salvation of our 
civilization" (1957a, p. 30).
Personalism
The other major school of thought from white Protestant 
liberalism which King embraced was personalism. King chose 
Boston University for his doctoral studies because with
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Edgar Brightman, Harold DeWolf, and others, it was the 
center for the study of personalism, to which King was 
initially exposed under George Davis at Crozer (Garrow, 
1986b, p. 12). Personalism holds that conscious personality 
is the supreme value and supreme reality in the universe.
The universe is seen as an organic whole, an interacting 
system of persons with the central and supreme personality 
being God. All persons are imperfect copies of the Supreme 
Personality, yet they have inherent dignity and worth 
because they participate in the ultimate reality of God 
(Ansbro, 1982, p. 287; Smith & Zepp, 1974, pp. 100-101).
Thus, the central tenet of personal ism--the intrinsic value 
of all individuals--King found attractive because it had 
consonance with and provided "intellectual" justification 
for the same theme in black theology (Garrow, 198 6b, pp. 12- 
13; Miller 1992, p. 62). King (1958) described personalism 
as his "basic philosophical position" and said that "it gave 
metaphysical and philosophical grounding for the idea of a 
personal God, and it gave me a metaphysical basis for the 
dignity and worth of all human personality" (p. 100).
Personalism provided King with the philosophical basis for 
his attack on segregation (Smith & Zepp, 1974, p. 106) and 
its influence is evident in King’s rhetoric. He told the 
audience at the First Annual Institute on Nonviolence and 
Social Change, "Whatever affects one directly affects all 
indirectly. We are all links in the great chain of 
humanity," (M. L. King, 1957a, p. 28); and in a 1961 speech
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he said: "All this is simply to say that all life is 
interrelated. We are caught in an inescapable network of 
mutuality; tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever 
affects one directly, affects all indirectly" (M. L. King, 
1986, p. 209; also, see M. L. King, 1981, p. 70). The same 
theme appears in the "Dream" speech, where King tells his 
followers that many white people "have come to realize that 
their destiny is tied up with our destiny. And they have 
come to realize that their freedom is inextricably bound to 
our freedom" (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 724). Because all human 
beings are related, life is social, and because all humans 
partake, although imperfectly, of the essence of a loving 
and moral God, they have the capacity for moral improvement. 
Thus, for the personalists the goal of human existence is 
the creation of a loving and moral society (Smith & Zepp, 
1974, pp. 107-114).
The Beloved CQjwnunity
The black religious tradition of the hope for freedom 
and reconciliation, the social gospel of Rauschenbusch, and 
the theology of personalism, all converged in King's concept 
of the Beloved Community. While King spoke of the Beloved 
Community often (M. L. King, 1957a, p. 30; 1958, p. 102; 
1986, p. B), he never defines it in detail. An early SCLC 
brochure simply states: "The ultimate aim of SCLC is to 
foster and create the 'beloved community* in America where 
brotherhood is a reality.... Our ultimate goal is genuine
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intergroup and interpersonal 1iving-- integration" [emphasis
in original] (This is SCLC. n.d.). Ansbro (1982) describes
King's concept of the Beloved Community as a society based
on agape (love) in all social relations, where
discrimination is excluded and each person is regarded in
the image of God (pp. 187-188). Cartwright (1989) states
that for King the Beloved Community is virtually synonymous
with the Kingdom of God and is depicted in the "dream" theme
(pp. 3-5). Smith & Zepp (1974) describe it as a "transformed
and regenerated human society" where "brotherhood would be
an actuality in every aspect of social life" (p. 120). They
claim that the Beloved Community is grounded in the
scriptural view of the millennial hope of the Kingdom of God
and was closely related to the American democratic ideal of
a nation of justice, equality, and freedom (pp. 125-131).
While King does not actually provide a definition of
the Beloved Community, it is depicted in numerous speeches
as the goal of the civil rights movement. In his 1956
address to the First Annual Institute on Nonviolence and
Social Change, King describes:
...a new world in which men will live together as 
brothers; a world in which men will beat their swords 
into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks; 
a world in which men will no longer take necessities 
from the masses to give luxuries to the classes; a 
world in which all men will respect the dignity and 
worth of all human personality (M. L. King, 1957a, p.
34 ) .
In a speech at the Highlander Folk School, King (1957b) 
spoke of the "dcgacn of the Fatherhood of God and the 
Brotherhood of Man" [emphasis added]. In what is apparently
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one of the earliest elaborations of the dream motif, in a
1960 speech to the National Urban League, King concluded by
calling upon his audience to work to rid the body politic of
.., this cancerous disease of discrimination which is 
preventing our democratic and Christian health from 
being realized. Then and only then will we be able to 
bring into full realization the dream of our American 
democracy--a dream yet unfulfilled. A dream of equality 
of opportunity, of privilege and property widely
distributed ... a dream of a land where men do not
argue that the color of a man's skin determines the 
content of his character ... the dream of a country
where every man will respect the dignity and worth of
all human personality, and men will dare to live 
together as brothers--that is the dream (M. L. King, 
1986, pp. 150-151).
In a 1961 commencement address at Lincoln University in
Pennsylvania, titled "The American Dream," King told his
audience:
I should like to discuss with you some aspects of the 
American dream. For in a real sense, America is 
essentially a dream, a dream as yet unfulfilled. It is 
a dream of a land where men of all races, of all 
nationalities and of all creeds can live together as 
brothers. The substance of the dream is expressed in 
these sublime words, words lifted to cosmic 
proportions: "We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that 
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness." This is the dream (M. L. King, 1986, p.
208 ) .
King was obviously evolving toward the wording of the 
dream sequence that would stir the nation at the March on 
Washington. He used the dream motif in wording similar to 
that in the 1960 National Urban League speech cited above, 
at a December 1961 speech before the AFL-CIO, and a July, 
1962 address at the National Press Club (M. L. King, 1986, 
pp. 105, 206). He used it again in Birmingham in April, 1963
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(Fairclough, 1987, p. 155). On June 23, 1963, at a Detroit
rally attended by 12 5,000 people, King spoke to the largest
crowd he had ever addressed at that time (Branch, 1988, p.
843). He employed much of the phraseology he would use later
that summer in his most famous speech, such as the "Now is
the time ..." refrain and the line about "transform[ing] the
dangling [sic] discords of our nation into a beautiful
symphony of brotherhood" (M. L. King, 1963a). In his
peroration King delivered his latest rendering of the dream
motif. This rendering is longer than, and lacks the succinct
vividness of the version delivered on August 28, but it
demonstrates how King was gradually refining this theme:
And so this afternoon, I have a dream. It is a dream 
deeply rooted in the American dream. I have a dream 
that one day, right down in Georgia and Mississippi and 
Alabama, the sons of former slaves and the sons of 
former slave owners will be able to live together as 
brothers.
I have a dream this afternoon, that one day ... that 
one day little white children and little Negro children 
will be able to join hands as brothers and sisters.
I have a dream this afternoon that one day, that one 
day men will no longer burn down houses and the church 
of God simply because people want to be free.
I have a dream this afternoon that there will be a day 
when we will no longer face the atrocities that Emmett 
Till had to face or Medgar Evers had to face. That all 
men can live with dignity.
I have a dream thi3 afternoon that my four little 
children ... that my four little children will not come 
up in the same young days that I came up within. That 
they will be judged on the basis of the content of 
their character, not the color of their skin.
I have a dream this afternoon that one day, right here 
in Detroit, Negroes will be able to buy a house or rent 
a house anywhere that their money will carry them and 
they will be able to get a job.
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I have a dream this afternoonI
I have a dream that one day "every valley shall be 
exalted and every hill and mountain shall be made low. 
The rough places will be made plain and the crooked 
places will be made straight, and the glory of the Lord 
shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it 
together."
I have a dream this afternoon that the brotherhood of 
man will become a reality in this day. And with this 
faith I will go out and carve a tunnel of hope through 
the mountain of despair. With this faith, I will go 
with you and transform dark yesterdays into bright 
tomorrows. With this faith we will be able to achieve 
this new day when all of God's children, black men and 
white men, Jews and Gentiles, protestants and 
catholics, will be able to join hands and sing with the 
Negro in the spiritual of old: "Free at last. Free at 
last. Thank God Almighty, we are free at last." (M. L. 
King, 1963a).
Vo ic e. .Merging
King had used the "Free at last" conclusion before 
(1986, p. 207, 216) and he would use it again in the "I Have
a Dream" speech. Miller (1988, 1989) says that the merging 
of scripture, song lyrics and excerpts from traditional 
sermons into one's own sermon was a common practice in the 
black folk pulpit tradition. We saw above that King often 
embedded scripture from Amos and Isaiah into his speeches.
He had merged Jefferson's most famous line from the 
Declaration of Independence, "We hold these truths to be 
self-evident ..." into his speeches before (1957b, 1986, p. 
208) and did so again in the "Dream" speech (1963d, p. 725). 
The use of song lyrics from "America the Beautiful" ("My 
country 'tis of thee ...") followed by the "Let freedom
to
ring" refrain which he uses near the end of "I Have a Dream" 
(1963d, p. 726), had also been used before by King (1957a, 
p. 34). Miller (198 9) points out that this was adapted from 
a similar peroration by Archibald Carey in an address to the 
1952 Republican National Convention (pp. 28-29).
SuMnary
King’s thinking reflected a merging of the ideas of the 
black church tradition with the theology of white protestant 
liberalism. In the theology of the social gospel and 
personalism he found the "intellectual justification" he 
needed to translate the African-American religious themes of 
freedom and reconciliation into the community, and the 
concept of God as a personal and loving Being who values the 
dignity and worth of each human being, into terms acceptable 
to white protestant America. These themes culminated in 
King's vision of the redeemed and integrated society, which 
he called the "Beloved Community." These ideas, as reflected 
in the "I Have a Dream" speech, were recurrent t.OEfii °f 
King's rhetoric going back to the beginning of his public 
career.
The Scene--March on Washington
The event at which King's "I Have a Dream" speech took 
place was the March on Washington on August 28, 1963. The 
March on Washington was a long-planned and much anticipated 
event which was the culmination of a series of civil rights
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activities that took place in the Spring and Summer of 1963, 
and which, in a larger sense, the civil rights movement had 
been working toward for years. It was probably the high 
point of the civil rights movement, as well as of King's 
career. Its overwhelming success in gathering several 
hundred thousand people, both black and white, for a 
peaceful demonstration for civil rights has marked it as a 
defining event of the movement, of which King's speech was 
the climatic moment. In order to put the event, and King's 
speech, into context I will describe the scene in three 
parts: (1) the historical scene, which briefly chronicles
the history and tradition of protest marches on the nation's 
capital, and outlines the history of marches in Washington 
for black civil rights prior to the 1963 march; (2) the 
intermediate scene, which describes the events of the Spring 
and Summer of 196 3 leading up to the March on Washington; 
and (3) the immediate scene, which describes the March on 
Washington itself in order to provide an understanding of 
the immediate setting in which King's speech took place.
The Historical Scene--Previous Marches
The tradition of exercising the constitutional "right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances" goes back to the 
earliest days of the nation. In 1783 unpaid soldiers marched 
to Philadelphia, at that time the nation's capital, to 
demand salaries due them from the fledgling and impecunious
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government. In 1894, a time of high unemployment and 
depression, Jacob Coxey led about 400 people from Ohio to 
Washington, D.C. to demand public works programs and a 
"legal tender" bill designed to put unbacked paper money 
into circulation. Mounted police dispersed the demonstrators 
and Coxey was jailed. Five thousand suffragettes marched 
down Pennsylvania Avenue in 1913, and in 1925 the Ku Klux 
Klan staged a march and held a ceremony at the Washington 
Monument in which 2 5,000 people turned out. In June of 193 2, 
during the Great Depression, the army was used to remove
20,000 World War I veterans, known as the Bonus Army, who 
refused to leave after descending upon Washington to demand 
Immediate payment of bonuses authorized by Congress in 1924, 
but not due until 1945. A series of smaller marches by the 
unemployed and hungry were staged in Washington over the 
next eleven months. In May of 1933 a second Bonus Army was 
received more warmly by the new Roosevelt Administration and 
left town without incident. The bonus payment was finally 
authorized in 1936 (Gentile, 1983, pp. 82-86),
The idea of using a march in the nation's capital to 
petition for the rights of African-Americans was the 
brainchild of A. Philip Randolph, the black labor leader. In 
September of 1940, Randolph, Walter White of the NAACP, and 
T. Arnold Hill of the National Urban League met with 
President Roosevelt to protest the segregation of blacks in 
the armed forces and the lack of access by blacks to most 
jobs in defense industries. After several months went by and
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it became apparent that the meeting had not produced any 
action on Roosevelt's part, Randolph began organizing and 
planning a march of 10,000 blacks down Pennsylvania Avenue 
to demand jobs in defense industries and integration of the 
armed forces. Encouraged by the favorable reaction of the 
black community, Randolph eventually raised his estimate to
100.000 marchers. Shocked and frightened by the prospect of
100.000 black people marching in the nation's capital, 
Roosevelt asked Randolph to call off the march. Randolph 
refused to do so without a tangible concession in return. 
Finally, Roosevelt issued an executive order creating the 
Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) which improved 
job opportunities for blacks in the defense industry. In 
return, Randolph called off the march, but the preparations 
for the march had aroused a sense of activism in the black 
community, leaving many discontented and charging that 
Randolph had "sold out." Randolph responded that the main 
goal of the march, jobs in defense industries, had been 
achieved and that the march was not really canceled, only 
"postponed." He told the black community that the threat of 
a march was "our ace in the hole" to make sure the 
government kept its commitment. To appease his critics and 
to keep the threat alive, Randolph formed the Harch on 
Washington Movement (MOWM) from the march organization he 
had built. The MOWM held a series of rallies and conferences 
around the country in the early forties, and although it did 
keep alive for a time the threat of a mass march on
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Washington, its activities subsided after 1943 and it died 
out by the late forties (Pfeffer, 1990, 45-55). The FEPC, 
which faced stringent opposition in Congress every year when 
it came up for renewal, was finally eliminated in 1946 
(Graham, 1990, pp. 9-14).
Although Randolph's plan for a huge march did not 
materialize until 1963, a series of smaller civil rights 
demonstrations took place in Washington in the late fifties. 
The first, the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom, was held at 
the Lincoln Memorial on May 17, 1957 to commemorate the 
third anniversary of the Supreme Court's Brown v s . Board of 
Education decision. It was organized by Randolph, King, and 
Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, all of whom spoke at the rally.
Its objectives were to protest violent resistance to 
integration in the South, protest legal harassment of the 
NAACP by some southern state governments, and to demonstrate 
support fox passage of the civil rights legislation, 
essentially a voting rights bill, then pending in Congress. 
Despite the sponsors' predictions that 50,000 to 7 5,000 
people would attend, only 15,000 to 25,000 showed up and the 
event garnered little media attention (Garrow, 198 6a, pp. 
92-94). The Prayer Pilgrimage is mainly remembered as a 
precursor to the much more successful March on Washington 
six years later, and as marking the ascension of King, whose 
"Give Us the Ballot" speech received the most enthusiastic 
response of the day, to national prominence as a civil
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rights spokesman on par with Randolph and Wilkins (Pfeffer, 
1990, p. 179). Although the event probably had little 
influence, Congress did pass the 1957 Civil Rights Act, but 
it was so watered down it had slight effect (Graham, 1990, 
p. 23). In October, 1958 the first Youth March for 
Integrated Schools was held; a second, which drew about
22,000 was held in 1959. King did not attend the first of 
these because he was recuperating from a stabbing incident 
which had occurred in Harlem in September of 1958, but he 
did address the 19 59 march, urging the youth to "Commit 
yourself to the noble struggle for equal rights. You will 
make a greater person of yourself, a greater nation of your 
country, and a finer world to live in" (M. L. King, 1986, p. 
2 2). Although these civil rights demonstrations of the late 
fifties had little substantive effect, Pfeffer (1990) argues 
that they did impress the white community with the peaceful 
and dignified manner in which they were handled and that 
they had a profound emotional impact on the participants who 
became excited with the potential of using mass marches to 
demonstrate for their rights (pp. 199-200).
In late 1962, in order to draw public attention to the 
need for more jobs for African-Americans and to call for a 
broad-based program to insure economic justice, Randolph 
began discussing the possibility of revising his march 
proposal of the 1940s. He asked Bayard Rustin, who had
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handled the details of organizing the marches in the late 
fifties, to prepare a memo outlining tentative plans for 
such an action. Initial plans called for a two-day "mass 
descent" upon Washington in June of 1963. On the first day, 
mass sit-ins would take place at Capitol Hill, blocking all 
normal Congressional business, while a smaller delegation 
visited the White House. Both Congress and the President 
would be presented with detailed legislative demands. On the 
second day a mass procession down Pennsylvania Avenue would 
be followed by a rally at the Lincoln Memorial. On March 23, 
1963, Randolph presented the plan to the executive board of 
his Negro American Labor Council (NALC), which readily 
approved it. During March and April Randolph and Rustin 
attempted to interest the other civil rights organizations 
in the plan and the march was rescheduled for October to 
allow time to gather support and make preparations. In order 
to obtain the participation of the more radical activists at 
SNCC and CORE, Rustin emphasized that there would be mass 
sit-ins designed to disrupt government business. This part 
of the plan was later jettisoned, prompting charges of a 
"sell-out" from more radical blacks such as Malcolm X and 
James Forman of SNCC (Forman, 1972, pp. 335-336; Malcolm X, 
1965, pp. 14-17). When Randolph contacted Nation Urban 
League director Whitney Young and the NAACP's Roy Wilkins 
about supporting the march, they both demurred because of 
their aversion to civil disobedience. King and the SCLC were 
also little interested at this time because they were
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preoccupied with the direct action campaign they had just 
begun in Birmingham, Alabama. Randolph and Rustin kept the 
plan on the front burner, but little progress was made that 
spring (Garrow, 1986a, pp. 266-767; Pfeffer, 1990, pp. 240- 
241) .
Although it is probably an exaggeration to say, as King 
did later, that "without Birmingham, the march on Washington 
wouldn't have been called" (M. L. King, 1986, p. 351), the 
Birmingham campaign in the Spring of 1963 did provide the 
momentum which propelled the civil rights organizations 
toward the March on Washington. It was Birmingham, more than 
any other event, that brought to the nations's attention 
what the media that year came to call "the Negro 
revolution." Lentz (1990) called Birmingham "the pivotal 
event of the black movement" (p. 294) that, along with the 
March on Washington, "stamped Martin Luther King as a symbol 
on the consciousness of America" (p. 75). Before Birmingham,
King was one of several major civil rights leaders. After 
Birmingham, he was, as a Newsweek poll found that summer, 
the top civil rights leader in the eyes of black America 
("The Big Man Is," 1963). Lentz (1990) argues that 
Birmingham and the March on Washington achieved such 
symbolic importance because the events reverberated against 
each other, providing the antithesis of confrontation and 
consensus, and the contrasting images of King as the moral 
leader with Bull Connor as the personification of evil (p.
76 ) .
Birmingham was the most carefully crafted direct action 
campaign King and the SCLC had undertaken to date. After the 
failure of the Albany campaign of 1961-1962* King and his 
aides realized that if their nonviolent direct action did 
not elicit violent over-reaction from police or sheriff's 
deputies, the media soon lost interest and public sympathy 
swung to the governmental authorities (Fairclough, 1987, pp. 
107-109; Garrow, 1978, pp. 2-3, 220-231; 1986a, pp. 216- 
217). Birmingham was chosen because it was a bastion of 
southern segregation, because the local leader, the Reverend 
Fred Shuttlesworth, had built a strong organization, but 
especially because Police Commissioner Eugene "Bull" Connor 
had a reputation for short-tempered violence.^ The campaign, 
which consisted of boycotts, sit-ins, demonstrations, and 
marches, commenced on April 3, but did not begin well for 
King and the SCLC. Many local leaders--both white and 
black--the national media, and the Kennedy Administration 
criticized the timing of the campaign. Because a new city 
government under the more moderate Albert Boutwell was due 
to soon take office, many felt the SCLC should wait and see 
if the new government would be willing to accept many of the 
SCLC’s demands without the need for demonstrations. Also, 
Connor, who was challenging Boutwell's election in court, 
showed uncharacteristic restraint by refraining from the use 
of violence when making arrests. After nine days of 
demonstrations with no tangible results, the spirits of 
local blacks began to sag and the media was losing interest.
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In an attempt to inspire his followers and ignite publicity. 
King defied a court injunction and led a march on Good 
Friday, April 12. He was in jail eight days, during which 
time he wrote the now-famous "Letter from Birmingham City 
Jail," although the letter received little notice at the 
time .
King's arrest temporarily rekindled interest, but by 
the end of April the demonstrators' spirits were sagging 
again and the campaign organizers were running out of people 
willing to march. By not using violence on the marchers 
Connor was depriving the movement of the drama it needed to 
generate publicity and sympathy. Finally, King made the 
crucial decision his aides had been urging upon him; he 
agreed to allow grade school and high school children to 
march. On Thursday, Hay 2, wave after wave of children left 
the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church heading toward downtown 
Birmingham. More than five hundred young marchers were 
arrested that day and the Birmingham campaign was back in 
the news. When hundreds more children marched on May 3, 
Connor made the fateful decision to use police dogs and fire 
hoses to break up the march. The photographs and television 
pictures of snarling police dogs and powerful fire hoses 
unleashed upon young black marchers seared the conscience of 
the nation and the world. The confrontation continued being 
played out in front of the cameras, and by Monday, May 6, 
more than 3,000 black people were in Birmingham jails--the 
largest number ever imprisoned at one time in the history of
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the movement--and thousands more were still demonstrating. 
Daily pictures of police brutality against black marchers 
were shocking the nation and winning widespread public 
sympathy for the civil rights movement. With its jails full 
and its national reputation disgraced, Birmingham's more 
moderate civic and business leaders called for 
accommodation. On May 8 the SCLC suspended its 
demonstrations and on May 10 a desegregation agreement was 
reached.
After the success of Birmingham, King was searching for 
a way to capitalize on the publicity and sympathy which had 
been generated for the civil rights movement. He was 
disappointed with President Kennedy's meager actions thus 
far in the area of civil rights. By the end of May King was 
discussing with aides the possibility of calling for a mass 
"March on Washington," which might include sit-ins on 
Capitol Hill, to pressure the President and Congress to act 
on the behalf of civil rights for African-Americans.
Impelled by the national outrage over Birmingham, and the 
wave of civil rights demonstrations across the country 
inspired by the Birmingham example, the Kennedy 
Administration was privately considering initiating civil 
rights legislation. Meanwhile, Alabama Governor George 
Wallace was threatening to disobey a court order requiring 
the admission of two black students to the University of 
Alabama. The Alabama crisis peaked on June 11 when Wallace 
made his famous, though largely symbolic, stand in the
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schoolhouse door. The president federalized the Alabama 
National Guard and Wallace stood aside when the commanding 
general ordered him to do so later that same day, and the 
black students were admitted. That evening, Kennedy went on 
national televison and announced that he would soon send to 
Congress a civil rights bill which included a public 
accommodations section. He told the nation that "We are 
confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the 
Scriptures and is as clear as the American Constitution .... 
Now is the time for this nation to fulfill its promise" 
(Heffner, 1985. pp. 330-331). The speech was Kennedy’s first 
clear and unequivocal call for the elimination of racial 
discrimination in America. It marked the beginning of the 
Federal Government's full-scale commitment to end 
segregation (Branch, 1988, pp. B16-624; Garrow, 1986a, pp. 
264-269; Goldzwig & Dionisopoulos, 1989, pp. 189-191).
King was extremely pleased with Kennedy's speech and 
decided that the thrust of the March on Washington should 
now be directed toward urging Congress to pass Kennedy's 
civil rights legislation. Since Randolph was still planning 
his march for jobs, King and Randolph decided to combine 
their two marches into one. On June 19 King and his advisers 
met with Randolph, Rustin, and representatives from SNCC and 
CORE, for the first group discussion of the March on 
Washington. The NAACP and the N U L , not yet on board, were 
not represented. Randolph's economic goals and King's 
broader civil rights objectives were merged by calling the
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event the "March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom" and it 
was decided to aim for a date between August 10 and 24, 
designed to coincide with the expected Senate filibuster of 
Kennedy's bill. The march was announced to the press on June 
21. The Kennedy administration, not pleased at the prospect 
of thousands of black protestors marching on Washington, 
summoned the black leadership to the White House for a 
meeting the next day. Kennedy tried to convince the leaders 
that a march might backfire by giving the impression that 
blacks were attempting to intimidate Congress. The black 
leaders responded by saying that the black masses were 
already in the streets demonstrating anyway, and that a 
peaceful march led by responsible leaders would be the best 
way to channel that legitimate discontent. The meeting ended 
with the black leadership holding firm and Kennedy still not 
fully convinced of the wisdom of the march (Garrow, 19 8 6a, 
pp. 269-272; Pfeffer, 1990, p. 244).
Public reaction to the planned march was less than 
enthusiastic. The nation was in the throes of the "Negro 
revolution" and there was widespread concern that a large 
march in the nation's capital might turn violent. Birmingham 
had spawned a wave of black activism across the nation that 
even some civil rights leaders worried might get out of 
control ("Worried Leaders," 1963). By one estimate, in the 
ten-week period after the Birmingham desegregation 
settlement on May 10, there were 7 58 racial demonstrations
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in 186 American cities resulting in 14,7 33 arrests (Branch, 
1988, p. 825). Many newspaper editorials criticized the 
planned march and a Gallup Poll found that 63% of all 
Americans had an "unfavorable" attitude toward it (Gentile, 
1983, pp. 42-43). Fueling the concern were reports of 
remarks such as those by the Reverend George Lawrence,
SCLC’s New York director, who said that a mass sit-in in 
Washington and a national campaign of civil disobedience 
would ensue if a filibuster against Kennedy's bill was 
attempted ("Threats: Negroes' Latest Weapon," 1963, p. 39). 
King and Randolph realized, however, that massive civil 
disobedience would be counterproductive to the goal of 
passing the civil rights bill. They also realized that the 
full support of the NAACP, the largest and richest civil 
rights organization, was essential if the march was to be a 
success, and that the NAACP's director, Roy Wilkins, would 
never go along with a plan for massive civil disobedience. 
For his part, Wilkins knew that with other major civil 
rights leaders such as King and Randolph involved, he and 
the NAACP would look bad if they did not participate. On 
July 2 the crucial meeting of "the Big Six"--King, Randolph, 
Wilkins, Whitney Young of the National Urban League, James 
Farmer of CORE, and John Lewis of SNCC--was held. In 
exchange for Wilkin's support the earlier plans for massive 
sit-ins were officially scrapped. The march was now a one- 
day affair, to be held on August 28. The leaders emerged 
from the meeting assuring the media that the march would be
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a peaceful and orderly event (Branch, 1988, pp. 847-848; 
Gentile, 1983, pp. 41-42).
The march was further legitimized when major labor and 
religious organizations were brought aboard. The "Big Six" 
became "the Big Ten" with the addition of Walter Reuther, 
President of the United Auto Workers, Dr. Eugene Carson 
Blake of the United Presbyterian Church, Rabbi Joachim 
Prinz, President of the American Jewish Congress, and 
Matthew Ahmann, Executive Director of the National Catholic 
Conference for Interracial Justice (Pfeffer, 1990, p. 245). 
Meanwhile, the Kennedy Administration, bowing to the 
inevitable, decided to cooperate with the march organizers 
to help assure a peaceful and orderly assembly that would 
not endanger the civil rights legislation. By mid-July the 
widespread concern over the march began to dissipate, and in 
a July 17 press conference the President publicly endorsed 
the march for the first time (Garrow, 1986a, p. 278).
By early August most of the post-Birmingham activism 
had abated as that energy was now being put into the 
preparation for the march. After a hectic eleven weeks of 
personal appearances and march planning, King took a ten-day 
vacation in mid-August to rest and begin work on his book 
about the Birmingham campaign (Fairclough, 1987, pp. 141- 
149; Garrow, 1986a, p. 280). In the days immediately 
preceding the march the television and print media gave it 
extensive pre-event publicity. Time . Newswee k . U . S . New & 
World Report. Life and most major newspapers carried
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prominent stories on the planned march, usually including a 
list of march demands, a schedule of the day's events, and a 
map showing the route the march would follow. The main march 
demands included passage of the civil rights bill, an end to 
segregation in the schools, and a federal program to train 
and employ all unemployed workers in "meaningful and 
dignified jobs at decent wages" ("The March in Washington," 
1963). The march received cautious endorsement from Life . 
the S t i s  7Dispatch, the New York Tim e s . and other
major publications. The Washington Post editorialized that 
the march would be "a great demonstration of the ways of 
democracy" and expressed "confidence that it will be 
remembered as an outpouring of good will, understanding and 
tolerance" ("Washington on Stage," 1963).
The Immediate Scene--August 28. 1963
Washington, D.C. on Wednesday, August 28, 1963 was
clear and sunny with a high temperature in the low eighties. 
Most government employees had been given the day off to 
avoid congestion. The sale of alcohol in the District of 
Columbia was banned for the day. Because of concerns about 
the possibility of violence, 1900 regular policemen were on 
duty and all leaves had been canceled for the other 1,000 
Washington police officers. Two thousand National Guardsmen 
were on duty in the area and the army was ready with 4,000 
troops at nearby Fort Meyer and another 15,000 paratroopers 
at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, if needed. In addition, march
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organizers had arranged for 2,000 civilian "marshals," most 
of them off-duty, black police officers from New York, to be 
present. Two Justice Department officials had direct control 
of the loudspeaker system. Unknown to march leaders, the 
officials had instructions to "pull the plug" should a riot 
ensue (Gentile, 1983, pp. 139, l(t7-149; "fill's Set for 
March," 1963).
Because it was one of the first major events 
transmitted live to Europe via the new Telestar satellite, 
the March on Washington received the most extensive world­
wide TV coverage ever afforded to that time. One thousand 
six hundred special press passes were issued, many to 
foreign correspondents, in addition to the 1,200 press 
passes already possessed by full-time Washington reporters. 
Thirty-five television cameras were employed to broadcast 
the event. CBS provided complete live coverage of the 
afternoon program at the Lincoln Memorial, with ABC and NBC 
providing periodic live reports and standing by to break in 
with live coverage as events warranted (Gentile, 1983, pp. 
201-202, 222-223).
That morning, while the march leaders called upon 
members of Congress, marchers gathering at the Washington 
Monument were entertained by a program that included Joan 
Baez, Bob Dylan, and Peter, Paul and Mary. Impatient to 
begin, the marchers left ten minutes ahead of schedule for 
the walk to the Lincoln Memorial and the march leaders had 
to be rushed to the scene to "lead" the march for the
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cameras. Estimates of the total attendance for the event 
ranged from 200,000 to <*00,000 people, about one-fourth of 
whom were white (Gentile, 1983, pp. 202-206, 229-230; Lewis, 
197 B , p. 224).
Shortly after 1:00 p.m. the official program began with 
Camilla Williams singing the national anthem, followed by 
the invocation by the Very Reverend Patrick O'Boyle, 
Archbishop of Washington. Each of the ten main speakers of 
the day was asked to limit his remarks to eight minutes in 
order to keep the program on schedule (all of the main 
speakers were male, although in a compromise with female 
civil rights activists, the organizers agreed to a segment 
of the program in which several prominent women in the 
movement would be introduced and allowed to briefly stand 
and acknowledge applause). The first speaker of the 
afternoon was Randolph. Stressing the economic theme, he 
told the crowd: "We are the advance guard of a massive moral
revolution for jobs and freedom," and demanded "new forms of 
social planning to create full employment" ("Excerpts from," 
1963). Reverend Dr. Eugene Carson Blake of the National 
Council of Churches criticized American churches for not 
coming out more forcefully in favor of black civil rights. 
John Lewis's speech "sent an electric charge" through the 
crowd (D. H. Smith, 1964, p. 193). Lewis, whose speech was 
toned down after O'Boyle and others objected to some of the 
harsh language in his prepared remarks, still gave the most 
incendiary speech of the day. He said that he supported the
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civil rights bill, but "with great reservations" because it 
did not do enough. He told his listeners that "we are 
involved in a serious social revolution" and urged them to 
"get in and stay in the streets ... until the unfinished 
revolution of 1776 is complete." He closed by promising 
that:
If we do not get meaningful legislation out of this 
Congress, the time will come when we will not confine 
our marching to Washington. We will march through the 
South.... By the force of our demands ... we shall 
splinter the segregated South into a thousand pieces 
and put them back together in the image of God and 
democracy. Wake up, America! (Forman, 197 2, pp. 336- 
337 ) .
Walter Reuther's speech drew crowd approval when he 
declared his support for civil rights "as a matter of human 
decency, as a matter of common morality." He said the rally 
was "the beginning of a great moral crusade to arouse 
America to the unfinished work of American democracy" (D. H. 
Smith, 1964, p. 194; Congressional Record. 1963, p. 16229). 
Roy Wilkins urged Congressional approval of the civil rights 
bill and stressed the need to include "an FEPC bill as part 
of the package" (Congressional Record. 1963, p. 16229). It 
was after 3:00 p.m. when Wilkins finished and the long, hot 
day was beginning to take its toll on the crowd as many 
began to drift back to the buses that had brought them, but 
gospel singer Mahalia Jackson's rendition of "I've Been 
'Buked and I've Been Scorned" reinvigorated the gathering 
(Gentile, 1983, p. 239). The lyrics of her spiritual helped 
set the stage for King's redemption drama:
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I'm gonna tell my Lord 
when I get home 
just how long you've 
been treating me wrong ...
I've been 'biiked and I've been scorned
Trying to make this journey all alone.
The next speaker, Rabbi Prinz, was the last before
King, who was scheduled to give the final speech of the day.
Prinz spoke of "the shame and disgrace of inequality and
injustice which make a mockery of the great American idea"
and identified the Jewish experience with the black
experience fCongressional Record. 1963, p. 16228). After
Prinz had finished, some in the crowd, knowing from their
program that King would be next, began to chant, "Martin
Luther King, Martin Luther King." King, introduced by
Randolph as "the moral leader of our nation," received a
one-minute ovation from the crowd. ABC and NBC had cut away
from regular afternoon programming to join CBS in live
coverage of King's speech. After the applause died down,
King began speaking from his prepared text (Branch, 1988, p.
B81; Gentile, 1983, p. 2(*0).
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NOTE
1The account of the Birmingham campaign in this and the 
following paragraph is taken from: Branch <1988, pp. 7 25- 
786); Garrow (1986a, pp. 236-266); Fairclough (19B7, pp. 
111-136); and Oates (1982, pp. 215-238).
CHAPTER 3 
ACT
This chapter is divided into five sections which 
examine the following: (1) the audiences addressed by and
the response to King's address; (2) an introduction to 
Burke's concept of a "redemption drama" and an explanation 
of how the term "redemption" is used in this study; (3) the 
analysis of the dramatic alignment of the speech; (4) the 
pentadic ratio analysis of the speech; and (5) Burke's 
theory of guilt and how guilt is symbolically manifested in 
King's address.
Audience and Response 
As the leader of the most "conservative" of the direct 
action civil rights organizations, King occupied the "vital 
center" of the civil rights movement (Meier, 1965, p. 56).
In his "Letter from Birmingham City Jail," King acknowledged 
his position in the strategic middle when he wrote: " ... I
stand in the middle of two opposing forces in the Negro 
community. One is the force of complacency .... the other 
force is one of bitterness and hatred, and comes perilously 
close to advocating violence" (M. L. King, 1966, p. 296). To 
King's left stood the more radical young activists at SNCC 
and CORE who thought King overly cautious, and to their 
left, others--represented chiefly by the Black Muslims and
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Mai colm X--who advocated even more rapid change through 
forceful and sometimes violent tactics. To King's right 
stood not only the older, more established civil rights 
organizations--the NAACP and the National Urban League--but 
most of white America. By 1963 "massive resistance" to 
desegregation had largely broken down, and the issue had 
become one of the proper timing of the steps toward 
integration, with white moderates advocating a policy of 
"gradualism" (see Cox, 1989, pp. 184*187). Thus, King in 
addressing a national audience was really addressing two 
major audiences with conflicting viewpoints. He had "to 
persuade whites that they should not countenance gradualism 
and to persuade blacks that they should not pursue radical 
change" (Hariman, 1989, p. 210).
That King had these two audiences in mind is clear from 
his prepared remarks which emphasized America's long overdue 
obligation to her black citizens, while cautioning blacks 
against extremism and violence (see M. L. King, 1963b).
From his prepared text, King spoke on the theme of America's 
failure to live up to its "promissory note" to provide "the 
unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness" to its people of color. He stressed "the fierce 
urgency of now" and warned against the "tranquilizing drug 
of gradualism." Then, turning to his black audience, King 
cautioned African-Americans not to resort to hatred and 
violence in their struggle to gain their legitimate rights: 
"In the process of gaining our rightful place we must not be
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guilty of wrongful deeds. Let us not seek to satisfy our
thirst for freedom by drinking from the cup of bitterness
and hatred" (M. L. King, 1963b; 1963d, p. 724). While King's
prepared remarks address his two major audiences separately,
his extemporized remarks, the words he uttered from the
"dream" sequence to the end of the speech, unite those
audiences by transcending their differences. As he was
nearing the end of his prepared speech, caught up in the
crowd response to his words. King abandoned his script and
extemporized the words which electrified the crowd and
forever stamped him as a national symbol (Branch, 1988, p.
88 2; Garrow, 1986a, p. 283; D. H. Smith, 1964, p. 221).
It is reported that some people were crying at the
conclusion of King's address ("Biggest Protest March," 1963;
D. H. Smith, 1964, pp. 223-224). One participant described
his response this way:
... it just seemed to move you off the platform, off 
the earth .... Dr. King brought to life the hope that 
someday we could walk together hand in hand .... It was 
a matter of being inspired and moved. It was an awfully 
sentimental and spiritual experience for me (Hampton & 
Fayer, 1990, p. 168).
The speech was widely commented upon and excerpted in news
accounts of the march. In the New York Time s . James Reston
(1963) wrote that until King spoke "the pilgrimage was
merely a great spectacle", but King "brought them alive with
a peroration that was an anguished echo from all the old
American reformers" (p. 1). Marquis W. Childs (1963),
writing in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. said that King’s
speech "rose above mere oratory to a moving peroration of
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what the future can mean for an America that has wiped out 
the hatred of race prejudice" (p. 20 D). Eugene Patterson 
(196 3) of the Atlanta Constitution praised King's powerful 
"vision of brotherhood and plenty" (pp. 1, 14).
The long-term assessment of the speech has marked it as 
"one of history's greatest public addresses" (O'Brien, 1988, 
p. 49). Leff (1987) calls it "an established classic." 
Boulware (1969) compares its significance to Lincoln's 
"Gettysburg Address" and William Jennings Bryan's "Cross of 
Gold" speech (p. 252). Osborn (1990) said that the speech 
"continues to satisfy requirements of both enduring artistry 
and intensity of immediate effect."
Redemption Drama
What accounts for this speech's immediate effect on the 
audience and its long-term impact on American culture? I 
contend that it is chiefly because the speech is a symbolic 
enactment of a redemption drama, in which ontological human 
guilt, and especially white America's guilt over racism, is 
symbolically purged. The speech is spoken of by many as a 
"spiritual experience" (Hampton & Fayer, 1990, p. 168) or an 
"emotional catharsis" (Spillers, 1971, p. 22). D. H. Smith's 
(1964) remark that the speech "brought about a mass 
catharsis .... the guilt of oppression and the yoke of 
subjugation were released in a torrent of passion and tears" 
(pp. 224-225), summarizes the point; but neither he, nor any
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other rhetorical critic, has developed that thesis to
demonstrate how the speech achieves this effect.
Before fully developing that thesis it is necessary to
briefly introduce Burke's concept of a "redemption drama"
and explain how the term "redemption" is being used in this
study. The process of guilt-purification-redemption is
pivotal to Burke's theory of dramatism and symbolic action.
It is a secular version of the Christian view of the soul's
journey from hell to purgatory to heaven. For Burke, guilt-
purif ication-redemption is a constantly repeating symbolic
ritual which responds to an archetypal need in humans as
symbol-using animals (Burke, 1970, pp. 4-5, 223; Foss, Foss
& Trapp, 1985, pp. 178, 182; Rueckert, 1982, pp. 46-47, 128,
133). Rueckert (1982) notes that in Burke's theory of
symbolic action:
The three main archetypal clusters are pollution (hell) 
[or guilt], purification (purgatory), and redemption 
(heaven). The movement from the first to the last 
through purification constitutes the pattern of the 
rhetoric of rebirth and is the prime function of 
symbolic action .... no symbolic act is complete unless 
it contains images of all three clusters in the pattern 
(p. 104).
That King would employ a rhetoric of redemption in his 
appeal to the nation is hardly surprising considering that 
he was a Christian preacher. In chapters one and two it was 
shown that the themes of redemption and reconciliation-- 
embodied in the concept of the "beloved c o m m u n i t y - w e r e  
central to King's thinking. He often said that the goal of 
the civil rights movement was to "save the soul of America" 
(Downing, 1986, p. 4; Vivian, 1970, p. 98). By employing the
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•term "redemption" in this study, I am using it in both its 
religious and secular senses. The word originally comes from 
the Latin verb redimere. meaning to buy back or repurchase 
something one formerly possessed. As the word has evolved 
over the centuries it has come to have both a religious and 
a secular meaning. In a religious or spiritual sense 
"redeem" means to deliver or save one's soul from the 
consequences of sin (as Christ did for humanity). In a 
secular sense "redeem" has been used in several senses, 
ranging from the act of freeing someone from a charge or 
claim to the act of atoning or making amends for past wrongs 
(Qjtf.ox4...JLnslish.J3..i.ctJLQiiary, 1989, Vol. 13, p. 410). In 
King’s thinking, as in black religion in general, 
"redemption" is often employed in a sense which contains 
both its religious and secular meanings simultaneously.
This dual nature of redemption as both this-worldly and 
otherworldly was a chief tenet of black religion (Cone,
1984, pp. 213-214; Miller, 1992, pp. 35, 40). It was based 
on the argument that human beings have both a physical and 
spiritual nature. Since we are physical beings, we are 
eligible for this-worldly liberation from oppression, and 
since we are spiritual, we are eligible for otherworldly 
salvation (Miller, 1992, p. 74; also, see M. L. King, 1981, 
p. 18). King was the inheritor of a black religious 
tradition in which spiritual and secular redemption were 
seen as different sides of the same coin, and his thinking 
reflects this intermingling of the religious with the
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secular (Henry, 1987, pp. 328-329). For King, the secular is 
suffused within the spiritual order, so there is no 
contradiction or tension between religious redemption and 
secular redemption. He believed that the religious and the 
social realms were interdependent (Hanigan, 197U, p. 88). 
King's rhetoric reflects an often ambiguous and murky 
synthesis of the spiritual with the secular. This ambiguity, 
this sliding back and forth between the spiritual and 
secular realms, infuses the secular within the spiritual 
(see chapter four) and gives King's rhetoric broad power and 
appeal, as exemplified in the "Dream" speech. Lucaites and 
Condit (1990) argue that the "Dream" speech merges 
Christianity with American secular mythology (pp. 15-17).
But this melding also produces a weakness and limitation 
because it redefines political issues in spiritual terms. It 
allows King to elide social complexities through appeal to 
religious imagery and secular mythology.
By appealing to the need for national, secular 
redemption, King was invoking a very potent national myth. 
America's central myth is its conception of itself as a 
chosen people, a new nation with a God-given mission to 
redeem the world by providing a refuge of freedom, 
democracy, and opportunity (Jewett, 1973, p. 9; Merk, 1963,
pp. 3-5, 261-266; Robertson, 1980, pp. 25-26, 122). Jewett 
and Lawrence (1988) argue that while the traditional 
"monomyth" of other cultures is based on rites of initiation 
and passage, the American "monomyth" is a secularized
68
version of the Judeo-Christian redemption drama (p. x i i ). 
Duncan (1962) claims that "the Christian drama of man's fall 
and redemption is the most powerful [social drama] produced 
thus far in our society" (p. 320). King's use of a 
redemption drama not only allowed him access to the powerful 
Christian symbolism of salvation, but also allowed him to 
merge that with the potent American mythology of secular 
redemption.
The need for redemption takes the form of a drama 
because any "principle of social order must be personified 
in some kind of dramatic action if it is to be 
comprehensible to all classes and conditions of man"
(Duncan, 1968, p. 64). As Metz (1977) points out, Christian 
soteriology (the theology of redemption) does not function 
as interpretation and argumentation, but as narrative (pp. 
332-333). Thus, King's representative anecdote (synecdochal 
narrative) in the "Dream" speech is a redemption drama in 
which a nation that has failed to live up to its promises is 
redeemed through the fulfillment of its creed. However, as 
we will see in the analysis, King elides the 
secular/religious distinction of redemption. That is, in 
King's discourse it is ambiguous whether that fulfillment is 
in the socio-political, this-worldly sense, or the 
spiritual-eschatological, otherwordly sense. King's rhetoric 




As noted in chapter one, this study adopts Conrad's
(1964) approach to the process of dramatistic criticism 
which involves three steps: (1) a statistical analysis of
terms involving an inductive search for the dramatic 
alignment of the work; (2) the search for the representative 
anecdote; and (3) pentadic analysis. I have already 
identified the representative anecdote, and most of the 
remainder of the study explains how that anecdote functions 
in the rhetoric of King's address, but first it is necessary 
to explicate the other two steps in the process.
The search for the dramatic alignment of a work 
requires a cluster-agon analysis. While Burke never 
summarizes this method in one place, it has been developed 
by others (see Berthold, 1976; Rueckert, 1962, pp. 83-111). 
To do a cluster analysis one selects the key term in the 
discourse being studied based on frequency and intensity of 
use. This is the speaker's ultimate "god-term." Then the 
critic looks for what term or terms go with that term, or 
cluster about it (Berthold, 1976, pp. 302-303; Rueckert,
1982, pp. 83-84). The ultimate god-term in King's "Dream" 
speech is "freedom." The word "freedom" appears twenty 
times, and the word "free" four times, in the speech. King 
opens the speech by stating that the purpose of the "act" 
(i.e., the March on Washington, and thereby the speech 
itself) is "freedom": "I am happy to join with you today in 
what will go down in history as the greatest demonstration
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fox_j£r&edo.(fl in the history of our nation" [emphasis added] 
(M. L. King, 1963d, p. 723). In his closing sentence. King 
uses the word "freedom" twice and the word "free" three 
times. (In my later analysis of transcendence I will examine 
how King's use of the word "freedom" evolves throughout the 
speech, but for now I only want to indicate the basic 
dramatic alignment of the work.) The main term which King 
clusters with'"freedom" is "justice," which he uses seven 
times, as when he speaks of "the riches of freedom and the 
security of justice" (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 724). The terms 
"freedom" and/or "justice" are also clustered with the terms 
"rights," "equality," and "democracy. 1
To discern the forces of opposition the critic must 
perform an agon analysis to go along with the cluster 
analysis (Berthold, 1976, p. 303). Burke says that in 
searching for dramatic alignment, we should should look for 
"What is vs. what." A drama, or agon, will contain the 
"principles," a "protagonist" and "antagonist," and the 
"satellites" or "adjuncts" associated with the principles 
(Burke, 1973, pp. 69, 76). The cluster analysis revealed 
that King's ultimate god-term is "freedom." Thus, the 
protagonist in King's drama is "freedom" and its satellite 
terms are "justice," "equality," "democracy," and "rights." 
While there is not one overall devil-term that King uses 
extensively as the antagonist, "freedom" and "justice" are 
obviously in conflict with the cluster of antagonistic terms 
"injustice" (used three times), "segregation" (used twice),
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"discrimination" (used once), and "vicious racists" (used 
once). Thus, the protagonists, the god-terms of "freedom" 
and "justice," are in conflict with the antagonists, the 
devil-terms of "injustice," "discrimination," and "racism," 
for the soul of America. (The cluster-agon analysis is taken 
up at greater length in chapter four where it is used to 
demonstrate King's methods of purification through 
transcendence and dramatic catharsis.)
Pentadic Ratio Analysis 
In pentadic ratio analysis the critic goes beyond 
identifying the parts of the pentad in the discourse under 
study, to identifying interrelationships between pentadic 
terms to demonstrate how an element or attribute of one term 
is "implicitly or analogically" present in another (Burke, 
1968b, p. 446). For example, if a rhetor employs a "scene- 
act ratio" then he or she is positing that a certain scene 
implies or calls for a certain act in response (Burke,
1969a, p. 3). Following the Burkean practice of conceiving 
of ratios in pairs (scene-act, scene-agent, act-purpose, 
act-agent, etc.; see Burke, 1969a, p. 15) we could say that 
in the "I Have a Dream" speech King employs a scene-act 
ratio in which the scene --described in the first half of the 
speech as an America that has failed to provide racial 
justice--implies the need for a certain act--national 
redemption. However, redemption is really a purpose which 
requires or implies that an act of purification has taken
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place. Thus, in this case conceiving of the ratio as a triad 
better fits the discourse under study, and corresponds to 
the three elements of the redemption drama. Guilt, 
purification, and redemption all imply one another. Guilt 
implies the need for redemption, which takes place through 
some process of purification. So in this case the pentadic 
ratio is a triad in which the scene of an America blighted 
by racial injustice (guilt) calls for an acJt of purification 
for the purpose of redemption. Thus, we have a triadic 
pentadic ratio which corresponds to the representative 
anecdote (synecdochal narrative) of this speech:
Pentadic Ratio scene act purpose
Narrative Form guilt purification redemption
This schematic representation of the structure of the speech 
will be expanded upon and added to in later chapters in 
order to integrate the analyses provided in chapters four 
and five.
To be an effective rhetorical pattern the logic of this 
particular scene-act-purpose relationship must be shared by 
the audience. I maintain that the guilt-purification- 
redemption model is an inter-subjective social/cultural form 
which was common property in the Judeo-Christian America of 
1963. It is, in other words, a "constitutive practice." 
Extending Searle's notion of "constitutive rules"--rules 
inseparable from the behavior they govern--Taylor (1985) 
argues that there are also constitutive "practices" which
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are inseparable from the language we use to describe them 
(pp. 34-35). Thus, a concept, i.e. guilt, must be embedded 
in a larger structure of language and culture by which we 
agree upon what one should feel guilty about and how one 
should react to a sense of guilt (see Taylor, 1985, p. 23- 
24). Therefore, in a Judeo-Christian culture, if there is 
guilt (sin), there is a need for redemption, and to achieve 
redemption, there must be some process of purification (see 
Burke, 19 70, pp. 4-5). Thus, in the context of the civil 
rights movement, one must consider the range of meanings 
available to a rhetor in a Judeo-Christian culture such as 
the America of 1963. If racism is immoral (sinful), then 
there is by the logic of the cultural practice--the 
"constitutive" practice--a need to make up for (redeem) that 
sin; and if there is a need for redemption, then there is a 
need for some process of purification or cleansing of that 
sin and its accompanying guilt. Thus, in Burke's terms, King 
employs a "scene-act-purpose ratio" in which the scene--an 
America blighted by the sin of racial injustice--cal1s for a 
particular act--the purification of that guilt--in order to 
achieve a certain purpose--racial reconciliation and the 
social redemption of the nation. As was argued above, the 
myth of America's redemptive role in history is the central 
American myth. King's speech had such immediate impact and 
long-term appeal because he effectively exploits this basic 
(and implicit) cultural attitude. As Iteik (1957) has noted.
7 it
"the guilt feeling of a group, of a nation, or of all 
nations need not be conscious to unfold tremendous effects" 
(pp. (*0-41),
Guilt
In this section, after explaining Burke's theory of 
guilt, I will demonstrate that King himself was aware of, 
and often spoke of, the need to arouse a latent sense of 
guilt in white America in order to overturn segregation.
Then I will illustrate how guilt is manifested in King's 
"Dream" speech, thus setting the stage for the symbolic 
purification of that guilt, which will be discussed in 
chapter four.
Burke's Theory of Guilt
In Burke's theory, guilt is ontological, due to humans' 
symbol-using nature. Human symbol-using capacity results in 
the creation of hierarchy, the idea of the negative, and the 
concept of perfection, all of which lead to guilt. According 
to Burke, language inevitably leads to the development of 
some type of social order, i.e. hierarchy. In a 
differentiated social structure, guilt about one's place in 
the structure will arise. Those higher up in the hierarchy 
will feel guilty about their privilege, while those lower 
down will feel guilty that they have not risen higher.^ 
Language also allows humans to create the concept of the
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negative, the idea that there are certain things one should 
not do. Any social order will thus create hundreds of 
"thou-shalt-nots." But no one i3 capable of upholding all of 
the rules of the social order, and in some way will fail or 
disobey. Failure and disobedience--the "fall of man" in the 
archetypal religious motif--results in guilt.2 And finally, 
according to Burke, symbol use contains within itself an 
inevitable perfectionistic tendency, in which the symbol- 
users strive toward the creation of terms designating 
ultimate states of perfection. But since humans will 
inevitably fall short of their notions of perfection, guilt 
ensues.3
The fact that humans feel guilt initiates the guilt- 
purification-redemption cycle. Guilt creates the need for 
redemption, and purification is any means through which 
redemption is achieved. Since guilt is inherent in human 
nature, redemption is never permanent. Thus, there is a 
never-ending need in humans for symbolic purification and 
the ritual of rebirth is an ever-repeating cycle (Burke,
1970, pp. 223, 231). Although the concept of "guilt" is
crucial in Burke's theory, he never actually defines the 
term. However, we can get a good sense of what he means by 
"guilt" from the way he uses the term--that is, by seeing 
what terms he clusters with guilt and uses as synonyms for 
guilt--and by what he speaks of as requiring redemption. 
While Burke's concept of guilt contains the usual meaning of 
the term as a sense of responsibility or shame for having
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done wrong, he extends the parameters of the concept. For 
Burke, guilt is a sort of ontological human sense of 
anxiety, a feeling of separation from others, or the failure 
to live up to standards imposed by self and society. Burke 
speaks of guilt in terms of "anxiety" (1970, p. 236); "sin" 
(1966, pp. 15, 144; 1970, pp. 112, 176, 1B1, 222, 228);
"disobedience" (1970, pp. 176, 242); "differentiation"
(1966, pp. 15; 1970, p. 202); and "disorder" (1970, pp. 190,
242). Foss, Foss, and Trapp (1985) state that in Burke's 
system other words for guilt are "anxiety," "social 
tension," and "embarrassment" (p. 178). Duncan (1962)
describes Burke's concept of guilt as a situation of 
"profound social disrelationship" which "arises out of 
negation of the principles of social order" [emphasis in 
original]; or, in other words, it is the "sin of 
disobedience" to the social order (p. 121).
In sum, Burke's theory is that guilt ontologically 
arises out of humans' nature as symbol-using animals, and 
thus there is need for expiation of our guilt to achieve a 
state of guiltlessness (redemption), which is nonetheless 
temporary. The idea that guilt is an inherent aspect of 
human nature which requires rituals of purification is not 
unique to Burke. The notion that guilt is ontological, or at 
least that it is a significant factor in human motivation, 
is shared by many other scholars. Reik (1957) argues that 
guilt feeling is common to humankind and that a universal 
sense of guilt or a similar idea appears in the works of
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Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Heidegger,
Shakespeare, Dostoevski, Tolstoi, Sartre, Faulkner, and 
others, and in theological terms, as sin, in religions from 
ancient times to today (pp. <tl-(t3). Carroll (198 5) argues 
that guilt is "the essence of humaneness," and that it is 
through sublimation of guilt that people create a culture. 
Therefore, he maintains, it is necessary for a culture to 
provide means for individuals to "sublimate" their guilt in 
socially constructive ways (pp. 1, 139-167). Buber (1965)
urges psychotherapists to understand the "ontic character" 
of guilt, "whose place is not the soul but being" (p. 123). 
The confession of guilt in a public and socially prescribed 
manner can lead to a type of "reconciliation," which Buber 
terms "illumination" (p. 137). The need to expiate guilt is
not unique to western Judeo-Christian culture. In The.. Gp.lden 
Bough. Frazer (1911-1915) cites numerous examples of rites 
of purification and expiation across many different 
cultures. Perera (198 6) writes that the scapegoat 
phenomenon, a common mode of purification, is almost 
universal (p. 9), and that the various "atonement and 
riddance-of-evil ceremonies" found in many cultures are 
attempts "to excise the evils that afflict mankind, whether 
these be death, disease, violence ... or the sense of sin 
and guilt that accompanies knowledge of transgressions of 
the moral code" (p. 11).
Burke is the only theorist I am aware of who finds the 
source of guilt in language, but Buber's analysis of why
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humans feel guilt is instructive. Buber (1965) argues that 
to understand the human "capacity and tendency" for guilt, 
one must bear in mind that man is the only creature that 
separates himself not only from his environment, but also 
from himself--he thus becomes a "detached object" about 
which he can reflect and condemn (p. 134). Buber leaves it
at that, but a Burkean would argue that Buber fails to 
recognize that humans have this capacity to separate 
themselves from themselves--to objectify themselves--because 
th$y have, the capacity fc>r larigusge. It is only because we 
have the capacity to speak of the self linguistically 
(objectify the self), and measure that self against 
linguistic constructs known as rules or norms of behavior, 
that we can feel a sense of failure. It is only because our 
language allows us to create a hierarchy of values, and to 
establish ethical norms, that humans can function in a 
moral-ethical realm. Without the objectifying, moralizing 
capacity of language humans could not feel guilt, for there 
would be nothing about which to feel guilty. It is only 
through language that an "I" can feel anxiety and division-- 
whether from separation from another (a "you" or a "them"), 
or from disobedience (sin) to the linguistically constructed 
norms of the social order. Buber (1965) writes that man is 
capable of guilt because he has a "conscience" which allows 
him to distinguish between those "actions which should be 
approved and those which should be disapproved" (p. 134).
But, Burke would say that man has a conscience because he
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has language. Language allows such concepts as "actions 
which should be approved" and "actions which should be 
disapproved," and it is that distinction which creates the 
"conscience."
Ki.hfi'JL..ItefiL. of Guilt
Other scholars have noted that King's rhetorical
strategy involved evoking a sense of guilt in white
Americans (Lewis, 1978, p. 394; D. H. Smith, 1964, pp. 145,
182); and Payne (1989) makes this point with respect to the
"I Have a Dream" speech specifically (p. 50). Meier's (1965)
analysis of the source of King’s rhetorical effectiveness is
especially insightful in this regard. Since he sums up well
King's use of the guilt-purification-redemption pattern, I
will quote him at length.
[King] unerringly knows how to exploit to maximum 
effectiveness their [whites'] growing feeling of guilt 
.... With intuitive, but extraordinary skill, he not 
only castigates whites for their sins but, in contrast 
to angry young writers like [James] Baldwin, he 
explicitly states his belief in their salvation. Not 
only will direct action bring fulfillment of the 
"American Dream" to Negroes but the Negroes1 use of 
direct action will help whites to live up to their 
Christian and democratic values; it will purify, 
cleanse and heal the sickness in white society. Whites 
will benefit as well as Negroes. He has faith that the 
white man will redeem himself.... King arouses the 
guilt feelings of whites, and then relieves them.... 
King's performance provides an extraordinary catharsis 
for the white listener (p. 54),
King himself was very much aware that his strategy 
involved evoking a sense of guilt in white Americans. Just a 
few months before the March on Washington, in an interview 
with Kenneth Clark, King said that the nonviolent movement
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"... arouses a sense of shame within them [the white
community].... I think it does something to touch the
conscience and establish a sense of guilt" (Clark, 1963, p.
42; also, see M. L. King, 1981, p. 121).
King's notion of white guilt was quite Burkean. For
King, whites felt guilt over segregation because they knew
in their hearts that segregation was wrong (see M. L. King,
1986, pp. 357-358). He spoke of segregation as a "glaring
evil" which "is a blatant denial of the unity which we have
in Christ" (M. L. King, 1957a, p. 32; 1958, p. 205).
Segregation was a sin, a moral failure of the nation to live
up to certain principles of its social order, which thus
created a kind of division, which King often called
schizophrenia. In Stride .Toward F_rg_e_dQm, he wrote:
America has manifested a schizophrenic personality on 
the question of race. She has been torn between 
selves--a self in which she has proudly professed 
democracy and a self in which she has sadly practiced 
the antithesis of democracy.... This contradiction has 
disturbed the conscience of whites both North and South 
(M. L. King, 1958, pp. 190-191).
In his "Letter from Birmingham City Jail," King called
segregation "morally wrong and sinful" and then presented an
almost-Burkean analysis of the ontological nature of sin as
manifested in segregation: "Paul Tillich has said that sin
is separation. Isn't segregation an existential expression
of man's tragic separation, an expression of his awful
estrangement, his terrible sinfulness?" (M. L. King, 1986,
pp. 293-294).
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Snilt in "I .Heve Cream"
The ritual of rebirth in King's speech is as much 
collective as individual; that is, the guilt, and thus the 
need for redemption, is national and the individual partakes 
of the guilt-purification-redemption process through 
membership in the collectivity- The idea of guilt and 
redemption as collective goes back at least to the Hebrew 
Old Testament. According to Reik (1957), the concept of 
collective guilt, of a social group or community sharing in 
a sense of guilt or responsibility, is found in ancient 
civilizations (pp. 34-36). Burke (1970) has noted that 
guilt, and thus the need for redemption, can be extended to 
"the idea of nationality" (p. 232). The notion of collective 
guilt is possible because, just as individuals have a 
conscience, nations have a collective conscience. Just as 
individuals have an "identity" which they can measure 
against norms of individual behavior, nations have a 
"national identity," which they can measure against 
standards of national behavior. Thus, a nation can feel 
guilt for not living up to its principles.
When seeking to absolve guilt the "first step is the 
symbolization of our guilt in some form which makes possible 
confrontation of our guilt" (Duncan, 1968, p. 138). In 
August of 1963, with the images of Birmingham still fresh in 
the national consciousness. King had a reservoir of 
symbolizations of guilt to tap into. King's verbal 
depictions of America's racial injustice against blacks
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resonated with a panoply of images that had entered the 
national consciousness in the years and months leading up to 
the March on Washington--the Little Rock and Ole Miss 
desegregation crises, the violence against the Freedom 
Riders, Bull Connor's brutality in Birmingham, George 
Wallace's stand in the schoolhouse door, the murder of 
Emmett Till and the assassination of Medgar Evers in 
Mississippi--revealing the great distance between America's 
principles and its practices.
In King's speech America's guilt is symbolized through 
all three of Burke's sources of guilt: hierarchy, the 
negative, and the principle of perfection. Hierarchy is 
manifested in the socio-political structure of America in 
which
... the Negro is still sadly crippled by the manacles 
of segregation and the chains of discrimination.... 
lives on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a 
vast ocean of material prosperity.... [and] is still 
languished in the corners of American society and finds 
himself an exile in his own land (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 
723 ) .
King then adds: "So we've come here today to dramatize a 
shameful condition" [emphasis added] (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 
723 ) .
Guilt is also revealed in the combination of the 
principle of perfection and the negative, i.e. the failure 
of the nation to achieve its ideals of justice and equality. 
According to Burke (1970), humans strive toward their 
perception of perfection (p. 296). To explain his concept of 
perfection Burke (1966) uses the Aristotelian concept of
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" ’entelechy,1 the notion that each being aims at the 
perfection natural to its kind" (p. 17). Humans express
their concepts of perfection, of course, in symbols (Burke, 
1970, p. 297), what Burke (1970) calls the "search for the 
title of titles," a "secular summarizing term," or a "god- 
term" (p. 25). The entelechal principle for the society or
collectivity is summed up in King's use of the god-term 
"justice," which he uses seven times. "Justice" is indeed a 
term of perfection. It is a word created by the symbol-users 
to represent their concept of perfect equity and equality 
(or non-hierarchy) which would be the telos or entelechal 
purpose of their concept of "society." What the god-term 
"justice" is for society, the god-term "freedom" represents 
for the individual (Burke, 1970, pp. 281-283), that is "the 
perfection natural to its kind." As noted earlier, King uses 
the word "freedom" or "free" twenty-four times in the 
"Dream" speech. Like the word "justice," "freedom" is a term 
expressing an idea of perfection, only attainable 
symbolically and only able to be conceived at all because of 
the symbol-using nature of the species.
By combining the negative with these terms of 
perfection, these god-terms (and the terms they cluster 
with), we get failure to live up to our concepts of 
perfection at the societal and individual levels--failure to 
live up to our national principles--thus guilt. King uses 
the term "injustice" (i.e., the negative plus justice) three 
times, and the phrase "not free" once. But also, of course,
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the god-terms are used within the context of the negative. 
Hence, we hear that America has "defaulted on this 
promissory note" to provide "the unalienable irisht-S of life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" and that "America has 
given the Negro people a bad check, a check which has come 
back marked 'insufficient funds'" tall emphases added] (M.
L. King, 1963d, p. 724),
In Burke's theory guilt is inherent in human symbol- 
using activity. The guilt exists before the rhetor speaks. 
The rhetor's challenge is not to convince the audience of 
its guilt, but to symbolically manifest their pre-existent 
guilt in a manner consistent with the sources of that guilt 
so it can be absolved through purification. In the situation 
in which King was speaking, there was not the time, or even 
the need, to present a thorough exposition of the necessity 
for and sources of white guilt. King's brief references to 
conditions under which blacks lived and the failure of 
America to live up to its principles "insofar as her 
citizens of color are concerned," evoked images and 




1On hierarchy as inevitable in the nature of language, see 
Burke (1969b, pp. 141, 279). On hierarchy as leading to 
guilt, see Burke (1966, pp. 15, 144; 1970, pp. 4-5).
20n the negative as the result of symbol use, see Burke 
(1966, pp. 9, 419-420, 469; 1970, pp. 18, 283). On a sense
of guilt arising from the negative, see Burke (1970, pp.
285, 294) and Rueckert (1982, p. 131).
30n the principle of perfection as contained in 
symbolicity, see Burke (1966, p. 16-17; 1970, p. 296). On 
the principle of perfection creating guilt, see Burke (1966, 
PP. 18-20; 1970, pp. 297-300).
CHAPTER 4 
PURIFICATION AND REDEMPTION
In this chapter I will explain Burke's theory of 
purification and analyze the "I Have a Dream" speech as a 
redemption drama employing purification through (1) symbolic 
victimage and mortification, (2) rhetorical transcendence, 
and (3) images of change, movement and dramatic catharsis. 
The final section of the chapter describes the temporary 
state of redemption which follows upon purification of 
guilt.
Purification
Any means whereby guilt is absolved is purification. 
Purification is the fulcrum of the process of guilt- 
purification-redemption. In Burke's theory guilt is inherent 
in human nature, and redemption is the result of the process 
of purification, so the key question to ask in applying the 
guilt-purification-redemption theory is: How does the rhetor 
take the listener from guilt to redemption, i.e., how does 
he or she achieve symbolic purification for the audience? 
Since achieving symbolic purification of guilt is the major 
rhetorical challenge in the rhetoric of rebirth, most of 
this chapter deals with the means through which King 
achieves symbolic purification for his audience. There are
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many ways in which a rhetor may accomplish symbolic 
purification for an audience and the multiplicity of ways in 
which King achieves rhetorical purification increases the 
effectiveness of his speech.
In considering King's use of the religiously-oriented 
concept of purification and redemption, we should not lose 
sight of the secular function of this type of rhetoric. 
Social authorities not only define what constitutes a 
transgression of the social order, they must also provide 
means of expiating or absolving the guilt people feel for 
violating the social order (Duncan, 1962, pp. 125, 285;
1968, pp. 75, 140). By providing means of expiating white
and black guilt (black guilt will be discussed in the next 
section) King hoped to create an environment in which racial 
reconciliation could take place. Thus King's redemption 
drama serves as more than a means of providing symbolic 
spiritual purification of guilt. He also is assigning his 
auditors roles in a civic polity and building a sense of 
identification through connecting whites and blacks to a 
heritage of democratic ideals. The spiritual element allows 
King to place civic reconciliation within the context of the 
divine order (see the section on transcendence in this 
chapter). The religious and secular mythology gives King 
discursive forms for justifying and making sense of his 
civic and legislative goals. That is not to imply that King 
did not genuinely want to improve his listeners' "souls" as 
well. The point here is that King, or another rhetor in this
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same situation, could have made other rhetorical choices. He 
could have sought to indict American racial injustice 
without providing hope of redemption. He could have dealt 
with the issue in purely secular terms without the religious 
context. For example, he could have chosen to constitute his 
auditors as citizens of the world in a secular sense and 
America as a member of the world community of nations. He 
could have rejected the American dream as materialistic, or 
as a sham. Although these are not likely choices for King-- 
given what we know about his thinking and what he had said 
in the past (see chapter two), and given the church-based 
nature of the civil rights movement--the rhetoric of this 
speech reflects choices that King and the movement made at 
som.e__point about how to appeal to the nation for racial 
justice. King chose to justify the movement in terms of 
America's image of itself as a just nation, thereby 
constituting the civil rights movement as an epic battle or 
a great test in that nation's struggle to perfect democracy, 
and placing that struggle within the context of morality and 
justice in God's divine order. These rhetorical choices had 
certain consequences for the civil rights movement at the 
time, and for shaping subsequent public discourse on civil 
rights and race relations in general. Those consequences 
will be considered in chapter seven, but for now I will 
examine how purification of guilt functions in King's 
speech.
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Victimage and Mortification 
Burke (1966) defines victimage as "purification by 
sacrifice, by vicarious atonement, unburdening of guilt 
within by transference to chosen vessels without" [emphasis 
in original] (p. 478). Thus, victimage is transference of 
guilt to a "scapegoat" (see Burke, 1966, p. 435; 1969a, p. 
406; 1973, pp. 39-40, 202-203). While victimage absolves 
guilt "homicidally," in the slaying of the scapegoat, 
mortification absolves guilt "suicidally," in self­
punishment and self-denial (Burke, 1970, pp. 190, 223; 1973,
p. 43 5; Rueckert, 1982, p. 146). These two modes of 
purification are closely related, because while victimage is 
the mortification of the other (the scapegoat), 
mortification is the victimizing or scapegoating of the self 
(Burke, 1970, p. 248; Rueckert, 1982, pp. 146-150). In 
King's "I Have a Dream" speech, the attempt is made to 
absolve black guilt through a typ_e of mortification, or 
victimage of the self. Even though black suffering is not 
self-inflicted, as mortification implies, it is nonetheless 
purificatory to see oneself as a victim or scapegoat for 
others. Although we normally do not think of African- 
Americans as having anything about which to feel "guilty" in 
regard to the history of race relations in America, in a 
Burkean sense black people do feel guilt and anxiety. In 
Burke's theory guilt is inherent in human nature. Just as 
those "Up" in the hierarchy are guilty of not being "Down,"
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those "Down" are guilty of not being "Up" (Burke, 1966, p. 
15). Therefore, black guilt differs from white guilt in that 
black guilt grows out of African-Americans' historical 
status as an oppressed minority. Downing (1986) says that an 
oppressed minority will often feel guilt and shame because 
it comes to accept the negative image of itself held up to 
it by the dominant majority. This can result in a sense of 
inferiority and self-hate (p. 189). Steele (1990) argues 
that just as "guilt is the essence of white anxiety ... 
inferiority is the essence of black anxiety" (p. 144).
Martin Luther King (1958) felt that segregation had caused 
African-Americans to feel "a tragic sense of inferiority"
(p. 190; also, see M.L. King, 1957b; 1981, p. 110).
The cleansing of guilt must be contrived in a manner 
consistent with the source of that guilt (Burke, 1966, pp. 
351-352). Thus, King's rhetoric cleanses black guilt by 
transforming the very conditions of that guilt, oppression 
and socio-economic inferiority, into a virtue. King purifies 
black guilt and anxiety because his vivid depictions of 
black suffering at the hands of white society calls on 
associations which cast blacks as martyrs for a greater 
good. Burke (1970) says that martyrdom "is the fulfillment 
of the principle of mortification ... with the self as 
scapegoat" (p. 248). Burke (1970) also notes that
"mortification is the exercising of oneself in 'virtue'" (p. 
190). In King’s rhetoric, African-Americans become virtuous 
martyrs who have suffered in order to redeem America of its
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sins and to force the nation to live up to its ideals. While 
King does not use the literal phrase "virtuous martyr" in 
his speeches or writings, the idea that blacks should turn 
their suffering into a virtue and teach nonviolence and love 
to America and the world, permeates King's speeches and 
writings (see M.L. King, 1957a, pp. 29-30; 1958, pp. 214- 
216, 220; 1964b, p.14; 1981, pp. 54-55, 121; 1986, pp. 10-
11, 41-42). For example, King (1958) wrote that "the Negro" 
may be God’s instrument for injecting "a new spiritual 
dynamic" into Western civilization (p. 224). He told black
church audiences that "Our present suffering and our 
nonviolent struggle to be free may well offer to Western 
civilization the kind of spiritual dynamic so desperately 
needed for survival" (M. L. King, 1981, p. 92).
In purifying African-Americans through symbolizing 
their status as virtuous martyrs, King was drawing upon a 
strong tradition in black religious and intellectual thought 
which held that the history of suffering and oppression 
endured by African-Americans had made them morally superior 
to their oppressors and given them a messiah-like mission to 
redeem their oppressors (see Fullinwider, 1969). The notion 
that the oppressed are morally superior to their oppressors 
is common in human thought, and oppressed groups often 
compensate for low material and social status by seeing 
themselves as superior in moral virtue (Robertson, 1980. p. 
104; Russell, 1950). Baldwin (1991) argued that "... King 
considered black people generally more humane than their
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white oppressors" because white America's obsession with 
racism and wealth, and its historic quest for power over 
other people, had resulted in a loss of spirituality and 
higher human values fp. 237). King (1981) said that 
America's scientific and material progress had 
"outdistanced" its moral and spiritual progress (pp. 73-74, 
139). King himself does not explicitly say that blacks are 
morally superior to whites, but the idea is implied in his 
notion that the African-American experience of suffering and 
oppression gives blacks a mission to redeem white America 
from its sins (see Baldwin, 1991, pp. 231-243; Cone, 1986, 
p. 26). For example, in his statement to the press before 
his trip to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, King (1964a) 
said:
Peace in this nation and in the world is due in large 
measure to the willingness of Negro Americans to suffer 
injustice and persecution and their ability to respond 
to their oppressors with Love. This may be the most 
significant fact in the world today--that God has 
entrusted his black children in America to teach the 
world to love, and to live together in brotherhood (p.
1 ) .
This "mission ideology"--the idea that through their 
Christ-like suffering God would use African-Americans to 
save humankind and bring about the kingdom of God on earth-- 
developed early in black religious thought, was accepted by 
twentieth-century black intellectuals, and became a 
cornerstone of King's philosophy. Robertson (1980) argues 
that African-Americans came to see themselves as America's 
Jews, a Chosen People, who, Christ-like in their suffering, 
wisdom, and morality, were sent to America to redeem the
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nation and make it truly free "by bringing its great promise
of equality to fruition" (p. 105). Fullinwider (1969) traces
the evolution of this myth from post-Civil War black
preachers through twentieth-century black intellectuals such
as W. E. B. DuBois, Charles S. Johnson, and James Baldwin.
Fullinwider maintains that King adopted the Christ-like
mythology and mission ideology of the black race from the
milieu of his home-life as the son of a Baptist minister and
in the halls of Morehouse College, which is one of the
places where the doctrine was being preached in the 1940s
when King did his undergraduate work there (pp. 231-232).
According to Walton (1971), the "concept of the black's
’saving' mission in America" was "central to King's
political thought" (p. 7). "In [King's] view, blacks had a
mission to fulfill beyond their struggle for justice and
equality, namely, the introduction of a new moral standard
in American life" (Walton, 1971, p. 31). According to
Baldwin (1991), "King espoused this concept [of the black
messianic mission] so consistently that it should be
accounted a fundamental component of his thought" (p. 230).
King's own words often reflected his belief in the black
mission. In his first speech of the Montgomery bus boycott,
King concluded:
When the history books are written in the future, 
somebody will have to say, "There lived a race of 
people, a black people, 'fleecy locks and black 
complexion,' but a people who had the marvelous courage 
to stand up for their rights, and thereby they injected 
new meaning into the veins of history and 
civilization." And we are going to do that (cited in D. 
H. Smith, 1968, p. 15).
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In Stride Toward Freedom King wrote that he prayed that "the 
Negro" would recognize the "necessity of suffering" and 
"make of it a virtue." He implored "the Negro ... to see the 
ordeals of this generation as the opportunity to transfigure 
himself and American society" (M. L. King, 1958, p. 220). A 
recurrent theme in King's speeches and writings was that 
"unearned suffering is redemptive" (Ansbro, 1982, p. 7;
M. L. King, 1958, pp. 103, 179; 1963d, p. 725; Oates, 1982,
p. 79 ) .
Thus, in depicting black suffering and victimage in his
"Dream" speech, King was drawing upon a classic African-
American and Christian theme, that suffering is expiatory
and makes one virtuous. King purifies blacks of guilt by
making them martyrs at the altar of American ideals of
freedom and justice, when he describes "Negro slaves" as
having been "seared in the flames of withering injustice;"
and blacks as "crippled by the manacles of segregation and
the chains of discrimination," and "languished in the
corners of American society" (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 723).
The very images which symbolize guilt for white America
purify guilt for black America. The process of purification
through black victimage and martyrdom can also be discerned
in the following words which describe African-Americans as:
... victim[s] of the unspeakable horrors of police 
brutality.... [whose] bodies, heavy with the fatigue of 
travel, cannot gain lodging in the motels of the 
highways and the hotels of the cities.... [and whose] 
children are stripped of their selfhood and robbed of 
their dignity by signs stating "For Whites Only" (M. L. 
King, 1963d, p. 725).
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Solomon (1980) writes that a group's perception of itself as
a moral agent is expiatory (p. 59); and I earlier noted
Burke’s (1970) claim that exercising oneself in "virtue" is
a type of mortification (p. 190). The "perfect" victim is
one who has been made worthy by reason of his or her virtue
(as was Christ), one who is "too good for this world"
(Burke, 1970, pp. 242, 252; 1973, p. 40). Purification
through virtue is symbolized when King tells his people not
to resort to violence in gaining their rights:
In the process of gaining our rightful place we must 
not be guilty of wrongful deeds .... We must forever 
conduct our struggle on the high plane of dignity and 
discipline. We must not allow our creative protest to 
degenerate into physical violence. Again and again we 
must rise to the majestic heights of meeting physical 
force with soul force (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 724).
In the following section King combines martyrdom with
virtue, and explicitly promises his followers that their
suffering will redeem them:
I am not mi- [gjLc] unmindful that some of you have come 
here out of great trials and tribulations. Some of you 
have come fresh from narrow jail cells. Some of you 
have come from areas where your crest- [&i.g] quest for 
freedom left you battered by the storms of persecution 
and staggered by the winds of police brutality. You 
have been the veterans of.creative suffering. Continue 
to work with the faith that unearned suffering is 
redejnnpfive [all emphases added] (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 
725 ) .
In short, King's rhetoric tells African-Americans that their 




While King absolves black guilt through images of black 
victimage and virtue, white guilt, as well as black guilt, 
is absolved through transcendence. Transcendence is a means 
of purification which has largely been ignored by Burkean 
scholars (the exception is Brummett, 1981; 1982) in favor of
an almost-exclusive focus on victimage and mortification. 
While Burke speaks most often of purification taking place 
through victimage or mortification (see, for example, Burke, 
1966, pp. (*35, 478; 1970, pp. 190, 223, 248 ), he does
mention transcendence as a means of purification. For 
example, Burke (1973) writes that "criminality" (or guilt) 
can be "trailsformed, transcended, transubstantiated . by 
incorporation into a wider context of symbolic action" 
[emphasis in original] (p. 52), and he claims that 
abstraction, transcendence, and ultimate hierarchy are among 
the many "modes of symbolic purification ingrained in the 
nature of symbolic action" (cited in Rueckert, 1982, p. 137; 
see also, Burke, 1984a, p. 73). This section explains the 
purificatory effects of transcendence, presents and develops 
Burke's theory of transcendence, and demonstrates how 
transcendence operates in King's speech.
Transcendenge as .Purificatory
It is fairly obvious why humans regard victimage and 
mortification as expiatory of guilt. Victimage places the 
guilt upon another (the scapegoat), who is then sacrificed
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for the good of the community. Mortification rids one of 
guilt because one has thus suffered for (paid for) one's 
sins (see Burke, 1970, p. 176). But, what is transcendence, 
and how does it expiate guilt?
In Burke's theory transcendence is basic to language 
and thought. It takes place every time we name something, 
for in assigning a symbol to a thing, we are, to a degree, 
transcending the thing symbolized by translating the non- 
symbolic into the symbolic (Burke, 1969b, pp. 192, 279;
1970, pp. 16, 21-22). Burke (1966) defines transcendence as 
"the building of a terminiStic bridge whereby one realm is 
transcended by being viewed in terms of a realm 'beyond' it" 
[all emphases in original] (p. 187). In other words,
transcendence is "when one redefines some action as part of 
a new higher context" (Brummett, 1982, p. 549). Crucial to 
transcendence then, is the concept of hierarchy, for 
transcendence is essentially the act of moving up a 
hierarchy in which an action taking place in a lower realm 
of the hierarchy is integrated into, or put within the 
context of, a higher realm (see Burke, 1969b, pp. 187-189). 
As Duncan (1962) notes: "All hierarchy rests on progression 
from a lower to a higher stage. Thus any improvement of 
status is a kind of transcendence" (p. 323). It is important
to emphasize, however, that one does not achieve rhetorical 
transcendence to a higher realm by completely rejectine the 
lower realm, but by encompassing the lower realm within the 
context of the higher realm. For examples of this we could
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look at the rhetoric of Abraham Lincoln, who used 
transcendence often. In his Gettysburg Address the physical 
realm is transcended for the political realm when Lincoln 
places the death of the soldiers at Gettysburg within the 
context of the greater purpose of keeping alive the 
democratic system. (This is a common technique of "war 
rhetoric" in which soldiers are portrayed as sacrificing 
their lives for a greater political good, "democracy," 
"freedom," etc.) In his Second Inaugural Address Lincoln 
transcends the physical and socio-political orders for the 
spiritual order when he speculates that the strife and 
bloodshed of the Civil War may be God's judgment upon the 
nation for the sin of slavery (for the Lincoln speeches, see 
Heffner, 1985, pp. 157, 161-163).
Why and how, then, can transcendence bring about 
purification of guilt? The idea is not unique to Burke, or 
even to western thought. In Zen Buddhism one achieves Satori 
or nirvana--a state of enlightenment--by transcending the 
conscious realm; that is by integrating the conscious with 
the unconscious. Singh and Sirisena (1988) write: "The
object of meditation is to integrate the part with the 
whole, the conscious mind with unconscious mind, and in this 
process of unification and transfiguration Satori is 
experienced" (p. 136). A similar concept is Jung's (1960)
notion of the "transcendent function," in which one attains 
"liberation" by joining the conscious with the unconscious 
mind. Koestler (1978) argues that human beings have both
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"self-assertive" (or individualistic) needs and "self- 
transcending" or "integrative" needs. The latter arise out 
of the "need to belong, to transcend the narrow boundaries 
of the self and be part of a more embracing whole" (p. 60). 
Transcendence, then, eliminates division (guilt) by appeal 
to a higher principle under which various parts can be 
united. Since a social hierarchy will always contain 
differences, to absolve guilt over division and 
differentiation social authorities must be able to appeal to 
some higher principle which unites individuals, justifies 
social distinctions, and integrates the parts into a whole 
(see Duncan, 1962, pp. 279, 308; 1968, pp. 66, 130).
It could be argued that all modes of purification 
involve transcendence of some type. Perera (1986) notes that 
the scapegoat ritual originally had ties to the spiritual 
realm. The scapegoat was a human or animal victim chosen for 
sacrifice to propitiate a "god's anger and heal the 
community." Its purpose was to "bring the transpersonal 
dimension" to the aid and renewal of the community (p. 8).
Mortification is a type of transcendence in which the 
physical/material realm is transcended for the 
spiritual/moral realm, Payne (1989) makes this point when he 
writes that King's recounting in the "Dream" speech of the 
horrors of slavery and the black struggle in America 
consoles blacks for their suffering by elevating spiritual 
values above material losses (pp. 49-50). Purification 
through change, movement, and dramatic catharsis--which will
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be examined later in this chapter--always involves 
transformation of some type in which an initial state of 
being is, in a sense, transcended by a new state of being.
Burkean. Tran3cendea£s_^ja_J!I Have.-a.-Dxeam."
If purification, and thus redemption, can be achieved
through transcendence, then how in Burke's theory does one
achieve transcendence?
Transcendence ... is best got by processes of dialectic 
.... In dialectical transcendence, the principle of 
transformation operates in terms of a "beyond." It ... 
"builds a bridge" between disparate realms. And insofar 
as things here and now are treated in terms of a 
"beyond," they thereby become infused or inspirited by 
the addition of a new or further dimension [emphasis in 
original] (Burke, 1966, pp. 188-190).
In order to discern transcendence in a piece of
discourse and evaluate how it operates, then, we must look
for the terms that build bridges to new or higher
dimensions. Burke (1970) describes the process as follows:
First, there is the "Upward Way" from "lower terms" to 
a unitary transcendent term conceived "mythically" 
(analogically); and then there is a reversal of 
direction, a "Downward Way," back to "lower" terms with 
which the dialectician began his climb; but now the 
"lower" terms are viewed as having become modified by 
the unitary principle encountered en route. The 
secular, empirical terms are "infused by the spirit" of 
the transcendent term (p. 37).
Burke’s "cluster analysis" provides the critical method 
for discovering the way a rhetor achieves a dialectical 
transcendence, or movement upward. As the reader will recall 
from the explanation of the cluster-agon method in chapter 
three, a cluster analysis involves a search for the 
speaker's key terms based on frequency and intensity of use.
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The critic then identifies the speaker's ultimate "god-term” 
to which the other terms are related in a subordinate 
manner. In other words, the critic looks for "what goes with 
what" (Burke, 1973, p. 22; see also, Berthold, 1976, p.
303). For example, Berthold's (1976) cluster analysis of 
John F. Kennedy's rhetoric concluded that Kennedy's god-term 
is "freedom,” which he frequently links to four other key 
terms: "peace," "strength," "unity," and "defense" (pp. 304- 
306). As noted in chapter three, the ultimate god-term in 
King's "Dream" speech is also "freedom." In his first 
sentence King describes the demonstration as being "for 
freedom," and he uses the term "freedom" twenty times and 
the term "free" four times throughout the speech. However, 
King uses "freedom" differently and clusters it with 
different terms than does Kennedy. Also, while King uses the 
term "freedom" throughout the speech, he is not always using 
it in the same sense. In other words, he takes it "up the 
hierarchy," using the term "freedom" to build a "terministic 
bridge" from the socio-political to the supernatural realm. 
Before employing cluster analysis to demonstrate how King 
achieves rhetorical transcendence, it is necessary to 
explain Burke’s hierarchy of the realms to which words may 
refer.
Burke claims that there are four realms to which a word 
may refer. The first is the natural realm, which is that of 
material entities, biological classifications, physiological 
conditions, and the like. These are words such as "dog,"
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"tree," "hunger," etc. Burke calls these "positive" terms. 
The second realm is that of "dialectical" terms. This is the 
socio-political realm dealing with social relations, laws, 
right and wrong, etc., and includes terms such as "good," 
"bad," "justice," "injustice," "democracy," and "communism." 
The third realm, the logological, deals with "words about 
words," and concerns grammar, etymology, literary criticism, 
poetics, rhetoric, and the like. The fourth realm, which 
Burke calls the "ultimate," is that of words for the 
mystical, divine, spiritual, or supernatural. Since, by 
definition, the supernatural is the realm of the ineffable, 
our words for this realm are borrowed analogically from the 
other realms (Burke, 1966, pp. 373-376; 1969a, p. 506;
1969b, pp. 183-189; 1970, pp. lt-15).
The ultimate hierarchical appeal is to move out of this 
world to the supernatural (Duncan, 1968, p. 80). The 
greatest distinction the human mind is capable of "is that 
between the sacred and the profane or merely utilitarian 
.... To endow anything with sacred significance ... is to 
remove it from the sphere of things which must be justified 
by expediency or pragmatic considerations" (NisbeL, 1975, p. 
87). In "I Have a Dream" King's appeal is based on the 
highest principle humans recognize, that of the supernatural 
realm. Mundane and/or socio-political actions are infused 
with higher meaning. By building a terministic bridge from 
marching and demonstrating for integration, equality and 
justice in the socio-political realm, to the supernatural or
103
ultimate realm, King transcends the lower realm and places 
it within the context of the higher realm.
By examining the words which King clusters with his 
ultimate god-term "freedom," we can see how he achieves 
transcendence, how he moves "freedom" from the dialectical 
realm to the supernatural realm. According to Berthold 
(197 6) there are five ways in which terms may be clustered 
with one another: (1) through conjunctions, (2) through
cause-effect relationships, (3) through the use of mutual 
imagery, (4) through mutual connection to a third term, and 
(5) from the way they are used in a particular context (p. 
306). In the first half of the speech King is mostly 
operating in the dialectical or socio-political realm, and 
the term "freedom" is used in that sense. Here "freedom" is 
clustered with "justice" (five of the seven uses of the word 
"justice" come in the first half of the speech), a socio­
political term. As noted in chapter three, "justice" is the 
telos of the social order. "Freedom" and "justice" are 
linked through conjunction--"the riches of freedom and the 
security of justice"--as well as through context: the 
demonstration is "for freedom" and "justice" is repeatedly 
invoked as one of the demonstrators' demands. The two terms 
are also linked through mutual imagery. The Emancipation 
Proclamation freeing the slaves was "a great beacon Light of 
hope" and "justice" is a "sunlit path" and a "bright day." 
"Freedom" is also clustered with other socio-political terms 
in the first half of the speech. "Freedom" clusters with
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"©quality" through conjunction: "... an invigorating autumn 
of freedom and equality." "Freedom" also clusters with the 
socio-political term "democracy" through mutual connection 
to "justice": "Now is the time to make real the promises of
democracy .... Now is the time to rise ... to the sunlight
path of racial justice .... Now is the time to make justice 
a reality for all of God's children" (M. L. King. 1963d, p. 
724). "Freedom" and "justice" also cluster with "rights" and 
"the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness" through context. Thus, in the first half of the 
speech "freedom" is repeatedly invoked as the goal of the
demonstration, but the term is used mainly in the socio­
political sense through its association with socio-political 
terms such as "justice," "democracy," "equality," and 
"rights," before the movement up the hierarchy to the 
supernatural realm which is fully developed in the second 
half of the speech.
Other analysts of this speech have also noted a shift 
in style and substance from the first half of the speech to 
the second half. Leff (1987) argues that King moves from 
historical time and up/down imagery in the first half of the 
speech to a time beyond history and images of ideal equality 
in the second half. Miller (1989) finds that King replaces 
"secular authority" in the first half of the speech with 
"divine authority" in the second half (pp. 27-28). But, King 
actually begins to build his terministic bridge up the 
hierarchy to the supernatural realm in the first half of the
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speech, and he builds his bridge in the Burkean sense by
moving up, and then back down the hierarchy several times.
Thus the lower realm terms become "infused by the spirit" of
the higher realm (Burke, 197 0, p. 37). The first movement
upward occurs about one-third of the way through the speech.
King has just spoken of "the fierce urgency of now" and
warned against gradualism, when he says:
Now is the time to make real the promises of democracy.
Now is the time to rise from the dark and desolate
valley of segregation to the sunlit path of racial 
justice.
Now is the time to lift our nation from the quicksands 
of racial injustice to the solid rock of brotherhood.
Now is the time to make justice a reality for all of 
God's children (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 724).
The "Now is the time ..." refrain connects making "real the
promises of democracy" in the first line, to making "justice
a reality for all of God's children" in the last line, while
the two lines in between speak of "risting]" from
"segregation" to "justice," and "liftting]" ourselves from
"injustice" to "the solid rock of brotherhood" (a phrase
with spiritual connotations). The total image is one of
upward movement (movement up a hierarchy) in which
fulfilling the "promises of democracy" is in accord with
God's will. Here King has begyji to relate fulfillment of
political justice in historical time to fulfillment of
spiritual justice in God's time. King is beginning a
repetitive form (Burke, 1968a, p. 125) of movement up the
hierarchy from the socio-political to the supernatural,
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which he sometimes uses delivery to enhance. D. H. Smith 
(1964) has noted that the common pattern of King's delivery 
was to begin slowly, then gradually quicken his cadence, 
taking his audience up, then down again, through a series of 
mini-climaxes which build toward a final, driving climatic 
peroration. After each mini-climax King reverts back to his 
calm delivery to begin developing a new idea and prepare for 
the next climax, with each new series building toward his 
peroration (pp. 331-332). Generally, the minor climaxes are 
introduced by four or five repeated phrases, as in the "Now 
is the time ..." refrain cited above.
After the "Now is the time ..." refrain King reverts 
back to a more measured delivery. He warns the nation not to 
"overlook the urgency of the moment" and then cautions 
African-Americans against violence or "distrust of all white 
people" (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 724). Four paragraphs after 
the "Now is the time ..." refrain, King begins another mini­
climax, moving up the hierarchy:
There are those who are asking the devotees of civil 
rights, "When will you be satisfied?"
We can never be satisfied as long as the Negro is the 
vie- [gic] victim of the unspeakable horrors of police 
brutality ....
We cannot be satisfied as long as the Negro's basic 
mobility is from a smaller ghetto to a larger one ....
We cannot be satisfied as long as a Negro in 
Mississippi cannot vote and a Negro in New York 
believes he has nothing for which to vote.
No, no, we are not satisfied, and we will not be 
satisfied until justice rolls down like waters and 
righteousness like a mighty stream (M. L. King, 1963d, 
pp. 7 24-725).
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This section again displays the repetitive form of 
anaphoric, hierarchical movement upward as King moves 
through a series of socio-political references that then 
conclude with words from the Old Testament prophet Amos.
In the next paragraph King first uses the word "faith," 
a term belonging to the supernatural realm, and clusters 
that term with "freedom" as he again moves up the hierarchy, 
this time without the use of anaphora or accelerating 
cadence:
I am not mi- [sic] unmindful that some of you have come 
here out of great trials and tribulations. Some of you 
have come fresh from narrow jail cells. Some of you 
have come from areas where your crest- [gi__g] quest for 
freedom left you battered by the storms of persecution 
and staggered by the winds of police brutality. You 
have been the veterans of creative suffering. Continue 
to work with the faith that unearned suffering is 
redemptive [emphases added] (M. L. King, 1963d, p.
725 ) .
Here King takes material and socio-political terms such as
"narrow jail cells" and "police brutality" and associates
them with concepts such as "great trials and tribulations,"
"persecution," "suffering," and "freedom"--terms which can
function in the socio-political realm, but also have
spiritual connotations--and then associates them all with
the strongly spiritual terms "faith" and "redempt[ion]."
King relates the struggles of civil rights workers in the
here and now to their ultimate redemption.
In the next paragraph King comes back down again to
secular language, naming particular states:
Go back to Mississippi, go back to Alabama, go back to 
South Carolina, go back to Georgia, go back to 
Louisiana, go back to the slums and ghettos of our
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Northern cities, knowing that somehow this situation 
can and will be changed. Let us not wallow in the 
valley of despair (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 725).
However, this paragraph also builds slightly toward an
implied divine authority when King says "... knowing that
somehow this situation can and will be changed." This phrase
contains implications of faith in an ultimate order, and the
final sentence's "valley of despair" connotes the 23rd
Psalm's "valley of the shadow of death" and other Biblical
references to valleys as low points in the Christian iourney
toward salvation.
In the next paragraph King introduces the word "dream":
"I say to you today, my friends, so even though we face the
difficulties of today and tomorrow, I still have a dream. It
is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream," The term
"dream" is again taking us up to the mystical and
supernatural realm, as in the dreams and visions of noted
biblical figures such as Joseph. Parman (1991) has shown
that the Judeo-Christian tradition in western culture has
regarded the dream as a bridge to the supernatural (pp. 27-
<*5). King has made an explicit connection (built a bridge)
between the "American dream" (socio-political term) and his
"dream" as a vision of the future (ultimate term). Also,
here King is moving out of the present, and out of real
time, into the future, and into mythological time. The use
of past-future themes in rhetoric is a mode of transcendence
(Payne, 1989, pp. 97-108). King is achieving temporal
transcendence by transcending the past and the present for
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the future. As King is passing from the material realm to 
the socio-political realm to the ultimate realm, he is also 
moving from the world of physical motion, time, and place-- 
"we shall always march ahead;" "tslome of you have come 
fresh from narrow jail cells;" "[g]o back to Mississippi, go 
back to Alabama ..."--to the world of action and idea-- 
"justice;" "American dream"--to the world of unitary 
principles--"faith;" "redemption;" "dream" (see Burke,
1969b, pp. 183-187).
The final one-third of the speech (from the beginning 
of the "dream" sequence to the conclusion) is the long, 
consummating climax for which the speech has become famous. 
Here King stays in the ultimate realm. He has stepped out of 
real, historical time and into the impressionistic, utopian 
future. Although there are secular references, as I will 
demonstrate shortly they are so tightly woven into the 
fabric of King's mythical/supernatural vision that they 
merge into it. By going up, then down, then up again from 
the positive realm, to the dialectical realm, to the 
ultimate realm, through several mini-climaxes that come 
closer and closer together, by the time of the final climax 
the secular terms have become "infused by the spirit" of the 
supernatural realm. For the remainder of the speech the 
socio-political terms "justice" and "equal[ity]" are used 
only once each, and they are now clustered with the 
supernatural terms "dream" (employed nine times, excluding 
the reference to the "American dream"), "faith" (four times.
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in addition to the previous use noted above), and "hope" 
(used twice), all put into the divine context as King draws 
upon biblical language in describing his "dream that one day 
every valley shall be exalted, every hill and mountain shall 
be made low, the rough places shall be made plain and the 
crooked places shall be made straight, and the glory of the 
Lord will be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together" 
(M. L. King, 1963d, pp. 725-26). In the conclusion, 
"freedom," the overarching god-term of King's message, is no 
longer <?Qiy socio-political freedom, it is also spiritual 
freedom, spiritual rebirth. It is clustered not with 
"justice," "rights," and "democracy," but with "dream," 
"faith," and "hope." It is linked with mountains, symbols of 
ascension and majesty, often associated with God in biblical 
literature. It is significant to note also, that in the 
first half of the speech where "freedom" clusters with the 
dialectical terms "justice," "democracy," and "rights," the 
linkage is most often through conjunction, cause and effect, 
mutual imagery, and mutual connection to a third term. 
Whereas in the final one-third of the speech, where 
"freedom" becomes supernatural and is linked to "faith," 
"hope, ' and mountain imagery, the link i3 almost entirely 
contextual through the organizing metaphor of the "dream" as 
a vision of a redeemed future (see chapter five on the 
analysis of the "dream" as metaphor). Before closely 
examining the final one-third of the speech, I must briefly 
explain whv King needed to use a transcendent strategy.
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Miller (1989) has suggested that King "replac[e s ] 
secular authority" in the first half of the speech with 
"divine authority" in the second half (pp. 27-28). But what 
King does is not so much replace secular authority with 
divine authority as subsume the former under the latter.
That i3, he trflDS.cendS the secular order for the spiritual 
order. King's rhetorical strategy is a transcendent one 
because he had to reconcile two conflicting political/ 
temporal tensions--white gradualism and black radicalism. 
Burke (198ta) notes that transcendence is the adoption of a 
perspective which allows one to merge opposites (p. 336).
King reconciled the opposition between white gradualism and 
black radicalism by elevating the discourse to the 
moral/spiritual plane where this tension is transcended in a 
futuristic vision that subsumes historical time and 
political justice under eschatological time and spiritual 
justice. While King must convince his white audience that 
gradualism is not a fitting response to racial injustice, he 
has a separate rhetorical challenge with regard to his black 
audience, k people responding to injustice with nonviolence 
and dignity must have the hope that their virtue will be 
rewarded. Black radicals claimed that King's nonviolent 
methods were not working, or that they would take too long 
even if they did work. On this point the black radicals 
prevailed as long as the debate was conducted within the 
temporal dimension of history and political reality, so King 
transcended political justice and historical temporality for
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spiritual justice and eschatological temporality.
Nonviolence was not only a political strategy, but a 
redemptive act: "Continue to work with the faith that 
unearned suffering is redemptive." This was the only 
response King could give to the charges that nonviolence was 
ineffective. In other words, he responded to those charges 
by measuring the effectiveness of nonviolence not in 
political terms but in spiritual terms. He changed the terms 
of the debate with black radicals on how to achieve justice 
by subsuming the notion of political justice under one of 
spiritual justice. Nonviolence and love is ns?t abandoned as 
a political strategy, but its political significance is 
subsumed within its greater spiritual significance. Thus 
King was reconciling divisions within his large national 
audience by elevating the discourse to a higher plane. The 
final one-third of the speech is King's elevated vision 
which subsumes all racial, temporal, and political 
oppositions under the banner of secular/spiritual 
redemption.
King achieves this reconciliation by transcending the 
socio-political realm for the supernatural realm while at 
the same time transcending political ideology for secular 
mythology. Burke (1947) argues that one way to transcend 
social and political differences is to move from the plane 
of ideology to the plane of myth (p. 198). As argued in 
chapter three, America's most enduring myth has been its 
image of itself as a chosen people deposited in a virgin
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land to build a new order based on freedom, justice, and
democracy. Thus, the final one-third of King's speech not
only symbolically effects spiritual redemption, but also
secular redemption by invoking American mythology and tying
the fulfillment of that mythology into spiritual redemption.
King's "dream" sequence depicts a nation that has risen
up "to live out the true meaning of its creed" to provide
freedom and equality for all. The myth of "the American
dream" is invoked in a vision which extends that dream to
black people as well as white people:
... I still have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted 
in the American dream.
I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up to
live out the true meaning of its creed: "We hold these
truths to be self-evident that all men are created 
equal."
I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia 
the sons of former slaves and the sons of former 
slaveowners will ba- [glsl be able to sit down together 
at the table of brotherhood (M. L. King, 1963d, p.
725 ) .
In vivid language King envisions a series of transformations
taking place in America:
I have a dream that one day even the state of 
Mississippi, a state sweltering with the heat of 
injustice, sweltering with the heat of oppression, will 
be transformed into an oasis of freedom and justice.
I have dream that my four little children will one day 
live in a nation where they will not be judged by the 
color of their skin but by the content of their 
character.
I have a dream that one day, d-o-w-n-n in Alabama, with 
its vicious racists, with its governor having his lips 
dripping with the words of interposition and 
nullification, one day right there in Alabama little
lie
black boys and black girls will be able to join hands 
with little white boys and white girls as sisters and 
brothers.
I have a dream today I (M. L. King, 1963c; 1963d, p.
725 ) .
In the final one-third of the speech King is masterfully
merging spiritual redemption with secular mythology. The
dream sequence depicts a series of utopian, mythical
images--"the sons of former slaves and the sons of former
slave owners1' sitting "down together at the table of
brotherhood;" and "little black boys and black girls ...
jointing] hands with little white boys and white girls as
sisters and b r o t h e r s s e t  within a series of secular
references--"one day on the red hills of Georgia"; "one day
even the state of Mississippi"; "one day, d-o-w-n-n in
Alabama, with its vicious racists, with its governor having
his lips dripping with the words of interposition and
nullification"--which are then climaxed with a merging of
the language of the Old Testament prophet Isaiah with King's
own dream--"I have a dream that one day every valley shall
be exalted, every hill and mountain shall be made low, the
rough places will be made plain and the crooked places will
be made straight, and the glory of the Lord shall be
revealed, and all flesh shall see it together" (M. L. King,
1963c; 1963d, p. 725-726).
After this description of his "dream" King says that he
will "go back to the South" with "hope" and "faith:"
This is our hope. This is the faith that I will go back 
to the South with. With this faith we will be able to 
hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope-
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With this faith we will be able to transform the 
jangling discords of our nation into a beautiful 
symphony of brotherhood. With this faith we will be 
able to work together, to orav together, to struggle 
together, to go to jail together, to stand up for 
f reedpni together, knowing _that„ we jwilA. be Jftee— one...day 
[all emphases added] (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 726).
Working, struggling, and going to jail for "freedom” are
here put alongside pxayex. and all are clustered under acts
of "faith." King does not explicitly say what or whom this
"faith" is in, but from the context (the previous paragraph
concluded with the words from the prophet Isaiah), it is
almost certainly faith in some divine or supernatural order.
When King concludes this paragraph with "... knowing we will
be free one day" [emphases added], he communicates a sense
of ultimate determinism, of long-term inevitability. "[0]ne
day" could mean "one day" in historical time in this world,
or "one day" in eschatological time in heaven.
Next, King merges the secular mythology of song lyrics
from "America the Beautiful" with a reference to unity in
God :
This will be the day ... when all of God's children 
will be able to sing with new meaning: "My country ’tis 
of thee, sweet land of liberty, of thee I sing. Land 
where my fathers died, land of the Pilgrims' pride, 
from every mountainside, let freedbtEl ring," and if 
America is to be a great nation, this must become true 
[emphases added] (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 726).
The next section carries over the "let freedom ring"
lyric into another refrain, combining it with secular
references to well-known American mountain ranges. But,
mountains in general also evoke the sense of God-like vision
from great heights. King calls for "freedom" to ring from
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mountains from east to west, paralleling the development of
the nation, then finally south, the region where the
greatest racial injustices were then being perpetrated.
So let freedom ring. From the prodigious hilltops of 
New Hampshire, let freedom ring. From the mighty 
mountains of New York, let freedom ring, from the 
heightening Alleghenies of Pennsylvania!
Let freedom ring from the snowcapped Rockies of 
Colorado!
Let freedom ring from the curvaceous slopes of 
California!
But not only that.
Let freedom ring from Stone Mountain of Georgia!
Let freedom ring from Lookout Mountain of Tennessee!
Let freedom ring from every hill and mole hill of
Mississippi (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 726).
The final paragraph then explicitly reinvokes divine
authority and climaxes King's "dream" within the spiritual
context:
From every mountainside, let freedom ring, and when 
this happens ... when we allow fxeedoro [to] ring, when 
we let it ring from every village and every hamlet, 
from every state and every city, we will be able to 
speed up that day when all of God's children, black men 
and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and 
Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the 
words of the pld. Negro 5P.ixityal̂ „_'.!.F3ree_. at lest! fjree 
at... lest! Thank God .hlmighty., we are_fxee at last ! " [all 
emphases added] (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 726)
The freedom here referred to is no longer only worldly,
socio-political freedom. It has become infused by the spirit
of the ultimate realm. "Freedom" now connotes national and
spiritual rebirth and secular/religious redemption. King has
transcended all racial and religious divisions for his
listeners by moving up the hierarchy to the "'unitary
principle1 behind the diversity of voices" (Burke, 1969b, p.
187). By doing so, the struggle for racial justice in the
socio-political realm is no longer only that. It is now also
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a divine struggle. It is not just a struggle for socio­
economic freedom, but a struggle for spiritual freedom, for 
spiritual rebirth and a new identity for the individual and 
the nation. America, by living up to its secular promises, 
by bringing to realization its secular myths, has been 
assured of national redemption in the eyes of God. In King's 
vision of the future (his "dream") America's guilt has been 
purified and its people united under a transcendent, mythic 
ideal.
Change, Movement, and Dramatic Catharsis 
Victimage, mortification and transcendence are not the 
only means whereby a rhetor may achieve symbolic 
purification for the audience. Due to its nature as arising 
out of the symbolic resources of language, purification may 
be accomplished via many symbolic modes (Rueckert, 1962, p. 
137), Victimage and mortification are Burke's most 
frequently mentioned modes of purification, and Burke 
explicitly, although less frequently, mentions transcendence 
as a mode of purification, but he implicitly or briefly 
alludes to other means of purification as well. The 
following modes are not necessarily fully developed in 
Burke’s theory, but are treated here in order to fill out 
the analysis of how King achieves symbolic purification, and 
to further demonstrate the many methods of purification 
available. Symbolic purification is a complex and subtle 
process. Many major and minor modes are possible; these
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often overlap, intersect, and loop back upon one another. In 
this section I will discuss purification through images of 
change, movement and dramatic catharsis.
Rueckert (198 2) notes that in Burke's theory 
"Purification is always a process--movement and change-- 
something is always expelled or sloughed off, and the end is 
always a change of some kind, whether physical, spiritual, 
or psychological. Of necessity, purification is almost 
always depicted by ’active' or 'process' images" (p. 104).
Hoban (19B0) argues that rhetorical rituals of rebirth use 
images of transformation and metamorphosis--expressed as 
temporal, spatial, or psychological change--to "provide a 
purifying basis for a new order" (p. 285). According to
Rueckert (1982), among the many images Burke treats as 
producing purification through change and movement are the 
following: fire; journeys, pilgrimages and quests; "movement 
of any kind from negatively charged to positively charged, 
such a s...night to day, down to up;" the "act of unburdening 
or divesting" of any form; "imagery of ascent (mounting);" 
and dying and killing (p. 105).
King's "Dream" speech is rich in imagery of change and 
movement, especially in its metaphors. In his study of 
archetypal metaphors in the light-dark family, Osborn 
(1967a) notes that change can be represented by seasonal 
metaphors (p. 124); we can observe King's use of this 
imagery when he speaks of the "sweltering summer of the 
Negro's legitimate discontent" to be followed by an
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"invigorating autumn of freedom and equality" (M. L- King,
1963d, p. 7 24). Throughout the speech, King's metaphors and
images create a sense of change and continuous movement,
forward and upward:
Now is the time to rise from the d.ark„MiiLjie^ulJI>iJ! 
V&Lley of segregation to the sunlit path of racial 
justice. Now is the time to lift our .nation from the 
quicksands of racial injustice to the solid rock of 
brotherhood.
Again and again we must rise to the majestic heights of 
meeting physical force with soul force.
And as we walk* we must make the pledge that we shall 
always march ahead. We cannot turn.back [all emphases
added] (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 724).
In addition to change and movement, some metaphors can 
contain specific purifying images in themselves. For 
example, Osborn (1967a) notes that rebirth can be symbolized 
by dawn metaphors (p. 121) and we see King's use of such
images in the following phrases: "It [the Emancipation
Proclamation] came as a joyous d a y b r e a k  to end the long 
night of their captivity;" and "The whirlwinds of revolt 
will continue to shake the foundations of our nation until 
the bright ̂ daJY of justice emerges" [emphases added] (M. L. 
King, 1963d, pp. 723, 724). Fire metaphors can represent 
purifying or purgatorial forces (Osborn, 1967a, p. 123), and
we note King's depiction of "Negro slaves, who had been
seared jp the flames of withering injustice" [emphasis 
added] (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 723). Water is also a 
purifying element. The following phrase combines images of 
purification through water, as well as movement: "... and
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we will not be satisfied until justice rolls down like 
wa.t£jr_s and righteousness like a mi&hty._S_tr_eam" [emphases 
added] (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 725).
Not only are images of change and movement elicited by 
King's use of metaphor, his "dream" sequence speaks of a 
series of changes or transformations from the present 
reality to a future order. He sees the state of Mississippi, 
"a state sweltering with the heat of injustice, sweltering 
with the heat of oppression ... transformed into an oasis of 
freedom and justice;" and the state of Alabama, "with its 
vicious racists" transformed into a place where "little 
black boys and black girls will be able to join hands with 
little white boys and white girls as sisters and brothers." 
King also speaks of the faith which will enable us "to 
transform the jangling discords of our nation into a 
beautiful symphony of brotherhood" [emphases added] (M. L. 
King, 1963d, pp. 725, 726).
Burke (1973 ) finds that in The. Grapes of Wjrath Tom 
Joad's journey serves as a type of "pilgrim's progress" for 
the redemption of his crime (p. 82). In King's speech the 
depiction of America's historical journey in search of its 
destiny amounts to a type of "pilgrim's progress" for the 
nation as a whole. It is a national quest of purpose, a 
chronological account of America in search of its true 
identity. King's references early in the speech to the 
Emancipation Proclamation, the United States Constitution 
and the Declaration of Independence refer to America's past
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and its basic myths and values embodied in those documents. 
The historical journey is brought up to the present where 
America has failed to live up to these promises "insofar as 
her citizens of color are concerned." In the dream sequence 
King takes us into a future utopia where America has risen 
up to "live out the true meaning of its creed;" that is, 
where the purpose of America has been realized in the 
extension of the American dream to all its people and the 
nation has been redeemed. This historical journey of America 
in quest of its purpose, is parallel to the journey of the 
individual soul from innocence to sin to redemption.
Spillers (1971) writes that in "I Have a Dream" King's 
images of struggle and journey through valleys and mountains 
provide an "allegory of the Christian journey" (p. 25).
The American/Christian journey King depicts is a type 
of drama, with the forces of good and the forces of evil 
doing battle for the soul of America. Drama or symbolic 
conflict can also provide catharsis for the audience (Burke, 
1966, pp. 186-191). The cluster/agon analysis presented in 
chapter three showed that the protagonist in King's speech 
is "freedom," and its satellite terms are "justice," 
"equality," "democracy," etc., while the antagonistic 
cluster consists of the terms "injustice," "segregation," 
"discrimination," and "vicious racists." Thus the 
protagonists, the god-terms of "freedom" and "justice," are
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in conflict with the antagonists, the devil-terms of 
"injustice,” "discrimination," and "racism," for the soul of 
America.
Rueckert (1982) notes that cathartic drama releases 
"civic tensions" (p. 211), and Burke (1966) talks about this 
taking place through symbolic sacrifice of an appropriate 
victim (pp. 88-89, 189). A victim or scapegoat, who assumes 
the burden of "unwanted evils," can be considered 
appropriate or worthy in many ways, such as "by making him 
an offender against legal or moral justice, so that he 
'deserves' what he gets" (Burke, 197 3, pp. 39-40). According 
to Duncan (1968), guilt can be purged through witnessing or 
participating in a social drama in which we symbolically 
banish, punish, or kill somebody or something which 
personifies evil (pp. 140-141). In King's "drama," racists 
and segregationists are the scapegoats for society's ills, 
and civic tension (or guilt) over racism and segregation is 
released as these sources of corporate pollution are 
symbolically killed or expunged from the body politic.
Perera (1986) notes that ceremonies for the riddance of 
collective guilt operate by expelling what is felt to be 
alien. In such a case "the restoration of a sense of 
wholeness" depends upon "a consciousness - fostering ritual of 
separation from evil by collective confession and sacrifice" 
(p. 12). In King’s dramatic conclusion the protagonists, the
"good guys," have won out. His "dream" includes no place in 
the reborn America for the racists and segregationists. They
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have been eliminated, or purged, from his vision of 
America's future. The scapegoat is "dialectically appealing" 
because it "combines in one figure contrary principles of 
identification and alienation" (Burke, 1969b, p. 140). Thus 
listeners who identify a part of themselves with racism and 
segregation receive catharsis through vicarious victimage, 
and those who see racism and segregation as outside 
themselves but part of the body politic, see it alienated 
and symbolically killed.
In sum, King's multiple images of change, movement, and 
transformation, as well as the depiction of dramatic 
conflict between good and evil, resolved in favor of the 
forces of good, vividly reinforce the process of symbolic 
purification taking place through victimage/mortification 
and transcendence.
Redemption
As noted earlier, for purposes of persuasion,
purification is the most important part of the guilt-
purification-redemption cycle. It is the fulcrum of the
process of movement from guilt to redemption. Redemption is
a temporary state at the end of the cycle before it repeats
(on redemption, see Burke, 1970, pp. 4-5, 174-178; Foss,
Foss & Trapp, 1985, p. 181; Rueckert, 1982, p. 131).
Rueckert (1982) describes redemption as
... a moment of stasis, the still moment following the 
fusion and release of a symbol- induced catharsis, or 
the still moment of vision when, after the furious 
activity of dialectic, a fusion at a higher level of
\ 2 k
discourse takes place to produce a perceived unity 
among many previously discordant ideas and things (pp. 
137-138 ) .
This section briefly describes the condition of temporary 
stasis or rebirth to which King has brought his audience in 
the "Dream" speech.
Burke (1966) observes that "the cleansing of guilt must 
be contrived in ways that reinforce the very assumptions on 
which the sense of guilt was based" (pp. 351-352). Thus, we 
note that King's "dream" amounts to a description of a type 
of heaven on earth, a state of national rebirth or 
redemption in which the very sources of America's guilt-- 
hierarchy, failure to live up to the ideals of justice and 
equality for all, racial discrimination, etc.--are 
eliminated. In their place is an America of freedom, justice 
and brotherhood. America's rebirth is indeed a rebirth, for 
it is a new order that finally realizes the dreams and 
promises contained in America's past. King's description of 
this redemptive state is consistent with America's most 
basic values and positive myths about itself. America has 
risen up (been reborn), to "live out the true meaning of its 
creed."
Burke (1973) notes that "symbolic rebirth" can be 
provided through a "'positive' view of life" such as can be 
gotten through a feeling "of moving forward, towards a goal" 
[emphases in original] (p. 203). King's speech gives the 
listeners the sense that America has a destiny to fulfill, a 
great purpose she is moving toward. King's listeners partake
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of that purposefulness. For the advocates of civil rights, 
the marchers and demonstrators, their actions are imbued 
with a higher meaning. All guilt is purged and their 
commitment to the cause is further inspired. For moderate 
white America, their guilt is also purged if they 
symbolically join the movement. They can be reborn and 
redeemed by joining the movement, forward and upward towards 
the goal-~an America of freedom, justice and racial harmony. 
In the new America King envisions, racism and segregation 
have been expunged, purifying the body politic and allowing 
national redemption to take place. Thus, King's redemption 
drama creates a stasis of attitude in the auditor. Burke 
(1969a) notes that an attitude can either be "an incipient 
act or the substitute for an act" (p. 476). King's speech 
could be an incipient act if it emotionally prepares the 
audience for action, or it could be a "substitute for an act 
in that the sympathetic person can let the intent do service 
for the deed" (p. 476). In chapter seven I will argue that 
one of the long-term effects of this speech has been that it 
provided our culture with a discursive artifact which has 
been used more for the latter than the former. But King's 
purpose was to create the conditions for an act of 
purification to allow redemption and reconciliation to take 
place. A type of temporal movement is posited by King which 
corresponds to the tripartite pentadic ratio analysis and 
narrative form (representative anecdote) analysis presented 
in chapter three. A past of racial injustice is transformed
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by an incipient purificatory action which results in future 
redemption. Adding this temporal dimension to the diagram 
from chapter three gives us a schematic representation of 
the speech which looks like this:
Pentadic Ratio scene act purpose
Narrative Form guilt purification redemption
Temporal Movement past present future
"Temporal Movement" is not to be understood in terms of the 
actual structure of the speech (although the speech does 
roughly follow this pattern), but in terms of the attitude 
KihR was attempting to instill. "Temporal movement" is 
King’s proposed temporal movement in which the present is 
not the actual, immediate present, but the incipAeiit present 
of the act of purification and the past is the guilt-ridden 
scene that America is about to shed. The following chapter 
on metaphor analysis will, among other things, demonstrate 




King's "I Have a Dream" speech is dense in metaphor. In 
order to attain a fuller understanding of the speech and to 
see how King's metaphors contribute to the overall dramatic 
enactment examined in the previous chapters, it is necessary 
to analyze King's metaphors. First, a brief history of the 
theory of metaphor is presented to show how what was once 
regarded by most theorists as a simple stylistic device has 
come to be regarded as a language phenomenon with important 
epistemological implications. Then I. A. Richards' 
interaction theory of metaphor, as extended by Paul Ricoeur 
and others, is discussed. Here I also demonstrate why this 
theory is superior to others as an analytical tool for 
allowing the critic to unpack the underlying meaning, or 
truth claims, implicit in a metaphorical expression. Edwin 
Black's concept of the second persona is also used because 
Black argues that the study of a rhetor's metaphors provides 
a means of determining how the rhetor defines the role the 
audience plays in the social drama depicted by the 
discourse. Finally, these theories are used to analyze 
King's major metaphoric clusters in "I Have a Dream." In the 
discussion of purification in chapter four I briefly 
illustrated the purificatory effects of some metaphors used
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by King, but this chapter presents a more thorough analysis 
of King's metaphors from the perspective of modern 
metaphorical theory.
A Brief History of the Theory of Metaphor 
Throughout most of the history of its study in western 
rhetoric, literature, and philosophy, the metaphor was 
regarded by most theorists as simply an ornamental trope 
which substituted one term for another in conveying an idea 
in a lively or unusual way. But twentieth-century theorists 
have come to regard the metaphor as a way of thinking, as a 
device that makes an argument in its own behalf (see Burke, 
1984b, pp. 89-96; Ivie, 1987, p. 166; Osborn and Ehninger, 
1962, pp. 223, 233; Richards, 1936, pp. 89-112; for 
overviews of the history of the theory of metaphor, see 
Osborn , 1967b; and Ricoeur, 1977). Thus, observes Whitson
(1989 ) :
The metaphor has gained much importance of late. No 
longer simply a decorative feature of discourse, the 
trope has obtained an epistemological and ontological 
dimension. No longer merely a figural flourish of 
prose, the metaphor has acquired an important role in 
the study of human understanding (p. 2 53).
Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics were the first texts
to treat the theory of metaphor in some detail (RhC-tPXic,
Book III, chapters 2-4 and 10-11; R_Q_gti.CS, chapter 20 and
1459a 5-8; for a thorough analysis of Aristotle's theory of
metaphor, see Ricoeur, 1977, pp. 9-43). Aristotle defined
metaphor as "giving the thing a name that belongs to
something else; the transference being either from genus to
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species, or from species to genus, or from species to 
3pecies, or on grounds of analogy" (Roe.'tics 1^57^ 6-9). 
According to Johnson (1981), Aristotle's definition of 
metaphor established the metaphor as, (1) a transference 
between words, rather than at the level of the sentence,
(2) a deviation from literal usage, and (3) based on 
similarities between things (pp. 5-6). Aristotle's theory of 
metaphor is usually seen as establishing the view of 
metaphor as a stylistic device which substitutes one name 
for another, a view which persisted and grew until the 
Medieval period when metaphor came to be regarded as simply 
an ornamental trope which substituted one term for another 
to convey an idea in a lively or unusual way (see Johnson, 
1981, pp. 8-11; and Ricoeur, 1977, pp. (*4-48), However, 
Aristotle's writings do contain hints that he recognized 
metaphor's epistemic role. For example, in Rhetoric (1410b 
5-11) he maintains that "ordinary words convey only what we 
know already," but it is through metaphor that we can "best 
get hold" of a "new idea": "When the poet calls old age 'a
withered stalk,' he conveys a new idea, a new fact, to us by 
means of the general notion of 'lost bloom,' which is common 
to both things" [emphasis added]. (For an interpretation of 
Aristotle's theory of metaphor which stresses the epistemic 
aspect of Aristotle's theory, see Derrida, 1982, pp. 236- 
245 . )
Although the view of metaphor as a stylistic device 
which simply substitutes one word for another dominated
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until the twentieth century, some rhetorical theorists and
philosophers apparently did recognize metaphor's ability to
function epistemically. Osborn (1967b) argues that the view
of metaphor as a category of thought evolved "in a slow,
growing realization" in post-Renaissance western thought. He
finds nascent hints of such a view in the writings of Lord
Karnes, George Campbell, and others. Johnson (1981) argues
that an exception to the dominant view of metaphor was
Kant's insight that the metaphoric capacity is one aspect of
our ability to create new concepts that cannot be captured
in literal expression (p. 14). Another exception to the
dominant view, Nietzsche (1990), saw metaphor as basic to
the process of human intellection. He maintained that "the
drive toward the formation of metaphors is the fundamental
human drive, which one cannot for a single instant dispense
with in thought" (p. 894). Nietzsche argued that all
language formation itself is metaphoric:
To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an 
image: first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated 
in a sound: second metaphor. And each time there is a 
complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the 
middle of an entirely new and different one (p. 890).
Thus, when we speak of things, "we believe that we know
something about the things themselves," but our words are
"nothing but metaphors for things" (pp. 890-891). Nietzsche
said that the concepts we accept as "truths" are nothing but
"metaphors that have become worn out" (p. B91).
In Permajnieoge and Change (originally published in 1935)
Kenneth Burke was one of the first twentieth-century
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theorists to maintain that metaphor has a heuristic and 
epistemic role. In functioning as a "perspective by 
incongruity" it brings together terms from different 
categories of association and thereby allows us to see 
heretofore unrevealed relationships (Burke, 1984b, pp. 89- 
96). Burke tied metaphor to motives through his concept of 
"perspective" (see Ivie, 1988). A "perspective" is a point 
of view or a general orientation for the interpretation of 
reality (Burke, 19B4b, pp. 5~14; also, see Ivie, 1988, pp. 
1-2). Motives are linguistic explanations or justifications 
for conduct based upon the accepted norms of our language 
group, and are thus assigned with reference to our 
orientation or perspective (Burke, 1984b, pp. 19-31). 
Therefore, motives are a subset or result of our perspective 
(pp. 25-31), and ipe.t.aEhPX.5 provide perspective: "Metaphor is 
a device for seeing something in f-.enD? of something else 
.... to consider A from the point of view of B is, of 
course, to use B as a perspective upon A" [emphases in 
original] (Burke, 1969a, pp. 503-504). Burke (1973) further 
maintained that "[e]very perspective requires a metaphor, 
implicit or explicit, for its organizational base" (p. 152, 
n. 2). According to Burke (1966), symbolicity itself 
contains a perfectionistic tendency or "compulsion" toward 
carrying out the "implications of one's terminology" (p.
19). All words, including metaphors, function as 
"terministic screens," filters through which we view 
reality. Much of what "we take as observations about
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'reality' may be but the spinning out of possibilities 
implicit in our particular choice of terms" (Burke, 1966, p. 
46). Thus, metaphor is more than a decorative device for an 
idea. Metaphors imply truth claims. By organizing 
"perspective" and providing "screens" through which to view 
the world, they function as ways of depicting reality. The 
unpacking of the meaning contained in a metaphor can reveal 
the epistemic claim implied by the metaphor.
Richards (1936) maintained that metaphor is an 
"omnipresent principle" of language and thought: "Thought is
metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of 
language derive therefrom" [emphasis in original] (pp. 92- 
94). Like Burke, Richards also realized that metaphor raises 
significant epistemological issues. The processes of 
metaphoric creation and the exchanges between meaning and 
metaphor are "super-imposed upon a perceived world which is 
itself a product of earlier or unwitting metaphor, and we 
shall not deal with them [metaphors] justly if we forget 
that this is so" (pp. 108-109). Richards also made an 
important break from the traditional view of metaphor as a 
process of describing a resemblence or similarity between 
objects by pointing out that many metaphors depend upon a 
relationship of dissirnilerity or disparity between objects,
thus creating a new meaning by creating or positing a
heretofore .Hnaeen...S.imiVerity (similar to Burke's concept of 
"perspective by incongruity") (pp. 107-109). I will return 
to Richards' theory of metaphor shortly when I discuss the
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interaction theory of metaphor which was originated by 
Richards, but for now I will continue with the discussion of 
twentieth-century theories of metaphor to illustrate the 
role modern metaphor theory has ascribed to metaphor in 
describing and creating reality.
For Grassi (1980), also, metaphor plays a central role 
in the process of thought and meaning creation. For him 
metaphor is not only an interaction between two objects, but 
is basic to the process of ingenium. I_ng.eni.uni is the 
fundamental and primary mode of human thought. It is the 
grasping of original insight as invention and discovery of 
ideas, relationships, and premises (pp. 7-8, 91-92). Thus, 
ingenium precedes deduction, because one can only draw 
deductive conclusions from premises or insights one has 
already grasped (pp. 45-46). According to Grassi, this 
capacity for original insight is the metaphoric process, 
because truly original ideas can only be expressed in 
metaphors: "The metaphor is, therefore, the original form of
the interpretative act itself, which raises itself from the 
particular to the general through representation in an 
image" (p. 7). Note the similarity of Grassi's theory to 
those of Kant and Nietzsche discussed above, who all see 
metaphor as basic to the process of the discovery and 
articulation of original concepts.
Hayden White also sees metaphor as integral to the 
discovery of original insights. He further argues that 
metaphor can be the first step in the creation of patterns
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of discourse and meaning-formation. White ( 1978) begins by 
maintaining that the study of the human sciences relies on 
tropes: "[T]ropics is the process by which all discourse
constitutes the objects which it pretends only to describe 
realistically and to analyze objectively" [emphasis in 
original] (p. 2). Since understanding is the process of 
making familiar the unfamiliar--that is, of moving from the 
domain of unclassified experience to that of encoded, 
accepted associations--it necessarily requires the process 
of troping. Thus, the process of understanding proceeds by 
exploitation of the four master tropes --metaphor, metonymy, 
synecdoche, and irony (White, 1978, p. 5). (On the four 
master tropes, also see Burke, 1969a, pp. 503-517. ) 
Therefore, White believes that the "archetypal plot of 
discursive formations" moves from "original metaphorical 
characterization of a domain of experience, through 
metonymic deconstructions of its elements, to synecdochic 
representations of the relations between its superficial 
attributes and its presumed essence," to, finally, ironic 
detachment and reflection on the inadequacy of the 
characterization itself to include all elements of the 
reality it is supposed to represent, or even to "self- 
reflexivity on the constructivist nature of the ordering 
principle itself" (pp. 5-6). White does not claim that this 
pattern of tropological prefiguration is universal, but that 
it does recur persistently in modern discourse. According to 
White, a historian's choice of a governing metaphor becomes
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a heuristic rule which determines what will be considered as 
historical data (pp. 46-47). In sum, in a manner similar to 
that of Grassi and Nietzsche, White sees metaphor as the 
initial characterization which establishes the framework for 
the construction of patterns of human consciousness and 
meaning-creation.
Philosophers of language have noted the relationship 
between metaphor and the polysemic nature of language. For 
Foucault (1972), the polysemic nature of language renders a 
statement neither completely visible nor completely hidden. 
Language, after its "meaning" is extracted always contains 
leftover meaning--a "proliferation of thoughts, images, or 
fantasies." Thus, an "analysis of statements can never 
confine its attention to the things said, to the sentences 
that were actually spoken or written, to the 'signifying' 
elements that were traced or pronounced" (p. 109). It must
also consider the leftover meanings that have left traces, 
awaiting the moment when they might be used again. Because 
of the polysemic nature of language all statements contain a 
profusion of meanings, some of these obviously metaphoric.
Ricoeur's (1973) analysis of creativity and polysemy in 
language treats metaphor as a "creative use of polysemy and 
in that way a specific strategy of language. Instead of 
reducing or suppressing polysemy, metaphor uses polysemy as 
a means to preserve polysemy and to make it work in a most 
effective way" (p. 105). When we accept a metaphor as
meaningful "we perceive both the literal meaning which is
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bound by semantic incongruity and the new meaning which 
makes sense in the present context." Metaphor is a "clear 
case where polysemy is preserved instead of being screened." 
Two lines of interpretation are open at the same time and 
put into tension. Thus, several layers of meaning now dwell 
in the words themselves (p. 110). Moreover the relationship
between metaphor and polysemy is one in which metaphor 
creates and extends polysemy. Once a metaphor becomes 
accepted by the language community, it tends to become 
literal. "Then it is merely added to the previous polysemy 
of the word. In this way we may say that metaphor is the 
procedure by which we extend polysemy" (Ricoeur, 197 3, p. 
110). I will present more on Ricoeur's theory of metaphor in 
the section on the interaction theory, which Ricoeur has 
extended. But before moving on to the interaction theory and 
its application to King's speech, I will mention the work of 
some rhetorical critics and theorists who have made use of 
and developed the new approaches to metaphor.
Rhetorical theorists have advanced the argument that 
metaphors provide prisms through which we interpret reality, 
thus directing action. In other words, metaphors can provide 
the linguistic frame through which actors perceive and deal 
with a situation (see Ivie, 1987, p. 166; Leff, 1983, pp.
219, 222-223). For example, Ivie (1982) demonstrates how a
particular metaphor can become literalized in use. That is, 
the element of analogy is forgotten and the metaphor 
dominates the discourse to the degree that it excludes all
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other perspectives. Carpenter's (1990) study shows how the 
"frontier" metaphor of American westward expansion has been 
transferred and updated to fit new situations Americans have 
encountered in the Spanish-American War, World War I, World 
War II, the Cold War, and Vietnam. These subsequent American 
challenges were thus framed as extensions of the American 
frontier experience. The metaphor establishes a "terministic 
incentive" by providing the nomenclature which "necessarily 
directs the attention into some channels rather than others" 
(Burke, 1966, p. 45). Osborn's (1967a, 1977) work has 
demonstrated how the use of archetypal metaphors such as 
"the sea" and light/dark imagery can establish structures of 
meaning in discourse (light/dark imagery in "I Have a Dream" 
is discussed briefly in chapter four and will be discussed 
more extensively later in this chapter). The work of Ivie 
<1980, 1987) and Jamieson (1980) on how metaphoric clusters
can be studied to identify the patterns of meaning 
constituted by a rhetor will be discussed later in this 
chapter.
In sum, modern theories of metaphor reject the 
traditional view of metaphor as the substitution of a 
figurative or poetic term for a literal expression, the 
purpose of which being to "dress up" an idea or make it more 
vivid, for a view which sees metaphor as part and parcel of 
the process of rhetorical invention and meaning creation. As 
Osborn (1967b) summarized the contrast between the two 
views: "Metaphor, instead of being selected after and apart
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from the discovery of ideas, occurs anterior to, and 
actually generates, the discovery of ideas" (p. 130).
The Interaction Theory of Metaphor 
Many of the strands of modern theories of metaphor come 
together in the interaction theory of metaphor, which 
provides a methodology for ascertaining the meaning 
structures implied by a particular metaphor. The interaction 
view of metaphor was first presented by I.A. Richards in 
1936. In The Philosophy of Rhetoric he maintained that "... 
when we use metaphor we have two thoughts of different 
things active together and supported by a single word, or 
phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction" 
(Richards, 193 6, p. 93). Metaphor, then, is a "borrowing 
between and intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between 
contexts" [emphasis in original] (p. 94). Richards' theory
is a significant advance over the classical concept of 
metaphor in two respects. First, it is a movement away from 
the idea of the substitution of one word fop another, and 
toward the idea of metaphor as the bringing together of two 
contexts ,_o£_ meaning (p* 93). When a metaphor is used it is 
more than the exchange of one word for another. It is the 
bringing together of two entire realms of association. 
Secondly, Richards realized that the interaction between the 
two contexts creates an entirely new m eaning, "a meaning of 
more varied powers" than could be ascribed to either alone 
(p. 100). Richards also greatly simplified our terminology
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for the parts of the metaphor and facilitated analysis by 
introducing the terms "tenor," for the principal subject or 
original idea, and "vehicle," for the borrowed idea or 
metaphoric image (p. 96). (For analyses of Richards’ theory
of metaphor, see Johnson, 1981, pp. 18-19; and Ricoeur,
1977, pp. 76-83).
Max Black (1962) extended Richards' interaction theory. 
Rejecting the substitution theory, that a metaphor is used 
in place of some equivalent literal expression (pp. 31-34), 
and the comparison view, that metaphor is a presentation of 
an underlying analogy or similarity (pp. 35-37), Black 
argues that metaphor "has its own distinctive capacities and 
achievements" and that in some cases it "creates" a 
similarity rather than formulating an antecedently existing 
one (p. 37). Black endorses Richards' interaction view: in
metaphor two thoughts "... are 'active together' and 
'interact' to produce a meaning that is a resultant of that 
interaction" (p. 38); the reader is forced to "connect" the
two ideas (p. 39). Black further argues that metaphor works 
by applying to the tenor a system of "associated 
commonplaces" or accepted implications that are 
characteristic of the vehicle (pp. 40, 44). Any
characteristics of the tenor that can be understood in terms 
of the vehicle will be foregrounded, or "rendered 
prominent." The tenor, then, is "seen through" the vehicle 
(p. 41). Thus, the metaphorical meaning emerges as the two
interact with one another and various aspects of each are
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selected, emphasized, or suppressed according to what makes 
sense in the particular context (see Leff, 1983, p. 217).
Max Black's work added to Richards' interaction theory 
by explaining how the context of meaning of the vehicle 
gives rise to new meaning in the tenor. By virtue of its 
"associated commonplaces"--that is, by virtue of the 
preconceptions and ideas associated in the linguistic 
community with the vehicle--the vehicle acts as a filter or 
screen to organize our view of the tenor. In this way it 
confers "insight" (see Ricoeur, 1977, p. 87). However, 
Black's notion of "associated commonplaces" only considers 
connotations which are already established (see Ricoeur, 
1977, p. 88). Thus we are left with a type of substitution 
theory--although an advance over the original--in which we 
have merely exchanged "associated commonplaces" for the word 
itself. Beardsley's (1962) work resolves this difficulty by 
pointing out that metaphorical meaning need not depend on 
actual properties of its objects, but often acts at the 
level of sense or meaning: " ... the metaphor transforms a
property (actual or attributed) into a sense" [emphasis in 
original] (p. 302). As the metaphor is employed in other
applications in its new sense, it is not only actualizing an 
existing connotation, but establishing a new one (p. 302).
Thus, a metaphor may not only "thrust latent connotations 
into the foreground of meaning," but bring "into play some 
properties that were not previously meant by it" (p. 303).
In this way, metaphor is actualizing meanings not yet
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present in our conceptual system. (For an analysis of 
Beardsley's theory of metaphor, see Ricoeur, 1977, pp. 90- 
98 . )
The interaction theory of metaphor is an advance over 
the classic substitution theory in three respects. First, it 
recognizes that words themselves are not metaphoric. Words 
are only metaphoric within the context of a sentence or a 
larger body of discourse (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 106). Secondly, 
the interaction theory recognizes that a metaphor has to 
pose a tenor against a vehicle. It is the unity, or the 
tension, of the two within the context of the discourse, 
which creates metaphorical meaning (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 106). 
And thirdly, with the contributions of Black and Beardsley, 
the interaction theory recognizes that it is not merely a 
matter of comparing objects to determine which properties 
applying to one also apply to the other, but instead that an 
entire system of associative meanings (both pre-existent and 
those newly-created by the metaphorical interaction) is 
being used to filter or organize some other system (Johnson, 
1981, p. 28 ) .
Thus, according to Ricoeur, within this new framework, 
metaphor's predicative and epistemological character is 
revealed. For Ricoeur, more directly than any other 
theorist, the problem of metaphor is connected to the issue 
of the relationship between truth and reality. The meaning 
of metaphor ultimately turns on the question of predication; 
i.e., what is meant by the copula "to be." Thus, the study
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of metaphor raises questions of ontology, epistemology, and 
metaphysics. The metaphoric utterance exploits access to a 
network of predicates in a familiar field of reference. This 
already-constituted meaning is taken from its initial field 
and cast into a new referential field in which it functions 
to delineate meaning. This transfer requires the receptive 
field to be already present in an unarticulated manner which 
exerts an attraction on the already-constituted field of 
meaning to tear it away from its initial haven. It is 
therefore in the semantic scope of the initial 
(unarticulated) field that the energy required to make the 
transfer resides. This transfer would not be possible if 
meaning were stable (Ricoeur, 1977, p. 299). Metaphor thus 
relies upon a purposive semantic discrepancy in which two 
semantic fields collide. The metaphoric attribution is the 
construction of a network of interactions as the resultant 
contradiction, and its semantic resolution, create new 
meaning (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 106; 1977, pp. 98-99).
Metaphorical meaning "does not merely consist of a semantic 
clash but of the new predicative meaning which emerges from 
the collapse" of the common, usual meaning [emphasis in 
original] (Ricoeur, 1978, p. 146). It is in this moment of 
imagination, what Ricoeur (1978) calls the insight of 
"predicative assimilation" that new meaning is born (pp. 
147-148). In metaphor, "to be" is used in a non-literal, 
non-denotative, thus transcendent, sense. The distinction 
between literal and figurative sense, and denotative and
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connotative meanings, are false dichotomies for Ricoeur. 
Literal usage is just figurative usage which has become 
accepted as conventional (Ricoeur, 1977, pp. 229-231, 236-
237, 290-291, 296-297). Therefore, according to Ricoeur 
(1977) the "place" of the metaphor is not in the word, the 
sentence, or even in the discourse, but in the copula of the 
verb to b e : "The metaphorical 'is' at once signifies both
'is not' and 'is like'," giving metaphorical reference the 
power to "redescribe reality” (p. 7). This is why Ricoeur
(1977) rejects the dissociation of a theory of resemblance 
from the interaction theory of metaphor (pp. 173-215). For 
him, resemblance is even more necessary in an interaction 
theory than in a substitution theory. The predicative 
attribution of metaphor is an attribution of similarity or 
resemblance, the resemblance of "seeing as." But the 
resemblance of "seeing as" is "no longer the resemblance 
between two ideas, but that very resemblance 'seeing a s ' 
establishes" (p. 213). In other words, it is the predicative
resemblance of the metaphoric attribution (see pp. 188-190,
19<* ) .
Thus, Ricoeur's extension of the interaction theory 
into the realm of predication opens epistemology to 
metaphoric intervention, raising questions concerning the 
relationship between language and reality. The underlying 
issue of Ricoeur's work is, as Johnson (1981) notes, whether 
reality is objectively given, so that we can only stand 
apart and comment upon it, "or whether we have a 'world'
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only by virtue of having a language and system of value­
laden concepts that make experience possible" (p. 41). 
Ricoeur's theory sees metaphor as a way of making and 
experiencing our world and gives metaphor an epistemological 
dimension. We experience the world not passively, but by 
means of projecting our thought system (through language and 
metaphor) upon it.
The Second Persona 
I will shortly examine the major metaphors in King's "I 
Have a Dream" speech to determine how his tenors and 
vehicles interact to produce meaning, to redescribe reality. 
However, there is one more aspect of modern theories of 
metaphor which requires examination. In a sense, Edwin 
Black's (1970) essay, "The Second Persona," introduced to 
the field of rhetorical criticism the modern re- 
conceptual ization of metaphor. Black argues that there is a 
reciprocal relationship between the language a rhetor uses 
and his or her thinking or "inner state" (p. 110). 
Furthermore, the discourse not only implies something about 
the author, if it is accepted by the auditor it also implies 
an "ideology" and a role for the auditor--i .e ., "the second 
persona" (pp. 111-113). Black writes: "Actual auditors look
to the discourse they are attending for cues that tell them 
how to view the world ..." and, the "critic can see in the 
auditor implied by the discourse a model of what the rhetor 
would have his real auditor become" (p. 113). As a
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paradigmatic example Black examines the "cancer of 
communism" metaphor in the discourse of the "Radical Right" 
to see what such a metaphor implies about the world view of 
the audience which attends to that discourse. Black 
concludes by suggesting that there are "strong and 
multifarious links between a style and an outlook" and that 
the critic may legitimately "move from the manifest evidence 
of style to the human personality that this evidence 
projects as a beckoning archetype" (p. 119). If, indeed, 
metaphors have the power to "redescribe reality" as Ricoeur 
asserts, then the acceptance of a rhetor's metaphors would 
be an acceptance of his or her description of reality. Booth
(1978) argues: "To understand a metaphor is by its very 
nature to decide whether to join the metaphorist or reject 
him, and that is simultaneously to decide either to be 
shaped in the shape his metaphor requires or to resist" 
[emphases in original] (p. 65). For Booth, so strong is this
link between the acceptance of a metaphor and acceptance of 
the reality it posits, that he maintains " ... the quality
of any culture will in part be measured both by the quality 
of the metaphors it induces or allows and the quality of the 
judges of metaphor that it educates and rewards" (p. 64). 
Thus, the concept of the second persona will allow the 
metaphoric analysis to be extended to the second person, so 
to speak, to determine the implied role assigned to the 
auditors by their acceptance of King's metaphorical world.
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Metaphoric Clusters 
The sheer number of metaphors in the "Dream" speech 
makes a detailed analysis of each one a daunting task. As 
Leff (1987) has stated, the metaphors in the "I Have a 
Dream" speech "are so diverse and so densely packed that, 
when examined in detail, they tend to bewilder the critic 
rather than to yield insight into the structural integrity 
of the text" (pp. 1-2). However, an analysis in terms of 
King's metaphoric clusters, or his system of associated 
metaphorical concepts, will yield a better understanding of 
how King's metaphors contribute to the overall meaning of 
the text than would a study of particular metaphors as if 
they are unrelated phenomena. The concept of metaphoric 
clusters has been employed by Ivie (1980; 1987) and Jamieson
(19B0). Ivie (1980) points out that the toppi a rhetor may 
call upon form "associated clusters." The topoi used to 
generate a constellation of meaning can be studied to 
identify the "strategies by which discourse is infused with 
rhetorical appeal" (p. 282). The critic can arrange a
rhetor's vehicles into subgroups by clustering those 
containing similar concepts (Ivie, 1987, p. 167). Jamieson 
(1980) argues that "metaphors simultaneously create 
inventional possibilities and impose inventional 
constraint." Adopting a particular metaphor involves the 
rejection of others and entails the spinning out of 
consistent metaphors within that cluster (p. 54). She 
contends that by examination of recurrent patterns of
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metaphoric usage "critics can minimize the likelihood that 
they are generalizing from aberrant rhetorical cues" (p.
51 ) .
There are three main metaphoric clusters in King's "I 
Have a Dream" speech. First, early in the speech there is 
King's extended "check/promissory note" metaphor. In King's 
prepared text this metaphor provides a major theme early in 
the speech around which King intended to emphasis the 
overdue obligations America owed to its citizens of color 
(see C. S. King, 1969, p. 236; M. L. King, 1963b). Secondly, 
King employs a number of metaphors of the type Osborn 
(1967a) has termed "archetypal." These are metaphors based 
on basic and prominent features of human experience, thus 
transcending time and culture. Examples of archetypal 
metaphors include water and sea metaphors, dark/light 
images, down/up images, and mountain and valley metaphors. 
Some of these images have been commented upon in the 
previous chapter. However, dark/light imagery, because of 
its association with what is the most significant natural 
cycle humans experience, the daily rising and setting of the 
sun, is perhaps the most important archetypal metaphor. 
Dark/light imagery is at the center of a cluster of 
metaphoric images King employs involving dichotomies of 
down/up, backward/forward, and bound/free. Thirdly, the 
metaphor of the "dream" is quite significant in this 
speech. The "dream" sequence is the climatic moment of the 
speech and the passage for which the speech is named and
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remembered. "Dream" is King’s metaphor for his vision of the 
future (of the beloved community), which, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, is the transcendent moment of the speech 
in which King elides social and political differences for 
his audience. Therefore, I will examine three metaphoric 
clusters in King's "I Have a Dream" speech: (1) the
"check/promissory note" cluster; (2) the use of dark/light 
metaphors and its associated clusters; and (3) the "dream" 
cluster. My procedure will be threefold. First, using the 
interaction theory of metaphor (as extended by Ricoeur and 
others) presented earlier in this chapter, I will examine 
each metaphoric cluster to determine what is the vehicle1s 
predicative attribution with regard to the tenor. That is, 
what perspective is the auditor being invited to adopt, what 
reality is King describing, through his selection of 
metaphors? Secondly, applying the theory of the second 
persona, I examine the metaphors to determine what role the 
discourse assigns to the auditor who accepts King's 
metaphoric world. And thirdly, in conjunction with the above 
and with the analysis presented in the previous chapters of 
King's speech as a guilt-purification-redemption drama, I 
consider the relationship of the metaphoric clusters to one 
another and to the text as a whole.
Metaphor in "I Have a Dream"
I contend that when we examine the relationship among 
King's three main metaphoric clusters we will see that they
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maintain and reinforce the structural integrity of the 
text's guilt-purification-redemption form. First, the "bad 
check" metaphor occurs early in the speech. A bad check 
conveys the idea of an unpaid obligation, of something owed 
to someone. This corresponds to the guilt phase of the 
redemption drama for whites (although it does reinforce the 
purification through victimage element for blacks).
Secondly, most of the dark/light imagery, and its associated 
metaphors of down/up, backward/forward, and bound/free occur 
in the middle one-third of the speech (although some do 
occur early in the speech, these are mostly "bound" images 
which reinforce the element of guilt and prepare the way for 
movement to the second term of the above pairings). This 
imagery conveys the sense of struggle between evil and good 
and between injustice and justice, and of movement, forward 
and upward, or from dark to light or bound to free. This 
corresponds to the purificatory phase of the redemption 
drama. In the final one-third of the speech the contrasting 
metaphors (dark/light, down/up, bound/free, etc.) are almost 
completely absent. The final third of the speech is 
dominated by images that portray events on a higher and 
mystic plane ("dreams" and mountains) and on an even level, 
where the vision of equality is being described (Leff, 1987, 
makes this same point). This corresponds to the redemptive 
phase of the redemption drama.
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The. "Check/Promis sory Note." Cl us ter
Early in his speech King uses the extended metaphor of
a "check11 or "promissory note," around which he clusters a
series of financial/legal terms, to describe the rights to
which black people have been entitled but denied:
In a sense we've come to our nation's capital to a
check. When the architects of our Republic wrote the 
magnificent words of the Constitution and the 
Declaration of Independence, they were signing a 
promissory note to which every American was to fall 
heir- This note was a promise that all men--yes, black 
men as well as white men--would be guaranteed the 
unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.
It is obvious that America has defaulted on this 
promissory note insofar as her citizens of color are 
concerned. Instead of honoring this sacred obligation, 
America has given the Negro people a bad_cheokt a check 
which has come back marked "insufficient funds." But we 
refuse to believe that the bank of justice is bankrupt. 
We refuse to believe that there are insufficient funds 
in the great vault.5 of opportunity of this nation. So
we've come to cash, .this check--a check which will give
us upon demand the riches of freedom and the security 
of justice [all emphases added] (M. L. King, 1963d, pp. 
7 2 3 - ) .
My approach in examining this extended metaphor or 
analogy is twofold: first, what type of metaphoric
interaction is taking place between the vehicle and the 
tenor--that is, what is the vehicle predicating about the 
tenor; and secondly, what does the metaphor imply about the 
second persona--that is, what is the world view and role of 
the audience?
The tenor of this metaphor is the rights owed to 
African-Americans. The vehicle, of course, is the check or 
promissory note, the later being a financial obligation to 
pay a certain amount of funds at a specified time. The
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metaphor predicates social and political rights in 
financial/economic terms. In other words, King is using a 
financial vehicle to describe a moral obligation. This 
metaphorical attribution presents several problems. When 
money is owed, one can pay the sum owed, with interest, and 
the debt is canceled, but how does one make good on a moral 
obligation? The main implication of the check/promissory 
note vehicle is one of financial and legal specificity. 
Checks and promissory notes state precisely what is owed and 
exactly when and how it is to be paid. A check is "made 
good" by paying a specific amount in dollars upon 
presentation of the check to a proper financial institution. 
There are certain easily-completed, commonly-known 
procedures for cashing a check. For example, one will need 
to endorse it and often show identification. Furthermore, 
once a check is paid, it is "paid in full." There is no 
outstanding balance and it is easy to determine if the 
amount due has been paid in full.
Thus, if the rights owed to black people in America are 
like a check or promissory note, several implications 
follow. We are precisely sure what those rights are and we 
can easily determine if they have been paid in full. We know 
exactly what is owed and specifically to whom. The procedure 
for "cashing in" upon those rights is a routine and 
relatively simple task. Hqwevex, "rights" such as "life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness," "justice," and 
"freedom" are amorphous and ill-defined concepts. Their
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nature is continually being worked out in the American legal 
and political process. There is no point at which one can 
say those "rights" have been guaranteed or "paid in full." 
There is no simple, routine procedure for "cashing in" upon 
such fluid concepts as "justice" and "liberty." Thus, King 
has employed a simplistic, quantifiable economic metaphor to 
organize the auditors' perspective on a complex, non- 
quantifiable situation. A complex social/moral obligation 
involving rights which are as yet unsecured (and for which 
there is as yet no national consensus as to the specific 
nature of that obligation) is being predicated in terms of 
something as quantifiable and routine as cashing a check. 
When money is owed one can pay the amount owed and the debt 
is canceled, but how does one pay back a moral obligation? 
The metaphor attempts to predicate a moral claim of social 
justice in terms of a specific financial obligation.
Another predication of this metaphor concerns the 
relationship of a victim to an institutional authority. 
"Checks," "promissory notes," "banks," and "vaults" are 
symbols of institutional authority and order--specifically 
financial institutions that harbor and safeguard resources. 
The "check" is supposed to give one access to those 
resources. But, if it is a "bad check" which has come back 
marked "insufficient funds," if the institution has 
"defaulted" on the "promissory note," then one has been 
£.he^ated • Thus one is a victim. And the victim is still owed 
something. To have received a "bad check," or to be the
153
victim of an unkept financial obligation, is to be the 
victim of one more wily and powerful than oneself (at least 
in the context of the way King weaves this metaphor, with 
references to institutional authority). This reinforces the 
concept of inequality between the races, with blacks as the 
victim and whites as the institutional authority who has 
cheated on its "promise," on its "sacred obligation." The 
victim is morally superior to the victimizer. This metaphor 
thus reinforces other allusions in the speech to white 
guilt, and black purification through being a victim (see 
chapters three and four), as well as reinforcing King's 
subtext of reconciliation through an exchange of black moral 
authority for white socio-economic authority (see chapter 
seven).
What does this metaphor of the check/promissory note 
imply about the second persona? When King speaks about "the 
bank of justice" and "the great vaults of opportunity of 
this nation," he tells his auditors that those rights are 
just sitting there in abundance (earning interest?) and that 
they can be simply handed over "upon demand." What role does 
that imply for the auditor? The auditor is one who presents 
her check to the bank, receives her payment and goes away 
and spends her money. It is an essentially passive role. In 
King's metaphor, the "cashing in" on "rights" is a simple, 
quick transaction, when in fact the guaranteeing of rights 
is a complicated, long-term, active process.
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In sum, although people play a role in agitating for 
and demanding their rights, once the "bank" recognizes its 
obligation to pay, the "rights" can be simply handed over 
and there is no further dispute about what is owed to whom. 
Those rights can now be freely and easily exercised--once 
one has cashed a check, the money can be freely and easily 
spent. There is no further obligation on the part of the 
bank and no further right to demand payment on the part of 
the payee. Such a metaphor implies that the rights to be won 
are clear and specific, the procedures of transaction will 
be quick and quotidian, and that the exercise of those 
rights will be easy and routine. Thus, King's
check/promissory note metaphor contributes to the elision of 
social and political differences among his hearers that is 
evident in the transcendent nature of his rhetoric in this 
speech, and possibly to the ultimate disappointment of 
African-Americans when the legal victories of the first 
phase of the civil rights movement failed to produce easy 
and immediate socio-economic equality. Just as King's 
redemption drama asks for no action on the part of his 
hearers, only that they have "faith" in the vision, this 
metaphor implies that we only need to have faith that once 
America recognizes its moral obligation, the previously- 
withheld rights can be simply handed over, presumably with 
interest, and all will be well. While King may have hoped to 
create a sympathetic attitude for an incipient action, this
155
particular metaphor predicates an attitude which substitutes 
intent for action (see Burke, 1969a, p. 476).
T h e j ) § E k / L l g h t C l y £ t & r
The second metaphoric cluster to be examined in King's
"Dream" speech is dark/light imagery and its associated,
dichotomous down/up, backward/forward, and bound/free
imagery, fill these metaphors involve good versus bad
antitheses, images of positive versus negative force, and/or
movement from the first term of the pair to the second.
These metaphors feature prominently in the speech, mainly by
connecting "injustice," "segregation," or "discrimination"
with darkness--or the first term in one of the above
dualities--and "justice," "freedom," or "equality" with
light--or the second, positive, term of the pair.
For example, early in the speech King combines
dark/light and bound/free images when he tells his listeners
that the Emancipation Proclamation "... came as a great
beacon light of hope to millions of Negro slaves who had
been seared in the flames of withering injustice. It came as
a joyous .daybreak to end the long night_ .©f the!r .captivity"
[all emphases added] (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 723). In the
next paragraph King exploits a series of "bound" vehicles to
depict the current situation of blacks in America:
... the Negro is still sadly crippled by the manacles 
of segregation and the chains of discrimination .... 
lives on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a 
vast ocean of material prosperity .... is still
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iarigyished.in the corners of American society and finds 
himself an exile in his own land [all emphases added] 
(p. 723).
After establishing the deplorable nature of blacks' 
condition in America with his "bound" vehicles, and then the 
use of the check/promissory note metaphor discussed above to 
communicate obligation, King returns to the dualistic 
metaphors of the dark/light cluster, but this time with 
images of movement from the negative terms of the pairs to 
the positive terms. "Now is the time to rise from the dark 
and desolate valley of segregation to sunlit path of racial 
justice. Now is the time to lift our nation from the 
quicksands of racial injustice to the solid rock of 
brotherhood" [all emphases added] (p. 724). In the next two
paragraphs the movement from negative to positive images is 
used again:
This sweltering.summer of the Negro's legitimate 
discontent will not pass until there is an invieorat.i ng 
autumn of freedom and equality .... The whirlwinds of 
revolt will continue to shake the foundations of our 
nation until the bright day of justice emerges [all 
emphases added] (p. 724).
Black people are then described, in a combination of forward
movement and light imagery, as "standting] on the warm
threshold which leads .into the palace of justice" [all
emphases added] (p. 724). ("Warmth" is part of the "light"
family of associations; see Osborn, 1967a, p. 122.) The next
two paragraphs make use of down/up and backward/forward
imagery, communicating the ideas of movement and determined
struggle toward a worthy goal:
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We must forever conduct our struggle on the high plane 
of dignity and discipline- We must not allow our 
creative protest to degenerate into physical violence. 
Again and again we must r ise to the majestic heights of 
meeting physical force with soul force .... And as we 
walk. we must make the pledge that we shall always 
march ahead. We csnDQt_tiir_Q_b&ck tail emphases added] 
(p. 724).
Thus, we see King employing a cluster of dualistic 
vehicles for injustice and segregation on the one hand, and 
justice, freedom, and equality, on the other hand, occurring 
mostly in the middle third of the speech (between the end of 
the "check/promissory note" cluster and the beginning of the 
"dream" cluster) which make use of contrasts between, and 
movement from, negative to positive images, as well as 
spatial movement forward and upward. This metaphoric 
cluster, through its use of images of change, movement, and 
struggle between good and evil (or between positive and 
negative forces) complements the purification stage of the 
redemption drama (see chapter four).
What are the implications of the use of this metaphoric 
cluster? What does this type of language predicate about the 
civil rights movement? Darkness connotes nighttime, 
blindness or difficulty in seeing, and fear of the unknown. 
Light is associated with sight, with warmth, with daytime; 
in short, positive things. Obviously dark/light imagery can 
be a powerful rhetorical device for speakers who want to 
associate one thing with positive values and its opposite 
with negative values. However, Osborn (1967a) finds further 
rhetorical implications of such imagery. First, dark/light 
images "indicate and perpetuate simplistic, two-valued,
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black-white attitudes which rhetoricians and their audiences 
seem so often to prefer;" it "simplifies complex situations 
and facilitates choice" (pp. 117, 118). Thus, while King's 
metaphors associate "justice" with light and positive 
values, and "injustice" with darkness and negative values, 
they also reinforce the simplistic thinking about complex 
social issues that we saw in his check/promissory note 
metaphor, but this time cast in the frame of binary 
antithesis. The distinction between injustice and justice is
as clear as the distinction between night and day. For the
auditor, the choice is simple and the values are absolute. 
There is no in-between, no shades of meaning, no degrees of 
justice or injustice--"you are either part of the problem or
part of the solution," as a popular saying of the 1960s
went. Thus, King's dark/light imagery helps effect the 
polarization of the audience into those who are saved (those 
whose are redeemed, those who have "seen the light") and 
those who are lost (racists). In King's transcendent vision, 
one either accepts the transcendent values of the social 
order, or one mires in sin and rebellion. The individual 
(and the nation) is either destined for a secular heaven or 
condemned to the hell of racial injustice and segregation. 
The other metaphors in this cluster--down/up, 
backward/forward, bound/free--also reinforce thinking in 
terms of two-valued, simplistic dichotomies. For example, in 
King's metaphoric world, one is either "bound" or "free." 
"Freedom," however, is not an absolute, but always a matter
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of degree. All human beings who are part of a social order 
have restrictions on their freedom. These metaphors eschew 
thinking in terms of moral and social complexity in favor of 
binary antithesis. A metaphoric cluster centered around 
images of evolutionary progress probably would have been 
more descriptive of how social change actually occurs, and 
perhaps proved less disappointing to adherents of the 
movement when its moral and legal victories did not 
immediately catapult African-Americans from bound, down, and 
dark injustice to a world of freedom, equality, and justice. 
Metaphors of evolutionary progress mignt not have been as 
effective in the short-run, but might have better sustained 
the movement for the long-run than did dualistic metaphors 
promising a utopian world of freedom and equality. A 
treatment of the civil rights movement in more complex terms 
might have better prepared it to deal with the imperfect 
accomplishment of its goals than did the treatment of issues 
in terms of two-valued dichotomies.
Secondly, Osborn (1957a) notes that dark/light images 
carry with them a sense of inevitability or determinism. The 
inevitable cycle of nature is that day follows night. 
Dark/light imagery, by associating the present with darkness 
and the future with light, carries with it implications of 
the routine, determined spinning of the earth (pp. 117-119). 
In King's address, if "justice" is inevitable. the situation 
is under the ultimate control of a higher power. It is the 
moral law of the universe. King had often told his audiences
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that "the universe is on the side of justice" (M. L. King, 
1957a, p. 31) and that "God is with us in our struggle" (M. 
L. King, 1981, p. 65, 110). The idea of determinism and the
inevitability of ultimate justice is reinforced by King's 
use of nature metaphors (changing seasons, flowing waters, 
valleys and mountains) and constant use of images of forward 
and upward movement.
In terms of the second persona, again, we see the 
reinforcing of an essentially passive role for the audience. 
There is no specific, active role for the audience to play 
beyond supporting its leaders in agitating for "rights" and 
"justice." The "rights" demanded are specific and easily 
provided, and the expected condition of "justice" is 
inevitable and clearly distinguishable from the present 
state of "injustice." The use of seasonal and nature 
metaphors strengthens the sense of determinism and 
inevitability, thus casting the auditor in an essentially 
passive role. In addition, dark/light, down/up, and 
backward/forward Imagery, and nature metaphors, are non­
specific about political means and general about time. These 
metaphors set the stage for the transcending of social and 
political differences, and the reconstituting of real, 
historical time as mythic and supernatural time, in the 
final one-third of the speech.
161
The_ Dream" Cluster
The final one-third of King’s "I Have a Dream" speech 
is dominated by the image of the "dream." In his study of 
the metaphoric clusters in Henry Wallace's rhetoric, Ivie 
(1987 ) places "dream" as a vehicle in the dark/light cluster 
along with "light," "dawn," "vision," "nightmare," "down," 
"dark," and others (p. 170). While "dream" as a vehicle may
often belong in a "light" cluster through its associations 
with vision and seeing, in this speech it belongs in a 
separate cluster. Not only does the "dream" vehicle form an 
organizing principle which dominates the final one-third of 
the speech, but it is also used in a manner different from 
the way the dark/light cluster was used in the middle of the 
speech. The dark/light cluster was used to express contrast 
between "injustice" and "discrimination" on the one hand, 
and "freedom" and "justice" on the other, and then struggle 
between and movement from the negative term to the positive 
term of each antithetical pair. In the final one-third of 
the speech the element of contrast, struggle, and movement 
is considerably lessened as King speaks more from an 
elevated plane envisioning a world in which freedom, justice 
and equality have been achieved. As Leff (1987), who divides 
the speech into two halfs, puts it, the first half is 
dominated by down/up patterns of strife, while in the second 
half, it "is as though King has risen to a high plateau 
where everything is even and on the same level" (p. 3) and
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where "a condition of strife gives way to fixed, timeless 
principles of equality" (p. 6).
The "dream" vehicle also poses a slightly different 
problem of analysis than the previous metaphors in the 
speech because it has two different senses. R dream is a 
series of mental images that occur in a state of sleep. 
However, "dream" can also mean an aspiration, an ambition, 
or a hope, as in "the American dream." The latter is clearly 
the sense in which King meant to cast this metaphor. We can 
discern this from the total context of the speech, as well 
as the immediate context, where King says: " ... I still 
have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the American 
dream" (M.L. King, 1963d, p. 725). "The American dream," of 
course, is a phrase used rather loosely for an individual 
goal or hope for "the good life" of work, family, 
independence, and financial security. So when King says "I 
have a dream ..." he is essentially saying "I have a hope" 
or a "vision" for America that looks like this. But while 
"dream" has come to mean a hope, vision, or aspiration, it 
originally means a series of mental images occurring during 
sleep (see Oxford English Dictionary. Vol. (*, p. 1036). 
Therefore, in this case we have a vehicle with a double 
level of meaning: "dream" as mental images during sleep
(level one) and "dream" as goal, vision, or aspiration 
(level two). Although from the context we can clearly 
discern that King meant "dream" in its level-two sense, the 
first-level implrcatipns are nonetheless inherent in the use
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of the term. As Richards ( 1936 ) points out, when we use a 
word, the other words in the language that overlap with it 
in sound and meaning form a part of the context for 
determining its meaning (pp. 62-63) . Therefore, "dream" 
level-two (as a hope or aspiration) always contains within 
it, as part of it, the sense of "dream" level-one (as mental 
images in sleep). The latter is nQ.t extracted from the 
meaning of the former, but the former is grafted onto the 
meaning of the latter. So in this case we have a vehicle 
which has a double level of meaning, and both levels of 
meaning must be considered. Together, they facilitate King's 
attempt to elide social and political differences through 
transcendence to the mythic and supernatural realms.
"Dream" at its first level of meaning, as mental images 
occurring during sleep, bridges the conscious with the 
unconscious and the secular with the spiritual. White (1978) 
says that metaphor functions as a symbol rather than as a 
sign; it gives directions for finding the set of images it 
seeks to characterize. The metaphor does not suggest 
specific attributes, but that the tenor shares qualities 
that have come to symbolize the vehicle in customary 
linguistic usages of the culture (p. 91). In western 
culture, dreams are commonly seen as a window to the 
unconscious mind, and in the Judeo-Christian tradition as 
the manner in which God sends a message or reveals his will 
to his servants (see Parman, 1991). Thus, "dream" (level-
one ) predicates transcendence and communication between the
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consciousness and unconscious realms and "the natural and 
supernatural realms. The implication of King's vision as a 
"dream" is that King has access to some transcendent realm 
of consciousness.
Hariman (1909) has noted other implications in King's 
speech associated with "dream" (level one). "Dream" as 
mental images during sleep is a vehicle which "... takes us 
out of time. A dream by definition is not a part of real 
time. Dreams have no secure, measurable sense of duration; 
dreams regularly scramble time and still make sense" (p. 
211). Thus, "dream," at its first-level meaning, is a 
vehicle which carries implications of uncertain duration, a 
scrambling of chronology and contexts, and of vaguely- 
remembered images that occur in an unconscious or semi­
conscious state. While Hariman is basically correct about 
the nature of time in dreams, he is incorrect in saying that 
they "still make sense." In fact, dreams usually do not make 
much sense. They are difficult to recall and to understand. 
Therefore, the predication of "dream" (level-one) is of 
something of a vague and uncertain nature that takes place 
outside of real time. The implication of King's vision as a 
"dream" is that the auditor is left uncertain as to when and 
how this is supposed to take place. The "dream" of the 
racially just and harmonious society is a beautiful utopian 
vision, but time frames and specific political actions are 
neglected. Dreams are, after all, illusions, self- 
deceptions. They are phenomena which real when they are
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being experienced, but are in fact, not real. The English 
word "dream" comes from the old Germanic root word draugmo . 
which has two senses, the first meaning ioy, mirth, or 
music, but in its second sense meaning deception or illusion 
(Dxf oxd JEnglish^DictipriaEY, Vol. <1, p. 1036). What role is 
the auditor to play in bringing about this vision? Again, 
the second persona is essentially passive.
"Dream" at its second level of meaning, as a vision or 
a hope for the future (as in the "American dream") invokes 
American mythology. Hariman (198 9) notes: "King's dream 
evokes the American dream, that mythic celebration of 
prosperity for all achieved by individual initiative and 
effort. Again, we are pulled out of time and into those
myths used to legitimate the status quo" (p. 211). What are
the associated implications of the vehicle "dream" in this 
sense? The American dream is a national mythic construct-- an 
Horatio Alger parable of prosperity through hard work and
virtue. While this sense of "dream" does imply a more active
role for the auditor (sort of a self-help, "pulling yourself 
up by your bootstraps" role), as Hariman notes, even at this 
level of meaning the "dream" vehicle pulls the audience out 
of real time and politics and into myth and legend. The 
vehicle provides no clue as to how or when this utopian 
vision is to be accomplished.
As I noted above, the "dream" metaphor dominates and 
organizes the final one-third of King's speech. As discussed 
in chapter four, this is the part of the speech which is the
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most transcendent as King moves out of historical time and 
the socio-political realm and into mythic time and the 
supernatural realm. The "dream" metaphor, with its 
symbolization of American mythology, and its implication of 
transcendence to the supernatural realm, is perfectly suited 
as a vehicle for carrying the redemptive phase of King's 
guilt-purification-redemption drama. The "dream" metaphor 
allows King to function as visionary, as seer, of the new 
redemptive state. The "dream" vehicle predicates both 
American mythology ("the American dream") and communication 
with the supernatural realm, thus reinforcing the dualistic 
nature of the secular/spiritual redemption King has invoked 
(see chapters three and four). This sense of King as secular 
visionary and mystic seer is reinforced by the other imagery 
used in this part of the speech* As discussed in chapter 
four, King's expression "dream" is clustered with Biblical 
language from the Book of Isaiah and then followed up with 
sentences employing the supernaturally-suggestive terms 
"faith" and "hope," and with images of mountains. The images 
of mountains reinforce King's stance as a mystic visionary. 
Burke (1969b) says that mountains can be associated with the 
"mystical" (p. 302). Leff (19B7) finds that by the end of
the dream sequence, "as he recalls the words of Isaiah, King 




Because of the power of metaphor and word choice to
shape human perception of reality, King's metaphors g_axiriQt
be seen as neutral reflections of an already-constituted
meaning; they themselves predicate meaning and provide
heuristic perspective, and thus direct action, on the issues
with which King was dealing. King's choice of metaphors has
several implications for the analysis of this speech.
First, King's metaphoric clusters are largely congruent
with the guilt-purification-redemption form of the speech.
King's metaphors move from: (1) images of black bondage,
white guilt, and national obligation to fulfill its
promises, to (2) purificatory images of struggle and
movement from negative to positive terms, to (3) an elevated
plane of meaning in which images of dreams and mountains are
used to communicate a transcendent vision of equality,
fulfillment of national promise, and secular/spiritual
redemption. We can add the metaphoric clusters to the
diagram of the speech as presented in chapter four:
Pentadic Ratio scene act purpose
Narrative Form guilt purification redemption
Temporal Movement past present future
Metaphor Clusters bound struggle and "dream"
images/ movement within 
bad check dark/light
cluster
Thus the bound images and the "bad check" metaphor in the 
first one-third of the speech predicate what King proposes 
as the immediate past scene of an America blighted by the
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guilt of racial injustice, which America is to leave behind. 
King's proposed act of purification in the incipient present 
is predicated through images of struggle between and 
movement from the first, negative term of the dark/light 
clusters, to the second, positive, terms of the metaphoric 
pairings, mostly occurring in the middle one-third of the 
speech. And finally, the "dream" metaphor organizes the 
final one-third of the speech in which King describes his 
futuristic vision of America fulfilling its purpose and 
achieving national redemption.
Secondly, King's metaphors characterize the issues of 
the civil rights movement in simplistic terms which avoid 
socio-political complexity and moral ambiguity. The 
check/promissory note metaphor puts the goals of the 
movement in terms of the clarity and specificity of a 
routine financial obligation, envisioning the attaining of 
justice as a straightforward task of redressing (redeeming) 
past wrongs by getting the government to honor its "check," 
This metaphor allowed King to give concreteness to the 
amorphous concept of "rights," but the vehicle implies that 
the "debt" can be "paid in full" and past racial injustice 
"redeemed" by an action on the part of the nation as simple 
as that of cashing a check. Furthermore, the issues of the 
movement are predicated in terms of two-valued antitheses 
between dark and light, bound and free, up and down, and 
backward and forward. This allowed King to cast the issues 
in terms of simple dichotomies of evil versus good,
169
injustice versus justice, inequality versus equality, etc. 
However, this also ignored the complexities of the issues 
and slighted the difficulties of achieving the goals of the 
movement. In light of the powerful impact of this speech on 
public consciousness, King's metaphoric choices may have 
inadvertently contributed to subsequent disappointment when 
the moral and legal victories achieved in the first phase of 
the civil rights movement failed to deliver immediate social 
and economic salvation for black Americans. A discourse of 
consensus'building, emphasizing the consolidation of gains 
as one gradually moves forward in shaping a better, but 
still imperfect, world, might have avoided the impression 
that the ultimate goals of the movement could be directly 
realized with the passage of certain pieces of legislation. 
The black power advocates realized that full social and 
economic equality would not come immediately upon the 
recognition by white America of certain legal and political 
rights for black Americans (see chapter seven). King 
realized this later in his career, but this speech is the 
legacy he has been assigned, and the King of this speech, 
not the later King, is the King celebrated today as a 
national icon (see chapters one and seven). The "dream" 
metaphor, while allowing King to provide hope and 
inspiration through a vision of a new, redeemed America, 
also contributed to the elision of social and political 
difficulties by taking the audience out of real time and 
history and by defining the goals of the movement in terms
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of American mythology. C. T. Vivian, a veteran of the sit-in 
movement and the Freedom Rides, who joined the SCLC staff in 
1963, later felt that the civil rights movement's acceptance 
of America's myths about itself was among the chief reasons 
for the failure of the movement to achieve its goals beyond 
the dismantling of legal segregation. Vivian (1970) wrote 
that the movement had erred because it had acted upon the 
false assumption that it was dealing with a tru ly Christian 
and democratic nation which would live up to its principles 
once the injustices of racial discrimination and segregation 
were exposed (pp. 55-59, 68-122).
Thirdly, King's metaphors define the audience, the 
second persona, in a generally passive role. There is little 
sense of the auditors as active, engaged agents in a process 
of continuous, ongoing, evolutionary change. The "check" 
vehicle casts the audience as receivers of a "payment" who 
then simply go out and "spend" their newly-won rights. The 
dark/light cluster and the nature metaphors provide no 
defining role for the audience. The other parts of the
speech do not provide any more of a pro-active, decision­
making role for the audience. The auditors are told to 
continue to march, to "work," to "pray," to "struggle," to 
"stand up for freedom ... knowing that we will be free one
day" [emphasis added] (M. L. King, 1963d, p. 726). But there
is little sense of the audience as active agents who 
participate in and shape their own emancipation, beyond 
their role as the ground troops of the movement. This is
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consistent with the underlying Christian theme of King's 
message. In the Protestant Christian tradition one is saved 
not by works, but by faith. King's speech of national 
salvation is concerned not with means but with ends. The 
audience's main role is to have fidLth in the vision of 
salvation.
CHAPTER 6
EVALUATION OF THE THEORY 
OF GUILT-PURIFICATION-REDEMPTION
Chapter seven will examine the social and political 
implications of the foregoing critical analysis of King's "I 
Have a Dream" speech. But, the other purpose of this study 
was to develop Burke's theory of guilt-purification- 
redemption. Therefore, this chapter will confine itself to 
an assessment of the guilt-purification-redemption 
methodology to consider its value as a tool of rhetorical 
criticism applicable in other situations.
Thus far Burke's theory of guilt-purification- 
redemption has been developed and applied to King's "I Have 
a Dream" speech, but the theory itself has not been 
critiqued to consider its usefulness in other contexts. This 
chapter will examine what the findings of this study reveal 
about the explanatory power of the redemption methodology. I 
will consider the adequacy of Burke's theory of guilt, 
whether guilt is ontological, as Burke claims, and whether 
Burke's theory is still useful if guilt is not ontological.
I also will examine what this study reveals about the 
Burkean modes of purification and suggest other modes that 
rhetorical critics should study. Finally, this chapter 
considers what the guilt-purification-redemption drama 
reveals about a culture which adopts and accepts this form
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as a way of experiencing and structuring reality. Therefore, 
this chapter is divided into three sections: (1) a critique
of Burke's theory of guilt; (2) the variety of modes of 
purification; and (3) an assessment of the guilt- 
purif ication-redemption model as a cultural form.
Critique of Burke's Theory of Guilt
In Burke's redemption drama the need for redemption is 
generated by an initial state of guilt, which Burke claims 
is inherent in humans as symbol-using animals. While in a 
particular situation--such as that in which King's "Dream" 
speech took place--it may be relatively easy to demonstrate 
that guilt was a primary motivating factor, Burke's claim 
concerning guilt's ontological status is not the kind of 
claim that can be empirically proven. This section critiques 
Burke's concept of guilt, examines in what way guilt can be 
said to be ontological, and considers to what degree the 
guilt-purification-redemption methodology is useful as a 
tool of rhetorical criticism if guilt is not ontological.
Many people have trouble accepting the idea of guilt as 
ontological, as something part and parcel of our being. This 
may be due to the negative connotations we attach to the 
word "guilt." However, as was pointed out in chapter two, 
the ontological nature of guilt has been noted by 
psychologists and philosophers (Buber, 1965; Carroll, 198 5; 
Reik, 1957, pp. ^1-43) and is a basic feature of much 
existential philosophy. For example, Heidegger (1962) claims
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that human beings "lire guilty in the very basis of their 
Being” [emphasis in original] (p. 332). I will briefly 
examine Heidegger's theory of guilt, because while it is 
similar to Burke's in some respects, it differs in a way 
that allows a critique and improvement upon Burke's theory.1 
Heidegger (1962) argues that because Casein's (Heidegger's 
term for human being, or what it is to be human) 
relationship to the world is one of "care” or intentional 
activity toward a world it finds itself thrown into, Dasein 
"constantly lags behind its possibilities" (p. 330). Built
into Dasein's existence is its awareness of what it is not 
and its knowledge of its inability to transcend itself. This 
possibility for inauthenticity, Heidegger terms "nullity"
(p. 3 31). Thus, he argues, "Being-guiltv is more primordial
than any knowledge about it. And only because Dasein is 
guilty in the basis of its Being ... is conscience possible
[all emphases in original] (p. 332).
Heidegger's theory of guilt is similar to Burke's in 
several respects. Both find guilt to be existential, in the 
basis of our being, and both see conscience as arising out 
of existential guilt as opposed to the other way around 
(where conscience creates the condition for guilt), as is 
the usual understanding. Also, Heidegger's concept of guilt
as based upon "nullity," Dasein's sense of what it is not,
echoes Burke's concept of guilt resulting from the 
linguistic creation of the negative. However, where 
Heidegger finds guilt to be primordial and pre-1inguistic,
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Burke bases ontological guilt on symbolicity itself, where 
symbolicity is the defining characteristic of human beings. 
Burke's failure to recognize the pre-linguistic nature of 
guilt is a shortcoming of his theory- If guilt is a result 
of human beings' inability to transcend themselves 
(Heidegger's "nullity"), then guilt would be pre-linguistic. 
The basic condition of our existence is that we are (or 
exist in) physical bodies that are physically separate from 
others of our species and from the rest of the physical 
world. Burke is aware of this basic condition of human 
existence, and implies its relationship to guilt, but does 
not explicitly treat it as a cause of guilt. For example, 
Burke (1969b) discusses the fact that human beings are 
somewhat divided from one another, or are of both distinct 
substance and consubstantial with one another. Our shared 
substance makes communication possible, while our division 
makes it necessary. It is this desire to identify with one 
another, to transcend ourselves, which makes communication 
necessary (pp. 20-23). Burke does mention that this 
"simultaneous identification-with and division-from" results 
in the need for a scapegoat--a mode of purification--(p .
46), but fails to develop this connection to guilt, instead 
focusing in other works on guilt as a result of symbolicity. 
Burke misses the existential nature of physical separateness 
because for him "division" is treated mainly in its 
sociological, thus linguistic, aspect. It seems with Burke's 
definition of human beings as "bodies that learn language"
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he should not have missed the fact that our basic condition 
of existence is one of physical separation, but he chose 
instead to focus on shared aspects of humanity.
I do not want to use this argument for pre-linguistic 
guilt to refute Burke's theory of guilt, but as an addendum 
to it. Guilt may be viewed as both pre-1inguistic and 
linguistic. Guilt is rooted in human nature because it is 
caused by that inevitable sense of division and separateness 
from others that resides in us as individual physical bodies 
who cannot have complete consubstantiality with other 
physical bodies. This sense of division is what we attempt 
to overcome through communication, although we can never 
overcome it completely. However, our attempts at overcoming 
division through the use of symbols to share meaning can 
also have certain guilt-inducing effects. For guilt to be an 
inevitable, recurring condition, it would need to be both 
pre-1inguistic and linguistic. If symbol-use itself could 
completely overcome division (as pre-1inguistic guilt), then 
guilt would not be a recurring cycle. Through proper 
communication we could reach a point of stasis, of ongoing 
and possibly permanent redemption. Burke's contribution in 
pointing out the linguistic sources of guilt tells us why 
that does not happen.
In considering the claim of the ontological nature of 
guilt, we must be aware that both Burke and Heidegger are, 
in a sense, using the term "guilt" catachrestically--that 
is, for lack of a better term in the language to communicate
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the concept they want to communicate. They use the term 
"guilt” to mean more than the usual sense of guilt as a 
feeling of responsibility or shame for having done wrong. 
Guilt is that ontological sense of anxiety that comes with 
being human. There is no way to "prove" empirically that 
guilt is ontological, but the argument is logical, both in 
the sense of guilt as pre-linguistic, discussed above, and 
in Burke's sense of guilt as arising out of our symbol-using 
nature. Language gives us the capacity to create standards 
and rules of behavior (what Burke calls the "thou-shalt- 
nots") as well as the capacity to conceptualize and 
communicate ideas of perfection, all of which cause guilt 
when not lived up to.
Another cause of guilt, according to Burke, is 
hierarchy. Language gives us a cultural matrix within which 
hierarchies are embedded, and hierarchy results in guilt. 
Radical egalitarians, such as some feminists and Marxist 
cultural critics, attack Burke on this point, maintaining 
that hierarchy is not inevitable. But a Burkean would 
respond that symbol-use inevitably creates hierarchy. Once 
people start labelling and naming things and acts, 
distinctions and judgments are inevitable. A hierarchy is 
simply a distinction of some type, an act of assigning 
value. There is no example of a society which has not had 
some type of hierarchy. As Condit (1991) has noted, on the 
inevitability of hierarchy in human systems, "Burke's 
analysis has been shown to be largely correct; we have
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learned that even in non-capitalist systems, dominated by 
discourses of equality, hierarchies reappear" (p. 7).
There is a school of thought which would admit Burke's 
claims for the significance of guilt as a dominant motive in 
Western, Judeo-Christian culture, but deny its universality. 
For example, Condit (1991) argues that Burke's theory is 
ethnocentric because it draws mainly on Western texts and 
the Judeo-Christian religion. "It may be that the cycle of 
guilt-victimage-purification-redemption is the single 
strongest motive in American discourse. But I believe we 
have insufficient evidence to claim that it is the dominant: 
motive of all cultures" [emphases in original] (p. 5).
Condit does not deny the possibility of guilt as a motive in 
other cultures, but simply questions Burke's claim of its 
universal dominance. While the widespread occurrence of 
rites of purification in non-Western cultures (see Frazer, 
1911-1915; Perera, 1986, pp. 9-11) indicates that guilt may
be a motive force in many cultures, Condit is wise in 
warning against unwarranted extrapolation of Western 
structures of thought to non-Western cultures. All of the 
scholars this study has noted as agreeing with Burke on the 
ontological nature of human guilt--Buber, Carroll,
Heidegger, Reik--are in the Western, Judeo-Christian 
tradition, and the Judeo-Christian religion provides a rich 
literature in the symbolicity of guilt and redemption. More 
research into the importance of this motive structure in 
other cultures is warranted.
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All of the above discussion of the ontological nature, 
or lack thereof, of guilt as a motivating force in discourse 
is presented in the interest of exploring the limits of the 
application of this theory. It should not obscure the fact 
that guilt need not be proven to be a universally-dominant 
force, or even the dominant motive structure in America, for 
the guilt-purification-redemption cycle to be applicable to 
any particular discursive act. Even a cursory examination of 
the historical context (Burke's •'scene") in which King's "I 
Have a Dream" speech took place would reveal that guilt over 
failure to live up to national principles was the essential 
motivating factor in overturning the system of segregation 
by race. To apply the guilt-purification-redemption model a 
critic . & Q . e s n e e d  to accept Burke's claim as to the 
ontological nature of guilt, but only show that it was a 
motivating factor in the discourse under study.
Burke's theory of guilt, however, does not distinguish 
between collective guilt and individual guilt. A discursive 
form such as the guilt-purification-redemption drama which 
relies on a sense of collective responsibility for societal 
wrongs may not be fully effective in an individualistic 
society. That is probably why King's rhetoric of evoking 
then purifying white guilt appears more dated as the years 
go by. For post-civil rights era generations the link 
between America's past of slavery and overt segregation, and
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their present responsibility for those wrongs as manifested 
in support for racial preference programs, is increasingly 
tenuous.
Modes of Purification
The existence of guilt, whether pre-1inguistic, 
linguistic, or arising out of a particular situation, 
requires purification. Purification is Burke’s term for any 
means whereby guilt is transcended or removed. In Burke’s 
theory, guilt, and thus the need for purification, is 
inherent in our nature. Burke maintains that although a 
scientific-rationalistic world-view attempts to deny this 
essentially moral-ethical aspect of our nature, it cannot be 
ignored. He asks not how forms of purification might be 
eliminated in a scientific culture, "but what new forms they 
take" (Burke, 1968b, p. 451; see also, Rueckert, 1982, pp. 
46-47 ) . In this section I will discuss what this study has 
contributed to our knowledge of the Burkean modes of 
purification, as well as consider what other modes of 
purification rhetorical critics should attempt to develop 
and apply.
This study has expanded our understanding of the 
Burkean modes of purification available to a rhetor. Burke 
usually cites victimage and mortification as the primary 
modes of purification, but this study demonstrates that 
purification through transcendence and through images of 
change, movement, and dramatic catharsis are also important
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modes of purification that need further study* Burke's 
emphasis on victimage and mortification has obscured our 
understanding of the multiplicity of ways in which 
purification may take place.
The Jictim ftgia/M oriif Aci5itiQn_QJ u££sr
One of those ways, which I have chosen to keep in the 
victimage/mortification family because of its similarity to 
those forms, might be called purification through suffering, 
or by being a victim. Burke's emphasis on victimage as a 
scapegoating ritual for the purification of the guilt of 
those enacting the ritual. obscured to him the fact that 
scapegoating also purifies the scapegoat/victim. Burke 
(197 3) says that in some circumstances the "most perfect 
sacrifice" [emphasis in original] is the person greatest in 
virtue; Christ being the archetypal example (p. ) . But
Burke fails to note that by the same logic one may attain 
virtue by.beiJlg a scapegoat or victim. Furthermore, Burke 
ignored the fact that once this form becomes self-reflexive 
(that is, once people can be shown that they are practicing 
or have practiced scapegoating), the guilt then turns back 
upon the perpetrator and the victim/scapegoat becomes 
purified not only in his or her own eyes (as one is when one 
knows one is being used as a scapegoat), but also in the 
eyes of society (as, for example, when a person is convicted 
of a crime and serves time for it, then it is later 
discovered that the person is innocent of the crime for
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which he or she was convicted). Also, Burke’s emphasis on 
suffering through mortification (self-inflicted suffering) 
ignores the fact that suffering need not be self-inflicted 
to be purificatory--as a matter of fact, suffering at the 
hands of others is often more purificatory than 
mortif ication.
These other types of purification in the 
victimage/mortification family--purification through being a 
victim and purification through any type of suffering 
(whether inflicted deliberately by others, or as a result of 
one’s social and economic circumstance, or even as the 
result of bad luck)--are today modes of purification with 
powerful appeal. Symbolizations of the suffering and 
victimization of oneself or one's group have probably always 
had strong rhetorical appeal, but are especially potent 
today in America (and throughout the world) because of 
social and cultural changes since World War II which have 
brought to our attention a history of unequal treatment and 
discrimination on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, 
religion, and nationality. The Jewish Holocaust, American 
slavery, segregation, and oppression of African-Americans, 
European colonization of African and Asian nations, and 
examples of unequal treatment of women, all provide rich 
veins of meaning for rhetors to draw upon in symbolizing 
victimization and suffering. Symbolization of the suffering 
and victimization of one's group has become such a powerful 
rhetorical form that a type of "oppression competition" has
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ensued in which groups compete in laying claim to greater 
degrees of past oppression. Power, as in the moral authority 
to be heard on certain issues and the right to receive 
preferential treatment in the allocation of society's 
resources (such as college admissions and employment hiring 
and promotion), is often allocated on the basis of the past 
record of victimization and suffering experienced by one's 
racial, ethnic, or sexual group.
This rhetoric of victimization has had important 
implications for political discourse and public policy. 
Symbolizations of victimage initially used to gain sympathy 
for a worthy cause and to motivate the community to effect 
healing and reconciliation--as in King's speech--often take 
on a power of their own that can have consequences beyond 
those initially intended. Edsall and Edsall's (1991) study 
demonstrates how, as the civil rights movement shifted from 
a focus on fundamental citizenship rights to a focus on 
equal outcomes achieved through racial preferences, black 
victimage became associated in the minds of many white 
Americans with special privileges in rights, employment, and 
education. A consequence of this has been that the core of 
the traditional Democratic Party constituency--the white 
working class, white ethnics, and white southerners--have 
come to regard themselves as victims of an alliance between 
the Democratic Party elite and special interest groups 
representing blacks, feminists, and homosexuals. These white 
voters now see their interests as separate from those of
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today's civil rights movement (pp. 3-31, 198-214). Further
studies of the long-term effects of the rhetorical impact of 
symbolizations of victimage suffered by one's own racial, 
ethnic, sexual, or national group are warranted.
Another Burkean mode of purification this study has 
expanded upon is transcendence. Transcendence as a mode of 
purification has received little attention from rhetorical 
scholars. While Burke discusses transcendence fairly often 
in his writings, he provides little systematic treatment of 
it as a mode of purification, and among others, only 
Brummett (1981) has given transcendence any attention as a 
mode of purification. Burke emphasizes purification through 
Ei&ualS- Of., vict-imafce. ,And._a.caE££&atjJl£. Which have their 
roots in primitive, religious practices. When updated to 
modern, mass societies, scapegoating often takes a sinister 
form, as in Hitler's scapegoating of Jews (see Burke, 1973, 
pp. 191-220) or southern segregationists' scapegoating of 
southern blacks. Burke’s emphasis on this type of 
purification reflects his bias toward pre-industrial rituals 
adapted to industrial-era societies of the mid-twentieth 
century. It may be that in post-industrial societies 
transcendence will prove a more potent form of purification. 
Transcendence may be a purificatory form adopted more by 
sophisticated and humane societies. Instead of dividing, it 
unites. Instead of emphasizing differences, it emphasizes
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similarities. It is no wonder then that in "I Have a Dream," 
King's paean to national unity and assimilation, his primary 
and most powerful mode of purification is transcendence (see 
chapter four).
Change, . J4q vem„enfc., and Dramatic Catharsis
Purification through symbolizations of change, 
movement, and dramatic catharsis also have been little 
examined by rhetorical scholars. With the exception of 
dramatic catharsis, Burke mentions these processes more in 
passing than systematically. Rueckert (1982) pointed out the 
theme of movement and change in Burke's theory of 
purification (p. 104), and Hoban (1980) is the only
rhetorical scholar I am aware of who has applied this theme 
critically. Purification through change, movement, and 
dramatic catharsis seems to operate at a more subtle, 
implicit level than the previously-discussed forms. In 
King1s speech we saw how the use of certain words, 
particularly metaphors, can subtly elicit images of change 
and movement. Also, we saw how change, movement, and 
dramatic catharsis is communicated in the overall structure 
of the speech, with its temporal progression from past 
promise, to present failure, to future realization of that 
promise, and the resolution of the conflict between good and 
evil for the soul of America (see chapter four). Other 
studies could demonstrate the multiplicity of ways in which 
symbolizations of change, movement, transformations of
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various types (physical, social, psychological, spiritual), 
and dramatic catharsis could serve purificatory functions in 
rhetoric.
Other Modes of Purification
The modes of purification discussed in this study do 
not exhaust the modes of purification available. There are 
other modes of purification that rhetorical critics should 
study. The modes presented below are forms which do not, for 
the most part, fit neatly under any of the Burkean 
categories considered in this study. While most of these are 
presented by the authors cited as purificatory actions (that 
is, non-1inguistic), they are all capable of being 
symbolized in discourse.
Jewett (197 3) maintains that righteous violence can 
bring about redemption (pp. 177-214). Duncan (1962) says 
that comedy purges social guilt. He argues that the comic 
scapegoat becomes a sacrificial vessel through which we 
purge our projected social errors (as opposed to evils for 
the tragic scapegoat) and achieve social catharsis (pp. 395- 
402). (Although Duncan’s way of putting it could be 
considered just a version of Burke's scapegoating, what 
about comedy in which there is no scapegoat? Does that not 
serve to reduce division and foster identification? Would 
that be considered a form of transcendence?) Carroll (1985) 
mentions a variety of ways in which guilt is dealt with, or 
''sublimated,” to use his term. Guilt can be purged through
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the paying of reparations (in the context of this study, 
today's "Affirmative Action" programs can be seen as an 
example of this.) Carroll says reparations can take the form 
of gift-giving, the offering of praise, and of being 
especially nice to someone (pp. 17-18). Also, washing and 
cleaning oneself are ways of dealing with guilt. Carroll 
argues that in the West the modern soap and cosmetic 
industries exploit this socially prescribed ritual (p. 19).
Carroll also mentions fasting, withdrawal into monasteries, 
and celibacy (forms of mortification), as well as "long and 
arduous pilgrimages to holy sites" (p. 19)--a combination of 
mortification and the journey, both of which are mentioned 
by Burke. Carroll cites chanting, singing and praying as 
other means of sublimating guilt (are these forms of 
transcendence?). And finally, Carroll says that hard work is 
one of the most socially acceptable ways to sublimate guilt 
(p. 39). Solomon (1980) also notes the role of hard work in
absolving guilt. She argues that the Right to Life Movement 
"encourages individual supporters to purge their guilt 
through hard work for a good cause. The appeal is quite 
similar to the Christian notion of salvation through good 
works" (p. 61). This notion of purification through hard 
work warrants further study. It would seem that this is 
quite pervasive in social movements and political campaigns, 
and could be seen as a means of transcending the self for a 
larger cause. As far as I am aware, no systematic study has
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been done examining how participation itself in the civil 
rights movement might have proved a redemptive experience 
for participants.
It would behoove rhetorical scholars to come to a 
better understanding of the variety of means for purifying 
guilt and the implications of particular forms that 
purification can take. For example, might some forms be 
"better," (i.e., more humane, more effective) than others? 
Which forms would work best in which situations? What are 
the implications for the audience, or for the society in 
general, when guilt is purified through any particular mode? 
What would a study of the mode or modes of purification 
dominant in a particular culture tell us about that culture? 
(For that matter, what do the things people feel guilty 
about tell us about a particular culture, and what is the 
relationship between particular sources of guilt and the 
modes of purification used to absolve that guilt?)
Guilt-Purification-Redemption 
as a Cultural Form
In Burke's theory one cannot escape guilt, and guilt 
implies the need for redemption through some process of 
purification. Therefore, the guilt-purification-redemption 
cycle is a form we are stuck with and the only issue is that 
of the forms that purification may take. However, in thi3 
section I want to move beyond the Burkean system and examine 
the implications of the redemption drama as a cultural form 
without assuming that the cycle must play itself out. In
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other words, what "trained incapacities" (Burke, 1984b, pp. 
7-11) are induced by cultural adherence to this particular 
motive structure? By "trained incapacity" Burke means an 
orientation that causes one to act in a predetermined, but 
inappropriate way--a learned dysfunction. To see something 
in terms of "A" is to fail to see it in terms of "B" (see 
Burke, 1984b, pp. 7-11, 48-49). It is a type of conditioning 
or orientation that causes us to see something from a 
particular perspective to such a degree that we act out of 
that framework even when it does not fit the situation. For 
example, a struggling young businessperson may work long 
hours to provide financial security for his or her family, 
feeling that financial security is what the family needs to 
be happy. Then, long after financial security has been 
achieved, the businessperson continues to work long hours, 
because he or she is acting from an old perspective which no 
longer applies, failing to realize that what the family n<?w 
needs is more time together as a family.
Guilt-purification-redemption is one such perspective 
or form for structuring and experiencing reality. Burke 
(196 8a) defines form as "the creation of an appetite in the 
mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that 
appetite" (p. 31). Since form has to do with the "creation 
and gratification of needs," it "is 'correct' in so far as 
it gratifies the needs which it creates. The appeal of form 
in this sense is obvious: form is. the appeal" [emphasis in 
original] (p. 138). Form provides "equipment for living"
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(Burke, 197 3, pp. 293-304), in that the enactment of a form 
not only serves as a way of experiencing, but also creates 
incipient actions and attitudes that shape future action. 
This is so because words, and discourse in general, shape 
perspectives and serve as terministic screens for viewing 
the world (Burke, 1966, p. 44-47; 1966a, p. 143; Heath,
1989, p. 64). In sum, form is not incidental, but 
instrumental. Form is not merely the shape or structure the 
discourse happens to take, but it is the discourse as much 
as are the words, and it provides a pattern for viewing the 
situation and shaping future action. Thus, guilt- 
purif ication-redemption is a form in which the gratification 
of a felt need for redemption from guilt is satisfied 
through purification. This is not to say that because an 
orientation is adopted the form is always completed.
Although the civil rights movement had many successes, in 
the movement as a whole the form of guilt-purification- 
redemption adopted by King and the moderate wing was never 
entirely completed. The movement splintered, black power 
advocates rejected the redemption framework (see chapter 
seven), and many whites, especially after the race riots of 
the middle and late sixties, abandoned the movement. Even in 
its particular manifestations the form did not always 
succeed. The campaign in Albany, Georgia, for example, 
failed to elicit white guilt, and sometimes demonstrations 
resulted in black violence, thus failing to elicit the 
sympathy needed for the redemption drama to succeed. (The
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recent riots in Los Angeles after the verdict in the trial 
of the policemen accused of beating Rodney King may have had 
the same effect. The sympathy gained for African-Americans 
by the images of the videotape showing police brutality 
against a black man may prove to have been dissipated and 
overshadowed in the long-run by the images of young black 
males rioting, looting, and beating white motorists.)
As a narrative form the guilt-purification-redemption 
cycle can be seen as a representative anecdote. A 
representative anecdote which is powerful in a particular 
culture provides a lens or template through which the critic 
can assess the values, concerns, and attitudes that culture 
brings to bear on issues for which that particular form is 
used. It tells the critic how the culture comes to terms 
symbolically with the issue. The articulation of a situation 
in discourse tells the audience how to deal with similar and 
related situations (see Brummett, 1984a, pp. 164, 166).
Since a representative anecdote or form is obviously an 
orientation or perspective (a way of seeing the world) it 
can result in a trained incapacity. To see a situation as 
one requiring the purification of guilt is to fail to see 
other possibilities in the situation, to fail to see other 
ways of looking at it. Thus, to see events in the form of a 
redemption drama predetermines a certain range of actions 
and responses. If the need for the redemption of guilt is 
the lens through which we view a situation, then that
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viewpoint predetermines that the response will be the 
enactment of some mode or modes of purification.
In chapter three I argued that King's use of the theme 
of national redemption invoked a very potent myth, America's 
sense of itself as a special nation or chosen people with a 
God-given mission to redeem the world by making of itself a 
beacon of freedom, equality, and opportunity (see Jewett, 
1973, p. 9; and Robertson, 1980, pp. 25-26, 122). This myth 
is doubly potent because it involves America's conception of 
its own founding and purpose as a secular New World in which 
the political ideas of the European Enlightenment could 
flourish and bear fruit, as well as the concept of America 
as a reJJLgi.oug New World to which persecuted religious 
groups could come to freely practice their faith. A 
secularized redemption drama which retains its spiritual 
dimensions and suffuses the secular within the spiritual--as 
does the representative anecdote (underlying narrative form) 
in King's "Dream" speech--meets Burke’s (19^7) requirements 
for the "ideal myth," a vision which transcends the 
political, yet has political attitudes interwoven with it 
(p. 201). Any particular secular mythology by itself has an
inherent weakness because it can always be "trumped" by a 
higher (sacred and absolute) standard. The power of King's 
rhetoric was in bringing that higher standard to bear on 
American secular mythology within the context of the civil 
rights movement. The guilt-purification-redemption drama is 
more than simply another narrative form. In America it is a
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powerful cultural form that combines our Judeo-Christian 
heritage with our European Enlightenment heritage.
What trained incapacities result from use of the guilt- 
purification-redemption form, especially in regard to the 
particular form of the secular/religious synthesis it takes 
in American public discourse? A full analysis in answer to 
that question is obviously beyond the scope of this study, 
but should prove a fruitful undertaking (for that matter, 
what trained incapacities are inherent in any particular 
narrative form?). Some learned dysfunctions in regard to the 
use of this form in dealing with the civil rights issue and 
race relations in general will be discussed in the next 
chapter, but for now I will venture some tentative 
observations on the learned dysfunctions of the redemption 
drama itself as a form for structuring and experiencing 
reality.
The first challenge in examining this form is simply in 
being able to step outside of it. If the initial premise of 
this form, that of the existence of guilt (whether pre­
linguist ic, linguistic, or situational) is not accepted, 
then the form itself has no potency. However, a fairly 
strong case has already been made for the ontological nature 
of guilt, and at the least we have to admit that guilt 
occurs in certain situations. So the way to step outside of 
the form (the point of exit, so to speak) is not at the 
level of guilt, but at the next level, that of purification. 
Must guill (again, speaking in the broad Burkean and
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Heideggerian sense) always require purification for the 
purpose of redemption? A guilt-purification-redemption form, 
especially one constructed in terms of ontological human 
guilt arising out of division, has the effect of construing 
divisions and differences as problems which much be overcome 
(purified), either through use of some transcendent, 
unifying terminology, or through some ritual of 
victimization in which a scapegoat is identified and 
symbolically destroyed or driven out. By seeing guilt 
(ontological human anxiety over our separation from one 
another) as something that Q!U3_t be overcome, this form 
ignores the possibility for a realistic acceptance of our 
state of separateness. Instead of accepting and resigning 
ourselves to perpetual division (anxiety) and accepting our 
differences from one another as inherent in our natures as 
individual monadic entities who can never achieve complete 
consubstantiality, we engage in a Sisyphean struggle to 
bridge the unbridgeable. The redemption drama may contribute 
to a trained incapacity toward trying to enact utopian 
visions of community instead of accepting a world of 
difference and imperfection.
If we look at guilt in Burkean terms (symbolically 
induced), as resulting from hierarchy, the "thou-shalt- 
nots," and failure to achieve perfection, we find the 
redemptive form drives us toward attempts to purify, to 
account for, these conditions. As we saw previously in this 
chapter, hierarchy is inevitable, and arises even in systems
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dominated by a discourse of equality. Should all hierarchies 
be considered bad? Also, should failure to achieve 
perfection, and violation of the rules of the social order, 
always require purification, or should they sometimes be 
accepted as part of our imperfect nature? Within a Burkean 
frame our ethical-moral natures cause us to be trapped in 
this recurring redemption cycle, but we can shape our own 
ethical-moral norms, and decide upon the steps to be taken 
when those norms are violated. We do not have to be trapped 
in a guilt-purification-redemption form of experiencing and 
acting. Condit (1991) suggests that to move beyond this form 
we might look to the narrative forms of other cultures. For 
"non-victimage oriented forms, we might turn to the 
mythologic structure of Buddhism" (p. 5). Instead of being 
structured around the sin/redemption form. Buddhism, and 
other Eastern religions, such as Hinduism, are structured 
around an illusion/enlightenment form in which the 
individual strives to shed his or her illusions by seeing 
through the world of mere appearance to that of ultimate 
reality. (This is, of course, similar to Plato, but when 
Plato's ideas were Christianized, the movement from illusion 
to enlightenment became subsumed within the sin/redemption 
narrative. Enlightenment, insight into the mind of God, 
became one of the benefits of salvation by grace.) The 
West's economic and technological achievements could be seen 
in terms of sublimation of sin/guilt through hard work, 
while the East's illusion/enlightenment narrative provides
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less incentive for worldly achievement. This is not to say 
that the East or West completely manifests these cultural 
forms in actual social praxis, but they do often function as 
ideal archetypes. Working within a cultural form in which 
the conditions of guilt require attempts at purification may 
cause us to be less accepting of differences, hierarchies, 
violations of social rules, and imperfection. The guilt- 
purif ication-redemption form can result in a trained 
incapacity toward seeing all manifestations of guilt 
(ontological anxiety, division, differences, disobedience to 
the social order) as problems which must be atoned for, 
instead of as normal conditions of human existence.
In a culture such as America, which has defined itself 
in terms of the assimilation of racial, ethnic, and 
religious groups under transcendent symbols--such as 
liberty, freedom, equality, justice, democracy--the 
redemption drama provides an ideal cultural form because of 
its emphasis on reducing division, differences, and 
hierarchy. (Multicultural ism, on the other hand, accepts, 
even stresses, cultural and ethnic differences. However, it 
ends up promising redemption through group identification.) 
But the costs may have been a failure to acknowledge our 
actual diversity. Furthermore, in America the redemptive 
cultural form has often resulted in zealous and unyielding 
attempts at national redemption through moralistic crusades. 
Jewett (1973) argues that these periods of great moral 
crusades with promises of national redemption, or of "making
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the world safe for democracy," are followed by periods of 
national disillusionment, of "long and counterproductive 
withdrawal[s ]" when the promise is dashed (p. <t9). For 
example, Jewett argues that after World War I and President 
Wilson's rhetoric about a "war to end all wars," Americans 
became disillusioned when the millennial peace did not 
follow. Thus, they were unable to deal with the complexities 
of a League of Nations to adjudicate further disputes (p. 
50). A rhetoric of unselfishness encourages "such illusions 
of moral superiority" that the people are often unable to 
deal with moral complexity (Jewett, 197 3, p. 50). Another 
example is the post-Reconstruction complacency toward the 
conditions of the former slaves after the zealous 
righteousness of the Abolitionist and Reconstruction 
periods. The pattern reemerged with the war on poverty and 
the civil rights movement (referred to by some as "the 
Second Reconstruction") of the 1960s, in which an initial 
period of idealistic moralism has been followed by a period 
of disillusionment as the nation has become more aware of 
the complexities of its social and racial problems (this 
point will be further developed in chapter seven). In short, 
the redemptive form has often been employed in America in a 
way which eschews the need for long-term consensus building 




This study has further developed Burke's theory of 
guilt-purification-redemption and expanded our understanding 
of how it can be used in rhetorical criticism. While Burke's 
theory of ontological guilt as grounded in symbolicity needs 
to be amended to take into account a pre-linguistic theory 
of guilt, Burke's contribution to the symbolic nature of 
guilt, and his recognition of guilt as a primary motive 
structure which can initiate the need for discursive forms 
of purification, are important contributions to rhetorical 
theory which help us understand human discursive practices 
and provide a valuable methodological tool for criticism. 
Burke's focus on mortification and victimage as modes of 
purification has obscured to rhetorical scholars the 
importance of other modes. This study has demonstrated the 
need to expand our concepts of victimage and mortification 
to include the purificatory effects of any type of 
suffering, whether self-inflicted or not, and of 
symbolizations of one's own victimage at the hands of 
others. It has also expanded awareness and understanding of 
transcendence and images of change, movement, and dramatic 
catharsis as important modes of purification. Finally, this 
study has contributed to our knowledge of the methodology of 
guilt-purification-redemption by noting its significance as 
a primary cultural form of structuring and experiencing
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reality in American public discourse, and suggesting some 




/ I  am indebted to Gregory Schufreider for his assistance 
with my understanding of Heidegger's theory of guilt.
CHAPTER 7
EVALUATION OF "I HAVE A DREAM"
AND ITS LEGACY
In this chapter I will assess the effect and legacy of 
the "I Have a Dream" speech by answering the questions this 
study posed in chapter one, which are summarized as follows 
(1) what myths and hierarchies does this speech invoke, and 
what conflicts does it transcend? (2) why did this speech 
emerge as the consensus voice on civil rights and what 
competing voices did it mute or ignore? (3) what are the 
limitations and contradictions of the message/form this 
speech employs? (4) what is the legacy of this speech? and 
(5) what are the consequences of a rhetoric of assimilation 
Before answering those questions, however, it is necessary 
to briefly summarize what this study has argued concerning 
the significance of the "I Have a Dream" speech as a 
cultural icon, because the answers to the above questions 
depend upon a recognition of the role this speech has taken 
on in American public discourse on race.
"I Have a Dream" as a Cultural Icon 
This study has argued that the representative anecdote 
(underlying narrative form) in King's "Dream" speech is a 
guilt-purification-redemption drama in which ontological 
human guilt, and white guilt over racism, is symbolically
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purged through: (1) victimage and mortification (or actually
a form thereof in which black suffering under oppression 
performs a redemptive function); (2) transcendence; and (3) 
images of change, movement, and dramatic catharsis. I have 
further argued that the "I Have a Dream” speech can be seen 
as the representative anecdote (representative discursive 
act) of the moderate wing of the first phase of the civil 
rights movement (see chapter one), and thus it functions as 
a text through which to examine the rhetorical appeals that 
proved so effective in overturning a decades-old system of 
legal segregation by race. But this speech is more than 
simply a representative text of the arguments of the 
moderate wing of the civil rights movement. This speech has 
taken on a powerful, symbolic role in American culture as an 
articulation of the vision of what the civil rights movement 
was striving for and as a national consensus of what America 
should be. More than any other individual, Martin Luther 
King, Jr. has come to symbolize for America the civil rights 
movement of the 1950s and 1960s. While King is noted for 
many events and accomplishments--the Montgomery bus boycott, 
the Birmingham and Selma campaigns, the Nobel Peace Prize-- 
it is through the "Dream" speech, with its repeated 
evocation in public discourse today of the symbol of "the 
dream" and the repeated playing of excerpts on television, 
that most Americans know of the ideas of Martin Luther King. 
While his "Letter from Birmingham Jail” is perhaps King's 
most detailed exposition of his philosophy, most Americans
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have not read it, but most adult Americans have at least 
seen or heard excerpts from the "Dream" speech. Excerpts 
from the speech have been played on such popular television
programs as The Cosby Show and The Wotl^er .Years, and every
January when the nation commemorates Martin Luther King with 
a national holiday, excerpts of the speech appear on 
television. Almost always the part of the speech excerpted 
is the famous "dream" sequence. The phrase, "Martin Luther 
King's dream," or simply "the dream," is now a cultural 
ideograph that stands for the vision of an America of racial 
harmony and justice. Lentz (1990) wrote that "King's dream 
was of America made whole, and it was of such power that it 
fixed him as an inextirpable symbol in the culture" (p. 1).
Tracy (1975) notes that certain historical personages can 
take on "symbolic dimensions," in that he or she becomes 
"representative of a certain human possibility for a 
particular cultural period" (p. 216). Tracy argues that
Martin Luther King, especially after his death, took on such 
symbolic dimensions for many in American culture: "... the
culture’s own memory-image of Martin Luther King became 
itself a cultural fact, a symbol, a representation of a 
particular authentic possibility" (p. 216). Thus, this
speech is more than just another Burkean representative 
anecdote which provides a text through which to study a 
movement, and it is more than just the most famous speech of 
a famous American orator. King, and the speech, are
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contemporary cultural icons, symbols of the civil rights 
movement and the great American promise of freedom, justice, 
and equality.
The Message/Form of the "Dream" Speech 
This study set out to answer several questions 
concerning the rhetorical appeal of this speech, its impact 
on public discourse about race, and its legacy (see chapter 
one). The first question asked what is the message/form of 
this speech, what myths and hierarchies does the speech 
invoke, and what conflicts does it transcend? Chapters two 
through five have been an attempt to answer that question.
We saw that the speech responded to a need on the part of 
Americans to have a sense that their guilt was purified-- 
ontological human guilt, white guilt over racism and the 
failure of America to live up to her national ideals in 
regard to African-Americans, and even black guilt resulting 
from low socio-economic status and poor self-esteem after 
centuries of oppression. The speech drew upon, and merged, 
two primary myths: one secular, one religious, both powerful 
and central to America's conception of itself. The speech 
invoked America's dominant secular myth--that of itself as a 
special nation with a mission to provide freedom, justice, 
and opportunity to all people on an equal basis. This was 
merged by King (as it often is in American public discourse) 
with the dominant theme of the Judeo-Christian faith--that 
of the need for the redemption of sin. By transcending the
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secular for the spiritual (that is, by placing the secular 
within the context of the spiritual), King was telling his 
auditors that by rising up to "live out the true meaning of 
its creed," America would not only achieve secular justice 
and national redemption for past failures, but that we as a 
people (and as individuals) would be spirituallv redeemed 
because racial justice is in accord with the laws of God.
This allowed King to transcend the contradiction 
between white secular power and black moral and spiritual 
power. Duncan (1962) maintains that "Two social orders 
cannot exist side by side unless there are ways of 
translating one into the other, or unless one transcends the 
other" (p. 308). King's genius was to articulate a
reconciliation in which white socio-economic authority could 
be exchanged for black moral and spiritual authority. On a 
socio-economic hierarchy, whites were superior to blacks, 
but, because the civil rights movement was making white 
America aware of the history of oppression to which black 
Americans had been subjected, blacks had developed superior 
moral and spiritual authority. King's rhetoric transcended 
the white social order of capitalism, materialism and 
competition for an order based on spiritual virtue, in which 
blacks were superior. He did this, however, by not totally 
rejecting the white value system, but by invoking its 
ultimate authority, God. Thus, for King, blacks had
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something to give whites in exchange for social and economic 
equality--i .e ., the salvation of their souls and the 
reinvigoration of the national purpose.
The Civil Rights Consensus 
Versus Black Power
The second question this study set out to answer was 
why the particular message/form of this speech emerged as 
the consensus voice on civil rights, and what competing 
voices were muted or ignored? To a large degree, the first 
part of this question was answered above and in the previous 
chapters: King's vision was articulate and inspiring, his 
persona appealing to moderate white America, and his message 
vividly exploited and merged America's most potent 
secular and religious myths. But to understand why King's 
vision became the consensus vision on civil rights we should 
place it in its historical and social context and assess the 
potency of the competing voices of the day.
Taylor (1985) analyzes the social upheavals of the 
1960s as a national identity crisis in which America was in 
the process of exchanging one consensus for another. He 
argues that before the 1960s the U.S. consensus had been 
that of a society of production, and people in the 
mainstream took their role therein. By the 1960s, however, 
the national infrastructure had been built and America was 
relatively affluent (although, as we discovered, that 
affluence was not evenly distributed). By 1963 America had 
achieved unmatched economic and military supremacy.
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Therefore, by the 1960s economic production and growth was 
no longer the overriding national concern, but there was no 
national identity with which to replace the production 
ethos. The youth rebellion of the sixties (of which the 
civil rights movement was the vanguard) came from a search 
for a new identity to replace the old consensus (pp. 48-51). 
This vacuum--in an environment of postwar national affluence 
and international dominance, along with the coming of age of 
the baby boom generation fed on the idealism of this postwar 
national affluence--allowed a social reform consensus to 
emerge to replace the production ethos.
African-Americans, on the margins of the old consensus 
and with their growing sense of purpose and unity from the 
civil rights movement, were in a position to play a leading 
role in defining and shaping the new consensus, and to 
redefine their relationship to the mainstream. In a social 
reform paradigm, their historical role as oppressed victims 
gave them superior moral authority in the new emerging 
consensus. King's rhetoric articulated the new relationship 
of black America to mainstream America. Blacks were 
America's redeemers. A new set of cultural practices, a 
reinterpretation of America's mission was in the process of 
being articulated. Thus, America made a tremendous 
investment in social reform (L BJ's "Great Society") to 
redeem itself from social injustice. The new identity for 
America, the new moral crusade, was social justice and 
equality. King's dream was the most succinct and vivid
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articulation of that new vision. To convict America of a 
moral failure of social justice in allocating its wealth, 
the natural paradigm to draw upon was the Christian 
redemption drama merged with the promise of secular, 
national redemption. King's speech came at a propitious time 
to serve the purpose of galvanizing a new national 
consensus. The speech occurred late enough in American 
history that it could be seen live by millions on television 
and recorded for posterity, and yet early enough that 
America had not yet lost its sense of national purpose and 
conviction. In the wake of Vietnam, the social upheavals and 
changes of the late 1960s, and then the Watergate scandal, 
it is doubtful that America could again coalesce around a 
vision based upon secular national redemption and Christian 
mythology. In invoking King's vision today, we are squeezing 
life out of a vision based upon myths that no longer have 
the same valence in our culture, but for which we have yet 
to find a replacement.
The emerging consensus, however, was not embraced by 
everyone. To determine which voices King's dream muted or 
ignored it is useful to look for those voices which 
criticized King's vision. Of course, King's dream was not 
shared by segregationists, but their harsh rhetoric and 
sometimes violent tactics, along with the increasingly 
obvious contradiction between America's principles of 
justice and the oppressive practice of segregation, made 
this a growingly untenable position to hold. However, King's
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speech received criticism from another quarter as well.
While the term "black power" did not enter into public 
discourse until 1966, the forerunners of the black power 
movement, in the persons of Malcolm X and the increasingly 
radical young activists at SNCC and CORE, were not entirely 
pleased with King's speech and the reaction it received.
Mai colm X (1965) criticized King and the other march 
organizers for "selling out" to the white power structure 
{pp. 13-17). Hare (1965) said the speech "was but a 
reaffirmation of [King's] faith in the white power 
structure" and noted that it "led Malcolm X to point out 
that while King is dreaming, other Negroes are having 
nightmares" (p. 40). Marable (1984) writes: "Militants were
bitterly disappointed that King had chosen not to include 
extensive critical remarks on the recent racist violence in 
the South, and the failure of most white liberals to respond 
concretely to the Negro's economic plight" (p. 82). As the 
black power movement began to coalesce around 1965-66 it 
found its voice muted by the assimilationist vision King had 
articulated so effectively at the March on Washington. The 
American media had come to feel it had an "investment" in 
Martin Luther King since they had christened him as the 
voice of reason and moderation in the civil rights movement 
(see Lentz, 1990). There is a long tradition in American 
public discourse on race, established at the time of Booker 
T. Washington, of asking "Who speaks for the Negro?" The 
press was accustomed to seeking out the single black leader
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who was supposed to be the spokesperson for all of black 
America. Thus, when black power advocates criticized King's 
position on civil rights, they were marginalized and 
presented by the media as unrepresentative, violence-prone 
radicals.
Black power advocates rejected King's assimilationist 
vision and turned instead to a model emphasizing black self- 
respect and stressing the importance of blacks taking 
control of their own institutions of economic and political 
empowerment. Generally, black power advocates rejected the 
assimilationist vision because after 1965 they began to feel 
that it was not working and/or because they felt the 
assimilationist model required blacks to sacrifice their 
culture in order to blend into the dominant white society. 
"Black power" was a 1960s slogan which resurrected a long 
tradition--from the slave rebellions of Nat Turner and 
others, to the protests of Frederick Douglas, to the black 
nationalism of Marcus Garvey--of blacks taking the 
responsibility for the emancipation and development of their 
race into their own hands (see Barbour, 1968, pp. 17-58; and 
Colston, 1979, pp. 233-235), Even Booker T. Washington, who 
is normally seen as an accommodationist to the white power 
structure of his day, can be seen in this tradition because 
of his emphasis on black economic self-reliance, self-pride, 
self-segregation, and racial cohesion (see Colston, 1979, p. 
234; and Newman, 1987, pp. 65-72).
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Space does not permit, nor does my purpose call for, a 
thorough explication of the philosophy of black power, or a 
discussion of every strand of the movement and every 
statement made in its name. Some black power elements did 
advocate aggressive violence against whites, but that was 
rarely put into practice and most responsible black power 
spokespersons insisted only upon the right of blacks to use 
violence in self-defense or as the only means to free 
themselves from oppression when all other avenues had been 
exhausted (in contrast to King's admonitions that blacks 
ghould not use violence under anv circumstances, even in 
self-defense). While some black power advocates did speak of 
"black nationalism" in literal terms--that is, of the 
formation of a separate black nation in America or Africa-- 
most considered that unrealistic and saw black nationalism 
in terms of "self-consciousness and group-identity ... or 
the conviction that participation in one community is not 
incompatible with ties of sentiment and support for another 
community where one has ethnic loyalties" (Newman, 1967, p. 
28). Even Martin Luther King, late in his career, began 
incorporating into his philosophy of love and nonviolence 
the need for black self-respect and the establishment of 
black economic and political power bases (see M. L. King, 
1986, pp. 245-252; Scott, 1968). However, as Lentz (1990) 
has demonstrated, King's increasing radicalism was muted by 
the American media who did not want to abandon their 
investment in King as the chief voice of moderation,
reasonableness, and nonviolence in the civil rights 
struggle. Thus, and especially so after his death and 
martyrdom in 1968, King was presented by the American media 
as the articulator of "the dream" and the symbol of the 
integrationist consensus which developed on civil rights, 
and which was consistent with America's "melting pot" theory 
of ethnic assimilation. In contrast, the American media 
focused upon the most radical elements of the black power 
movement (in part because they made better copy than did its 
moderate spokespersons), so that the whole movement was seen 
as racist, anti-white, separatist, and in general, a direct 
threat to America’s assimilationist vision of itself. In 
America the assimilationist vision--and its 1960s 
manifestation in the integrationist consensus (King's 
"dream")--has so dominated our discourse and thinking on 
racial and ethnic issues that it is difficult to stand 
outside of it to find a position from which to critique it. 
The assimilationist vision has become a defining feature of 
American national identity and of the individual identity of 
most Americans. To many persons such a critique may be 
profoundly disturbing as it seems to attack the hard-won 
foundations of their identity. My purpose, therefore, is to 
present some of the ideas of the more moderate wing of the 
black power movement as it served as a critique of, and 
alternative to, King's integrationist vision as articulated 
in the "Dream" speech.1
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The. ..".Black Bower-Jeoaitiou
Black power advocates, more directly and forcefully 
than integrationists, acknowledged two conditions concerning 
race relations in America. First, they recognized white 
America's deep-seeded and long-abiding racism, and the 
difficulty of removing that racism (and acceptance that it 
may never be removed). Newman (190 7) wrote that the 
"presupposition tof black power is] that the
assimilationist-accommodationist position is made untenable 
by the conscious and unconscious racism of white America, an 
aspect of culture so deep, strong and widespread that it can 
never be eliminated (p. 27). Lester (1966) argued that
blacks had been "naive" and "idealistic" in buying into "the 
American lie of assimilation," and that it was now time for 
blacks to focus on their own identity and seek control of 
their own institutions (pp. 22, 24-25). Secondly, black 
power advocates more openly acknowledged the long-term 
effects of racism on an oppressed minority. Racism had left 
African-Americans with low self-esteem and inferior socio­
economic status, and thus at a power disadvantage in dealing 
with whites. Therefore, black power spokespersons argued, 
the assimilationist model put blacks in the position of 
supplicants seeking admission into the majority culture on 
the terms of that majority culture - Poussaint (1968) wrote: 
"Assimilation by definition always takes place according to 
the larger societal (white) model of culture and behavior, 
and thus the Negro must give up much of his black identity
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and subculture to be comfortably integrated" (p. 99), Wright 
(1968) maintained that the integrationist approach had 
failed: "There can be no meaningful integration between
unequals. Thus as black men have turned toward an illusive 
integrationist goal, with white men holding the reins of 
power, black men have lost both their identity and their 
self-respect" (p. 116).
Black power advocates, then, turned toward a more 
pluralistic model of American society, stressing the need to 
build black self-respect and institutions of black 
empowerment in order to be able to approach white America 
from a position of mutual respect and equality. Hare (1965) 
said blacks should reject the assimilationist approach 
because it requires the adopting of white standards and 
norms, and it "undermines" black "self-respect and self- 
sufficiency" (pp. 172-173). He argued that blacks should 
instead adopt a "pluralistic approach," like the Jews and 
French Canadians, who demand "equality of opportunity and 
equality of citizenship," but also seek to "preserve group 
identity as a distinct ethnic group" (p. 174). Carmichael 
(1966) argued that the approach which called for integrating 
blacks into the mainstream of American society was "based on 
the assumption that there was nothing of value in the Negro 
community" (p. 645). The integrationist model, he
maintained, by appealing to the conscience and goodwill of 
white society, left blacks in a position of dependence (pp. 
646-647). Even a group as respectable as the National
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Committee of Negro Churchmen endorsed a version of black
power. In a statement on black power they called for:
A more equal sharing of power ... as the precondition 
of authentic human interaction .... Without this 
capacity to participate with power--i.e.. to have some 
organized political and economic strength to really 
influence people with whom one interacts--integration 
is not meaningful [emphasis in original] ("Black 
Power*" 1968, p. 267).
Because of the unequal distribution of power, and the 
sense on the part of much of white America that blacks had 
nothing of value to offer, integration became "irrelevant" 
to many black power advocates (Lester, 1966, p. 25; Newman, 
1987, p. 10). They turned instead to a philosophy that 
stressed building black self-respect, discovering and 
appreciating black cultural identity, and establishing 
institutional bases of economic and political power in the 
black community. As one black power spokesperson put it at 
an Atlanta forum: "Martin King was trying to get us to love 
white folks before we learned to love ourselves, and that 
ain't no good" (cited in Harding, 1968, p. U ) . Harding 
(1968) argued that before black Americans could fully 
participate in and identify with a larger community (whether 
that be the American community or humankind at large), they 
had to develop a healthy self-esteem and identification with 
their own racial and cultural heritage (pp. 5-11). Thus, a 
"temporary withdrawing of the black community into itself" 
was necessary to strengthen the black community and prepare 
it for true interdependence with white America on a basis of 
mutual respect and true equality (p. 20).
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In sum, black power advocates were not optimistic about 
the chances of achieving true integration, at least in the 
short-run, because they did not expect white America to 
voluntarily cede its power advantage in anything more than a 
token and piecemeal fashion, and they did not believe that 
true integration and equality could occur between races in a 
situation where power is unequally distributed. King's 
integrationist approach assumed blacks would attain power as. 
SL.resul._t of being fully integrated into American society, 
whereas black power advocates believed that power is a 
prex&qyAsite to true integration. King’s integrationist 
vision came to dominate public discourse on civil rights, 
marginalizing and muting the philosophy of black power, and 
depriving the assimilationist model of the healthy criticism 
it needed to adapt and maintain viability. Harding (1968) 
criticized King for his failure to offer anything more, in 
the face of white intransigence, than vague statements of 
"faith" that justice will eventually triumph: "King stands
for the liberal tradition, continuing to maintain faith in 
American goodness, in reason, in the ordered nature of the 
world." King "substitutes an eloquent dream" for a realistic 
appraisal of America's racist nature (pp. 34-35). However, 
the black power advocates, according to Harding, sometimes 
went too far in stressing the forces of evil in society, 
refusing "to dream" or sufficiently acknowledge the 
possibility of creative healing (pp. 35-36). Harding 
expressed the need for a perspective that balances the two
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approaches by combining black power's willingness to look 
realistically upon the evil of American racism with King's 
recognition of the possibility for healing and his 
"determination not to succumb to the enemy's disease" (p.
36 ) .
The black power perspective offers a ground from which 
to critique King's assimilationist vision. His emphasis on 
love, nonviolence, and moral persuasion leaves the oppressed 
minority in a position of dependence on the goodwill of the 
majority and without effective compensatory power if and 
when that goodwill wanes. His "Dream" speech fails to fully 
acknowledge the depth of American racism and the difficulty 
of overcoming it and achieving true integration. King's 
vision also fails to appreciate the argument of the black 
power advocates that a race that has been brutally and 
systematically oppressed cannot step immediately into a 
position of integration into the majority culture without 
losing its ethnic identity. True equality requires 
interdependence and mutual respect. Therefore, the argument 
goes, a period of black self-nurturing, self-empowerment, 
and community-building may be necessary before blacks can 
approach whites as true equals who have as much to offer as 
they expect to receive in return. Also, King tended to 
conflate equality with integration. He failed to realize 
what black power advocates realized full well; that 
integration does not necessarily mean that one is integrated 
on an equal basis. Nor did he seem to recognize the
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possibility of a pluralistic approach in which equalitv does 
not necessarily require integration. King's tendency to 
translate political problems into moral issues, as Gandhi 
had in India, created a sense of separation between power 
and moral authority which made power seem "bad" to him and 
his followers.
The Shortcomings of This Message/Form
The third question this study set out to answer 
concerns the shortcomings of the particular message/form 
King chose to employ in his speech at the March on 
Washington. In other words, what are its limitations and 
contradictions? What thought patterns does it encourage and 
discourage? What learned dysfunctions does it produce?
The rhetorical form of redemption from guilt that 
marked King's "I Have a Dream" speech is the paradigm for 
the moderate wing of the civil rights movement. Steele 
(1990) believes "that in the sixties the need for white 
redemption from racial guilt became the most powerful, yet 
unspoken, element in America's social-policy-making process 
..." (p. 79). The problem with the guilt paradigm which 
conceives of America's racial problems in terms of white 
guilt and black victimage, is that achieving the moral 
highground in terms of the cleansing of sin for whites and 
maintenance of innocence for blacks counts more than 
achieving actual results. Steele (1990) has commented upon 
the two major elements of the guilt paradigm: white guilt
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and black victimage. He argues that the need for white 
redemption shaped the nation's policies regarding blacks in 
ways that delivered the look of innocence without doing much 
to uplift blacks (pp. 79-80). According to Steele (1990), 
guilt can be a "very dangerous" motive because it has a 
tendency "to draw us into self-preoccupation and escapism" 
in which we are no longer interested in the source of our 
guilt and an authentic redemption from it, but only the look 
and appearance of redemption (pp. 84-85). Thus, the paradigm 
of white guilt makes the real problems of blacks secondary 
(for whites) to the preoccupation of whites with the need 
for quick redemption (Steele, 1990, pp. 87-88). One result 
of the need for white redemption is the institution of 
racial entitlements and preferential treatment policies. The 
enactment of racial prefernce programs for African-Americans 
was never established through broad public support, but 
through executive orders, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission guidelines, and the courts. Thus, it was often 
seen as a punishment handed down from above, creating 
resentment and causing it to lack legitimacy among many 
whites. Nieli (1991) demonstrates that white guilt over past 
racial sins of the white race resulted in a fear of standing 
up against preferential treatment of blacks, even though 
racial preferences and distinctions violate a central 
principle of the early civil rights movement --that race 
should not be a factor in the awarding of benefits. Thus, 
the use of the guilt paradigm in arguing for racial equality
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contained within it the seeds of a policy which contradicted 
the original goals of the movement.
The other side of the coin of white guilt is black 
victimage. For whites to be guilty, blacks must be victims. 
Steele (1990) argues that being black has come to be 
identified with being a victim (p. 107). Victimization 
carries with it a certain authority and power, but the power 
of victimage can be a dangerous power for two reasons.
First, while victimage spares one from some degree of guilt 
and responsibility, one must maintain the state of victimage 
to maintain one's innocence. Steele makes this point when he 
argues that the tragedy of black power today is that it is 
primarily a "victim's power"--a power rooted "too deeply in 
the entitlements derived from past injustice." This formula 
"binds the victim to his victimization by linking his power 
to his status as a victim" (p. l<t) . Secondly, the power of 
victimage is a passive power that depends upon the 
elicitation of guilt in the conscience of the victimizer. In 
this formula, the victimizer is the active agent of change, 
while the victimized is a mere passive receiver. The 
analysis of the "second persona" in chapter five has already 
demonstrated how King's metaphors cast the audience in a 
passive role. Steele (1990) notes that since social victims 
have been oppressed by society, they come to feel that their 
lives will be improved more by change in society than by 
individual action. Society rather than self becomes the
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agent of change and individual passivity is encouraged (pp.
14-15). In 1966 the National Committee of Negro Churchmen
warned of the consequences of this "distortion" and "gross
imbalance of power and conscience between Negroes and white
Americans." While it is assumed
that white people are justified in getting what they 
want through the use of power ... Negro Americans must 
... make their appeal only through conscience. As a 
result, the power of white men and the conscience of 
black men have both been corrupted. The power of white 
men is corrupted because it meets little meaningful 
resistance from Negroes to temper it .... The 
conscience of black men is corrupted because, having no 
power to implement the demands of conscience, the 
concern for justice is transmuted into a distorted form 
of love, which, in the absence of justice, becomes 
chaotic self-surrender. Powerlessness breeds a race of 
beggars ("Black Power," 196B, p. 264).
In sum, a certain irony results when the guilt paradigm 
is used by an historically oppressed group to achieve power. 
First, the oppressors, convicted of their guilt, become more 
interested in receiving absolution for their sins than in 
changing the conditions of oppression. Of course, changing 
conditions of oppression is one way to bring about 
absolution, but changing conditions of oppression is only 
secondary to the goal of absolution. For those convicted of 
social and moral failings, the primary concern is to achieve 
the appearance of redemption in as quick and painless a 
manner as possible. The second irony of the guilt paradigm 
is that it links the power of the oppressed to their status 
S_s oppressed. Thus, victims develop a stake in maintaining 
their status as victims, a status which places them in a 
condition of passivity and dependability. King's discourse
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failed to make a distinction between blacks as victims in a 
moral/spiritual order, and blacks as victims in a socio­
political sense (in fact, he merges these two orders of 
experience). When moral/spiritual victimage, for which one 
must rely upon the ultimate judgment of God, subsumes socio­
political victimage, the victim is encouraged to passivity 
in the socio-political realm.
Of course, in King's U3e of the guilt paradigm African- 
Americans ' role as victims was subsumed under a transcendent 
vision of national unity and secular/spiritual redemption. 
But the guilt paradigm itself, especially when the social 
values and myths upon which transcendence depends begin to 
fray, lends itself to a rhetoric of victimization. King's 
discourse established a powerful rhetorical form for dealing 
with race relations in America, which for later, lesser 
rhetors has often deteriorated into a rhetoric of 
victimization. In the hands of a rhetor less ethical than 
Martin Luther King a redemption drama can become an 
insidious and divisive paradigm in which one party has an 
excessive stake in convicting the other of guilt in order to 
insure and maintain the first party's innocence and power as 
a victim. Loury (1989) argues that many black leaders have 
come to base black claims
... above all, on the status of blacks as America's 
historical victims. Maintenance of this status requires 
constant emphasis on the wrongs of the past and 
exaggeration of present tribulations. He who leads a 
group of historical victims ... must renew the 
indictment and keep alive the moral asymmetry implicit
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in the respective positions of victim and victimizer 
.... The circumstance of his group as "underdog" 
becomes his most valuable political (and cultural) 
asset (p . 147).
Sleeper (1990) has demonstrated how this process has played 
out in New York City. His study describes how the racial 
politics of guilt and redemption has been used by racial 
demagogues such as A1 Sharpton to achieve personal power 
through exploiting racial divisiveness, led to excesses such 
as the Tawana Brawley affair, and resulted in alienation and 
mistrust between the races.
The Legacy of "I Have a Dream"
Next, this study set out to ascertain the legacy of 
King's speech. To what degree did the success of this 
speech’s message/form contribute to the civil rights 
movement's failure to achieve its goals beyond the 
dismantling of legal segregation?
"I Have a Dream" is the paradigmatic example of, and 
indeed helped to establish, the moral/religious approach 
adopted by most mainstream civil rights advocates. The 
legacy of this speech is in the way its particular 
message/form was elevated as the "correct" prism through 
which to view the civil rights issue, to the point that its 
assumptions and goals became unquestioned aspects of public 
culture; indeed it became almost a sacred text. Duncan 
(1968) has noted the tendency for articulations of ideal 
futures to become sacrosanct: "Once the promise is
symbolized and these symbols become sacred, they are no
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longer subject to critical discussion'' (p. 113). This is 
what happened with the "Dream" speech, as the martyred hero 
and his "dream" became the centerpiece of a symbolic cluster 
representing what the nation told itself was a commitment to 
racial justice. To question the heroism of King, or the 
desirability of achieving "the dream," was to risk having 
hurled upon one the culture's most venomous epithet-- 
"racist."
But a movement based on moral and religious arguments 
can often get bogged down in zealous moralism, self- 
righteousness, religious mythology, and spiritual other­
worldliness. Andrew A. King (1971), in his study of the 
rhetorical legacy of the black church, found that because of 
their religious roots, civil rights spokespersons tended to 
see the movement in terms of Biblical typology and religious 
mythology, resulting in a rhetoric which "rendered its goals 
impressionistic and illusory" (p. 183). Martin Luther King
was the exemplar of this approach with his focus upon the 
black man, made morally righteous through his suffering, as 
the redeemer of America. King's rhetoric encouraged whites 
and blacks to "act out the old Biblical romance of 
oppressors versus chosen people" (A. A. King, 1971, p. 18(t). 
Marable (1985) places King within the "Black Moses" 
tradition of black American politics in which an individual 
arises to challenge the racist system and inspire a "new 
vision of social relations. The political discourse is 
almost always connected with the Old Testament saga of
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Moses" (p. 30^). The weakness of this paradigm, according to 
Marable, is that one individual becomes the conduit of black 
social revolt and people fail to see that the power to act 
is in their own hands (p. 305).
Some have argued that the religious approach to civil 
rights only prolongs oppression by deflecting the need for 
socio-political action in the here and now. Hernton (1966) 
criticizes "mystical" solutions calling for "love," 
"suffering," and "forgiveness," employing such phrases as 
"Go down Moses," and "I Have a Dream," and telling black 
people that God is on their side. Such approaches tend "to 
transport the Negro's concentration awav from this world and 
this time, a world and time that, if he is to become free, 
he must deal with in an objective, secular fashion" [all 
emphases in original] (p. 80). Andrew A. King (1971) argues 
that "to achieve secular equality, it is necessary to appeal 
to audiences in terms of realistic alternatives; the 
supplication of supernatural powers only deflects action"
(p . 185 ) .
King's use in "I Have a Dream" of transcendent images 
and his synthesis of religious/secular mythology gave 
America a legacy of dealing with its racial problems in 
terms of abstraction and myth. In order to prove devotion to 
the ideals of racial justice, white Americans simply had to 
declare allegiance to the proper symbols and myths. Burke 
(1973) wrote that "The reading of a book on attaining
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success is in itself the symbolic attaining of that success 
..." (p. 299). The same could be said of listening to, or 
reading, or repeating the language of a speech, especially 
once those words have become transfixed in the national 
consciousness as secular ideals. The invocation and 
repetition of King's words and ideas allow Americans to 
symbolicallv attain racial justice. We attain racial 
justice--purge ourselves of guilt, prove our worthiness to 
be included in the community of right-thinking, racially 
enlightened people--by our acceptance of the symbols of 
racial justice. What we want is easy redemption, and we get 
it in symbolic form.
Kendall (1965) predicted that the civil rights movement 
would ultimately fail to substantially alter the lives of 
the majority of the black masses because it had not achieved 
a true political consensus for the type of change it was 
seeking. There i3 a danger in achieving a moral consensus 
without achieving a true political consensus to go along 
with it--that is, without having achieved political 
consensus on the sacrifices involved and the means necessary 
to realize the new moral vision. King's speech gave America 
an inspiring vision of a new moral order, but it elided the 
costs and difficulties of achieving racial equality. King 
cannot be held entirely responsible for the legacy of his 
speech, or the way Americans have chosen to use his words. 
King was a preacher who felt his job was to inspire people 
and give them a better vision of themselves. His "Dream"
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speech, although idealistic and unrealistic, did that. But 
America has used the speech as a national mantra. The mere 
invocation of the words and ideas provide us with symbolic 
purification and transcendence for our failure to achieve 
racial harmony.
Consequences of a Rhetoric of Assimilation
The final question this study sought to answer w a s :
What are the consequences of a successful, totalizing 
rhetoric of assimilation? Does the need to transcend 
differences necessarily result in a discourse which elides 
the practical difficulties of achieving assimilation? Can 
real, long-term divisions be transcended without ignoring 
the socio-political difficulties of effecting such 
assimilation?
This study reveals that in the case of the "I Have a 
Dream" speech the difficulties of achieving integration are 
elided in favor of an emphasis on inspiration toward the 
goal itself. Although the speech has been widely praised 
(see chapter three), some have criticized the speech as 
being empty of substance. Lewis (1978) said the speech "was 
rhetoric almost without content" (p. 228). One observer, a 
young, radical black, admitted that he and his friends got 
caught up in the moment, but upon reflection found the 
speech lacking: " ... we were screaming and yelling and wah-
hooing, but after it was over, I said to myself, 'What did 
he say?'" ("The March of Time," 1973, p. 26). Terrell (1989)
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contended that in contrast to John Lewis's censored speech 
which was "dangerously relevant," King's speech "wasn't 
censored because it was basically irrelevant .... About the 
best thing that can be said for King's speech is that it 
proved beyond a doubt that he was a truly great orator who 
had pleasant dreams" (p. 985). These criticisms reflect our 
misunderstanding and distrust of the power of form. They 
reflect a rational bias toward systematic presentation of 
issues and evidence. But as Burke (1968a) reminds us, form 
cannot be so easily separated from substance (pp. 45-49). 
King's form is his substance. It was a form which allowed 
him to transcend division. Had King spoken in terms of the 
partial and particular he would have remained a local 
figure.
It is perhaps unfair to fault King himself for the fact 
that his speech contained little substantive analysis of the 
difficult racial problems confronting America. King was a 
preacher and that day he preached. King's oratorical genius 
was in his ability to apply America's religious/moral values 
to secular issues in a visionary way. "I Have a Dream" was a 
secular sermon addressed to the nation, and it did what any 
good Sunday church sermon does. A religious sermon inspires 
the listeners to seek the Kingdom of God, and King's speech 
inspired the nation to seek a secular Kingdom of God in race 
relations. King was not a nuts and bolts leader who excelled 
in details. He was a national moral leader who provided 
vision and inspiration. As this study has demonstrated, "I
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Have a Dream" is best understood as a national, secular 
version of a Christian redemption drama.
Americans misuse the speech when they try to treat it 
as anything more than an inspirational sermon (albeit a 
great one) articulating an ideal vision. Alvarez (1988) 
argues that King's "I Have a Dream" is best understood as a 
sermon in the black Baptist tradition employing dialogic 
form, repetition, rhythm, and the use of common knowledge. 
Marbury (1989) says that King's rhetoric was in the style of 
Biblical rhetoric--a pre-literate, oral style in which the 
rhetor is caught up in the power of the revealed word of 
God. "I Have a Dream"--especially in the second half of the 
speech with its repetition, rhythm, vivid imagery and use of 
mythos--is rhetoric in the oral, pre-literate mode, similar 
to the Homeric style of rhetoric identified by Havelock 
(1963, pp. 3-193), The "dream" sequence--the most stirring, 
the most memorable part of the speech--does not move one 
nearly as much in the reading as in the hearing, unless one 
reads the text mentally employing King's famous cadence and 
rhythm (as a matter of fact, it is difficult to read those 
words without mentally employing King's cadence because the 
words and the cadence are so intricately interwoven in our 
minds). As Havelock observed about the Homeric rhetoric, 
oral rhetoric derives its effect from its participative and 
rhythmic nature. In order to analyze the content we must 
step back, as Plato did with the work of the poetic bards of 
Greece, and say, "What does this mean?"; that is, examine it
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objectively. In order to examine the content of King's 
message we must arouse our consciousness from its dream-like 
state induced by the language and rhythm to stimulate our 
minds to think conceptually about what is being said. King's 
speech provides vivid images of freedom, justice, and 
equality in the "dream" sequence, but this is embedded in 
the narrative form. There are no articulations of "freedom" 
or "justice" as concepts which then can be applied outside 
the context of King's narrative. Thus, the "Dream" speech is 
confined to a role as an inspirational vision or goal, but 
serves no function as a roadmap of horf to get there. It 
provides few concepts or definitions which can be carried 
over to apply to various situations. The "dream" is invoked 
as a goal, as identification, as the sharing of a vision of 
racial harmony and justice, but it provides no more than 
that.
A discourse employing a totalizing rhetoric of 
assimilation, by necessity, elides the practical 
difficulties of achieving that assimilation. Although later 
in his career King was more realistic in regard to the 
difficulties of achieving true racial harmony and 
integration, "I Have a Dream" articulates the promise of an 
unrealistic utopia. Walton's (1971) study of King's 
political philosophy concludes that King unrealistically 
attempts to impose a religious ethic of "pure love" (or, as 
King called it "agape") into the secular realm where justice 
can only be partial and temporary at best. King's philosophy
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ignores "man's egoism and self-interest" which tend to
"render all historical harmonies of interest partial and
incomplete" (p. 80). Walton argues that King's attempt to
forge high religious idealism with a practical methodology
... resulted in an insistence on the coming into being 
of a purely utopian community, a iust society which, if 
it ever were to be attained, would require a much 
greater transformation than any ever envisioned by 
King. The gap between the ideal envisaged and the 
reality at hand is much too ponderous to be bridged by 
powerful convictions (p. 100).
Walton concludes that King made an error common to political
theologians in his attempt to convert moral values based on
divine revelation and belief in God into a political
ideology applicable "to all people in all situations."
King's thought is "most directly applicable in those
religious communities with a common background to his own,"
and is increasingly less relevant as one moves away from
such communities (p. 116). King's greatest success came as a
leader of the church-based civil rights movement in the
South, but when King attempted to expand his movement to the
Northern cities, his message was less relevant and his
campaigns were less successful. It may be that King's focus
on changing political institutions rather than cultural
institutions constricted the potential success of his
message. His partial successes were implemented by Congress
and the courts, but these political authorities can only
craft and enforce regulations, they do not create
opportunity. Most activities that foster organic attitudinal
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change and create opportunities go on outside of government, 
in business and cultural institutions.
King’s philosophy was based on faith in God and belief 
in the power of redemptive love to transform the hearts of 
human beings, but King's political and legal successes were 
not a result of changing hearts and minds through the power 
of redemptive love. Ultimately all of his successes came 
about as the result of economic boycotts, court rulings, or 
from generating sympathy and embarrassment by inducing 
segregationists to violent overreaction. For King the 
ultimate goal of the movement was love and reconciliation 
between the races. Byt it is not necessary for blacks and 
whites to "love" each other in order to attain racial 
justice and equality. What is necessary is that race not be 
a factor in civil, legal, and economic matters.
Instead of confronting the harsh realities of America's 
racial problems and allowing for human imperfection in 
implementing solutions, King's assimilationist vision viewed 
race relations in terms of a socio-religious mythic drama. 
Walton (1971) notes that projecting reality into mythic 
drama is essential for moving the imagination of people, but 
there can be profound and long lasting consequences from the 
adoption of appealing social myths. Even though their ideals 
may not be attainable, they can shape thought and behavior 
for long periods of time (p. 88). A successful discourse of 
totalizing, assimilationist rhetoric can, as in the case of 
King's "Dream" speech, create and reinforce social myths
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that are harmful in their failure to acknowledge human 
imperfectability and the trade-offs always necessary to 
forge eny degree of social cohesion. This is both the power 
and weakness of assimilating mythologies. They bring us 
together, but by eliding our differences. King's views were 
simplistic in their two-valued view of the world. Dualities 
such as good versus evil, justice versus injustice, 
nonviolence versus violence, etc, ignore the fact that human 
nature and human institutions are both good and bad, just 
and unjust, and that any system which implements a measure 
of justice requires some degree of coercion. Reik (1957) 
argues that the danger in seeking moral perfectability is in 
overreaching (p. 424). In an ardent quest for virtue human 
beings often institute a reign of terror, as in the French 
Revolution, in an attempt to enforce virtue and justice.
Reik recommends that we give up ideas of our own 
"grandiosity and perfectability" and not make exaggerated 
moral demands upon ourselves (p. 428). Attempts to implement
King’s assimilationist vision of perfect equality and 
justice are vulnerable to this danger. Duncan (1962) notes 
that there is always a danger in "equality" being used as a 
slogan to mask or promote one particular type of hierarchy 
over another (p. 3 38). King's envisioned utopia would not be 
a world in which inequality (or hierarchy) is reallv 
eliminated, but one which inverts the present hierarchy 
based on economic and political power for one based on some 
people's conception of spiritual goodness and moral virtue.
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A successful transcendent vision tautologically elides 
social division. An alternative to dealing with race 
relations through the prism of assimilationist utopianism 
and socio-religious mythology is the approach of the black 
power advocates discussed earlier in this chapter. The 
black power approach avoided the unrealistic utopianism of 
King's vision which came to dominate our discourse on civil 
rights. King's assimilationist model would have been well 
served by incorporating a critique from the black power 
perspective. However, a weakness of the pluralistic, black 
power perspective is that it does not transcend our 
differences. This is why it was largely rejected by America 
(although some elements of it have been incorporated into 
our approach to race relations). At the beginning of this 
section I asked whether there are means whereby a rhetor can 
transcend real, bitter, long-term divisions of race, class, 
religion, etc. under a higher good without ignoring the 
socio-political difficulties of effecting such an 
assimilation. I have concluded that King's assimilationist 
model transcended divisions, but at the expense of a 
realistic assessment of the socio-political difficulties of 
effecting that assimilation. The black power advocates 
acknowledged the difficulties of overcoming these divisions, 
but provided no transcending vision of unification.
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The Comic Frame
It is difficult to imagine an approach to the civil 
rights debate of the 1960s that would have avoided the 
shortcomings of the two alternatives discussed above. In an 
effort to outline a perspective that might have provided an 
alternative to the Scylla of King's vision of redemptive 
assimilation and the Charybdis of division and bitterness in 
the black power perspective, this chapter will conclude with 
a brief explanation of Burke's (1984a) concept of "the comic 
frame" (pp. 39-44, 166-175). The comic frame has been little
studied by rhetorical scholars (the exception is Carlson, 
1986, 1988), so this treatment is meant merely to suggest
what an alternative view on American race relations in the 
1960s might have looked like; a view which avoids the 
shortcomings of King's redemptive mythology, but which also 
avoids the divisiveness of the black power approach.
Burke (1984a) argues that our "structures of symbolism" 
might be understood through the terminology of literary 
forms, and that each form "stresses its own peculiar way of 
building the mental equipment (meanings, attitudes, 
character) by which one handles the significant factors of 
his time" (p. 34). In other words, literary forms can be
seen as "frames of acceptance" or "strategies for living"
(p. 43). The comic frame, according to Burke (1984a),
"should enable people to be observers of themselves, while 
acting. Its ultimate would not be pcLSaiyene.55, but maximum 
consciousne ss. One would 'transcend' himself by noting his
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own foibles” [all emphases in original] (p. 171). (Comedy,
laughing at our own foibles, is not to be confused with
humor, laughing at others.) The comic frame can be
understood by contrasting it to the tragic frame. The tragic
frame sees social ills as the result of human evil . Thus,
the correction of social problems requires redemption to
purge guilt from the social order. In contrast, comedy
accepts human beings as imperfect. Social problems arise not
from human evil, but human error and stupidity (Burke,
1984a, p. 41; Carlson, 1986, p. 447-448). Burke wrote mainly
about the tragic frame because that perspective, especially
in the twentieth century, dominates our view of the world
and our view of ourselves, but he felt the comic frame
provided "mankind's only hope" to avoid self-destruction
(1966, p. 20) and was "the most serviceable for the handling
of human relationships" (1984a, p. 106). Burke (1984a)
considers comedy the most "humane" (p. 42) and "civilized"
(p. 39) form of art. He writes:
The progress of humane enlightenment can go no further 
than in picturing people not as vicious. but as 
mistaken. When you add that people are necessarily 
mistaken, that all people are exposed to situations in 
which they must act as fools, that every insight 
contains its own special kind of blindness, you 
complete the comic circle ... [all emphases in 
original] (Burke, 1984a, p. 41).
Burke's concept of the comic frame may seem similar to the
Platonic view that knowledge equals virtue, but it is not.
Plato believed that we should seek knowledge because with it
we would acquire virtue. In Burke there is more of a
recognition that our foibles will always be with us. He asks
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only that we recognize them. In recognizing our foibles we 
adopt a wider frame of reference which reduces the tendency 
to become strict in adherence to one ideology. The comic 
frame promotes a realistic sense of our own limits (Burke, 
1984a, pp. 101-102, 107). Burke's point is that instead of
labelling our rhetorical opponents as evil, we recognize 
that they consider themselves just as moral and well- 
intentioned as we consider ourselves to be. We should 
consider them not evil, but mistaken, and recognize that ye 
may well be mistaken in some respects ourselves.
In brief, while in the tragic frame actors play the 
roles of heroes or villains and the plot emphasizes the 
confrontation with and elimination of evil, in the comic 
frame everyone is both hero and villain. Although the comic 
frame allows for change in the social order, it recognizes 
that seme social order must exist for humans to function and 
that changes in the social order must never be accomplished 
at the expense of the humanity of those on the other side. 
Conflict is humanized by the actor's consciousness of his or 
her own foibles (see Carlson, 1986, p. <*48 ) .
Although Burke (1984a) does point out that the literary 
categories cannot be isolated in purity, that they do 
overlap somewhat (p. 57), both King and the black power 
movement can be said to have viewed the civil rights
struggle mainly through the frame of tragedy. While King did
recognize that good and evil exists in all of us, his
rhetoric emphasized the need for good to triumph over evil.
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He saw the civil rights movement largely in moral terms and 
he saw segregation and racism as not merely mistaken, but as 
evil and sinful blights upon humankind. Even his largely 
conciliatory "I Have a Dream" speech characterized his 
opponents as "vicious racists" and the governor of Alabama 
as "having his lips dripping with the words of interposition 
and nullification." The difference, within the perspective 
of the tragic frame, between King and the black power 
advocates was that King offered whites redemption for their 
sins, while black power advocates wanted to leave whites 
convicted of their guilt and turn their attention to healing 
the wounds of the black community.
Carlson (1986) contends that King operated in the comic 
frame because his reliance on Christian spirituality and 
peaceful goals emphasized identification with all humanity 
(p. 452). She also contends that "peaceful civil
disobedience" illustrates the comic frame because it 
"overcomes its opponents while still recognizing the value 
of individual human beings" (pp. 448-449). Carlson is 
incorrect on both counts. While civil disobedience per se. 
as a tactic, can be comic, King certainly did not use it 
that way. King used civil disobedience to elicit violence 
and to create a sociodrama of good versus evil in which 
civil rights demonstrators, and most notably King himself, 
played the role of tragic heroes and segregationists played 
the role of villains (see Garrow, 1978, pp. 2-3, 220-231;
Fairclough, 1987, pp. 107-109). Birmingham and Selma can
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hardly be seen as anything but tragedy. And although
Christian spirituality did underlie King’s rhetoric, he used
it not to emphasize the human mistakes and foibles of all
people, but to make sharp distinctions between good people
and evil people. This had important implications for the
civil rights movement. The motives we attribute to ourselves
and our opponents dramatically shape our perception of
events. Burke (1984a) wrote:
In the motives we assign to the actions of ourselves 
and our neighbors, there is implicit a program of 
socialization. In deciding why people do as they do, we 
get the cues that place us with relation to them.
Hence, a vocabulary of motives is important for the 
forming of both private and public relationships 
[emphasis in original] (p. 170).
King's tragic frame saw racists and segregationists as evil
and vicious. But a comic frame would have seen them as
mistaken, as perpetuators of folly. King's error was to say
that because racism is morally evil, those who practice it
are morally evil. Violent segregationists committed evil
acts, but the vast majority of segregationists were not
violent and did not consider themselves evil. They were
acting in accordance with the moral values to which they
were acculturated. Once the social order declares that those
values are "evil,” as opposed to being mistaken, one has two
choices. One can either withdraw in sullen silence, or
appeal to the social order for forgiveness. If the choice is
the latter, the priests of the new social order (in this
case) are African-Americans. Only they can give absolution
(a role the black power advocates refused to play). Thus,
240
the rituals of absolution that have developed in our post- 
civil -rights-era public culture: the Martin Luther King 
holiday, affirmative action programs, the extreme 
sensitivity whites often show to saying anything that might 
get them labelled "racists." If the choice is withdrawal, 
reconciliation does not take place. For all their 
legislative successes, King and the civil rights movement 
were not able to maintain what Hofstadter (1968) refers to 
as "comity." Comity is the maintenance in public debate of 
civility. Comity is engaging in public debate without 
denying the legitimacy of the opponent's values: "The basic
humanity of the opposition is not forgotten; civility is not 
abandoned; the sense that a community life must be carried 
on after the acerbic issues of the moment have been fought 
over and won is seldom very far out of mind" (p. 454). Of 
course, civility broke down on both sides, and 
segregationists violated this principle long before King 
ever came along, but it is African-Americans who have 
suffered the more for the failure of the nation to achieve 
racial reconciliation. It is the winners of the debate who 
are responsible for maintaining comity. They must win in a 
way that allows the opposition to rejoin the community. But 
this did not happen after the civil rights debate. Former 
segregationists, for the most part, withdrew, and the courts 
implemented the civil rights agenda of busing and 
affirmative action programs which is today breaking down 
because of lack of broad support in the white community.
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A civil rights movement from the comic frame would have
placed less emphasis on moralistic good versus evil
arguments--good blacks and good whites versus bad whites, as
King saw it; or blacks (good) versus whites (bad), as many
black power advocates saw it--and more emphasis on how
segregation and racism is another example of the folly and
stupidity we human beings are prone to falling into. This
could be done without ignoring the evil effects of the
mistaken intellectual notion of racism. When someone is
declared mistaken, as opposed to evil, then he or she can be
reconciled to the social order without as great a loss of
face. A comic approach might have avoided the playing out of
the tragic drama of white guilt and black victimage that has
been the legacy of the civil rights movement. A comic
approach could have allowed us to transcend our differences,
not by appealing to vague and illusory socio-religious
mythology, but by sharing the knowledge of our own
ignorance, stupidity, and shortcomings. A tragic view of the
history of American race relations requires reparations of
some type (whether economic or moral) for something which
can never be made up for--three hundred plus years of
slavery, segregation, discrimination, and racial
oppression--and for which the original perpetuators are all
dead. A comic perspective would not ignore or forgive this,
but reclassify it. Burke (1984a) writes:
The comic frame, in making a man the student of
himself, makes it possible for him to "transcend" 
occasions when he has been tricked or cheated, since he 
can readily put such discouragements in his "assets"
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column, under the head of "experience." Thus we "win" 
by subtly changing the rules of the game--and by a mere 
trick of bookkeeping ... we make "assets" out of 
"liabilities" (p. 171).
A comic frame of reference would not have convicted whites
of guilt as much as of folly and ignorance, perhaps
dissipating white shame and embarrassment and allowing
greater racial reconciliation. A comic frame might have
prevented the association of black power with black
victimage and black moral superiority, acknowledging the
humanity of black people through their shared fallibility
with all people instead of through their unique experience
of suffering and oppression.
Conclusion
Martin Luther King, Jr. and the "I Have a Dream" speech 
have become important cultural symbols for America. King's 
speech transcended America's racial divisions, but at the 
expense of eliding the racial problems America needed to 
confront. The speech vividly exploited America's melting pot 
mythology and helped establish the integrationist model as 
the consensus view on civil rights. Alternative viewpoints, 
such as those of black power spokespersons, were 
marginalized, depriving the assimilationist model of the 
dialectic of critque it needed to maintain viability. King's 
speech was reified as an articulation of the only proper 
path for race relations in America. The speech helped 
establish a tradition of dealing with racial issues in terms 
of socio-religious mythology. While King's rhetoric of
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assimilation transcends divisions, it elides America's 
racial problems. Black power spokespersons more directly 
confronted the nation's racial difficulties, but gave the 
nation no unitary principle under which to unite. Burke's 
concept of the comic frame provides an alternative 
perspective that might have avoided the shortcomings of both 
approaches.
NOTE
^•The following treatment of the ideas and philosophy of 
black power is derived mainly from the following sources: 
Carmichael (1966); Lester (1966); Barbour (Ed.) (1968);
Harding (1968); and Newman (1987), which contains reprints 
of Newman's essays and lectures on black power from 1966 to 
1970.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This chapter summarizes the final conclusions of the 
study, discusses lines of further research suggested by this 
study, and presents the author's concluding remarks.
Conclus ions
The following conclusions can be drawn from the 
foregoing analysis:
(1) Kenneth Burke's theory of guilt-purification- 
redemption provides a useful methodology for analyzing 
Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech and 
revealing the persuasive appeals at work in the speech. The 
guilt-purification-redemption model allows the critic to 
demonstrate how King's rhetoric elicits and exploits a 
latent sense of guilt in the minds of his auditors, both 
black and white, and provides symbolic purification of that 
guilt through victimage/mortification, transcendence, and 
images of change, movement, and dramatic catharsis. Through 
application of Burke's theory of transcendence the critic is 
able to demonstrate how King draws upon powerful images of 
American secular mythology and then strengthens those images 
by placing them within the context of divine authority and 
spiritual redemption. This model also allows an explication
5
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of King's elision of social and racial division under 
transcendent, unitary principles.
(2) Through the use of contemporary metaphor theory the 
critic is able to demonstrate how King's metaphors function 
in the speech to reinforce the redemption drama and the 
elision of social division. King's metaphors simplify 
complex social/moral issues by predicating those issues in 
terms of financial obligations and antithetical, binary 
opposition. His metaphors also ascribe to the audience an 
essentially passive role in the social drama of the civil 
rights movement.
(3) Because Martin Luther King and this speech have 
become cultural icons, this speech has shaped subsequent 
public discourse and thinking on civil rights, providing a 
legacy of dealing with America's racial problems in terms of 
secular and religious mythology and muting other African- 
American voices who attempted to provide an alternative 
viewpoint on race relations in America. King's
assimilationist vision would have been well-served to 
incorporate a critique from the black power perspective 
which more realistically acknowledged the difficulty of 
overcoming centuries of racial division and oppression in 
America. The weakness of the black power perspective, 
however, and the reason it was largely rejected by 
mainstream America, was that it provided no transcendent, 
unity principles under which the nation could unite. King's 
assimilationist rhetoric incorporated and exploited
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America’s basic myths about itself as a nation with a 
mission to provide freedom and opportunity for all on an 
equal basis, but at the expense of eliding the difficulties 
of achieving such assimilation.
Suggestions for Further Research 
The findings of this study suggests several avenues of 
further research. The guilt-purification-redemption form has 
proven extremely useful in understanding Martin Luther King, 
Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech. Less-developed versions of 
this theory have been used to examine other examples of 
discourse (see Brummett, 1981; Elwood, 1989; Mechling & 
Mechling, 1983;), but this study points to a need for 
rhetorical scholars to identify and analyze other situations 
in which the redemption of guilt might prove to be an 
important motivational structure. The findings of this study 
help rhetorical scholars better understand King's rhetoric, 
but more study of King's rhetoric, taking into account the 
findings of this study, needs to be done. O rr's (1990) 
analysis of King's "Eulogy for the Martyred Children" found 
that the speech portrays the girls killed in the bombing of 
the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church as martyrs whose death 
was an act of victjmage with the power to redeem the South. 
Other speec lies by King should also be examined to see if 
they contain images of purification and redemption. Also, 
considering that King's rhetoric in his later years 
contained harsher criticisms of American society, studies
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could consider how King's rhetoric evolved over the course 
of his public career. Did he employ the redemptive form less 
often as he became more radical in his later years, and if 
3 0  what form, if any, marked his later rhetoric?
The primary direction of further research suggested by 
this study, however, is in extensions and applications of 
the theory of guilt-purification-redemption. In the 
following sections I suggest further research into the 
concept of guilt, into the modes of purification, and into 
consideration of the continuing effectiveness of the guilt- 
purif ication-redemption form in light of cfianges in American 
culture since the time of King's speech.
Guilt
Burke's concept of guilt is useful for identifying 
motive structures which may initiate the need for redress or 
reconciliation to which rhetors may respond. More 
theoretical studies into the concept of guilt itself, and 
the sources of guilt, are warranted. For example, what do 
the things people in a particular culture feel guilty about 
tell us about that culture? What is the relationship between 
particular sources of guilt and the modes of purification 
used to absolve that guilt?
Modes _ef ....Pur i ficat ion
Much more work needs to be done into the modes of 
purification. We need to better understand the Burkean modes
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we are familiar with, as well as to identify other modes in 
which purification may be effected. We need to better 
understand what new forms purification may take as societies 
change, and the implications for the audience, and society 
in general, when any particular mode is employed. For 
example, might some modes be "better" (i.e., more humane, 
more effective) than others? Which forms work best in which 
situations? What would a study of the mode or modes dominant 
in a particular culture reveal about that culture?
Further study into particular modes developed in this 
study from Burke's categories is also warranted. For 
example, we need further research into the rhetorical effect 
of being ,a _vietiro* that is, study of the impact of 
portrayals of the victimization and suffering of one's 
racial, ethnic, or sexual group. These types of studies have 
largely been ignored by rhetorical critics because of the 
fear of implying offense to victimized groups. But to study 
the rhetorical effect of portrayals and symbolizations of 
the suffering and victimization of a group is not to deny 
the actuality or validity of that experience.
In addition, there are other modes of purification 
which need further study. What other ways may transcendence 
be effected? Is transcendence a more humane and unifying 
form of purification than the others? Does transcendence 
necessarily elide the practical difficulties of achieving 
unification, as this study argues? Also, there is a need for 
other studies to demonstrate the multiplicity of ways in
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which symbolizations of change, movement, and 
transformations of various types (physical, social, 
psychological, and spiritual), and dramatic catharsis could 
serve purificatory functions.
Further research into other (non-Burkean) modes of 
purification is warranted. For example, despite the fact 
that hard work seems to be a common form of purification, 
especially in American culture, it is only briefly mentioned 
in the literature (Carroll, 1985, p. 39; Solomon, 1980, p. 
61). This form could be applicable, for instance, to 
participants in social movements and political campaigns. No 
study of which I am aware has demonstrated how the act of 
working in a cause, movement, or political campaign, in and 
of itself, can have purificatory effects for the 
participants. Participation itself, the work and the sense 
of being involved, can be redemptive. Perhaps this could be 
studied as a type of transcendence in which the individual 
is transcending the self for a larger purpose, for a sense 
of involvement in a larger cause. Other actions, and 
symbolizations of actions, such as humor, the paying of 
reparations, washing, singing, and praying (see chapter six) 
could be studied as modes of purification.
The Redemotion Drama in American Culture
If the redemption drama is America's meta-narrative, as 
some have argued (see Duncan, 1962, p. 320; Jewett & 
Lawrence, 1988, p. x xi; Robertson, 1980, pp. 25-26) then
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what have been the consequences of that for the shaping of 
public discourse? (See chapter six where I suggest some 
lines of inquiry in answer to that question.) Also, is the 
redemption drama still as potent a form as it once was in 
American culture or has it decreased in effectiveness. Has 
or will American society become self-reflexive about a 
particular form of purification (i.e., recognizing it as a 
ritual of purification), and does that decrease its 
effectiveness? Has or will the American society become self­
reflexive about the redemption drama itself, thus causing it 
to cease to have valence? And finally, have changes in 
American society since the 1960s--such as a decrease in 
adherence to traditional Christian convictions, a decrease 
in belief in America's founding secular myths in the wake of 
Vietnam, Watergate, and the social upheavals of the 1960s, 
and the increasing fragmentation of American society into 
competing ethnic and interest groups--rendered the 
redemption drama less potent as a rhetorical form for 
shaping a discourse of national purpose and meaning?
Concluding Remarks 
Because of the role Martin Luther King, Jr. has assumed 
in America as a national hero, and because of reluctance to 
seem critical of what Martin Luther King stood for, 
rhetorical critics have been somewhat averse to analyzing 
King's rhetoric in a way which would imply that it contained 
any shortcomings. There has been a disinclination to apply
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the tools of rhetorical criticism to King in a manner as 
stringent as would be applied to most other rhetors. Most 
analyses of King's rhetoric seek mainly to praise King's 
oratorical ability, identify the sources of his ideas, or 
explain the reasons for his rhetorical effectiveness. Some 
studies of King's rhetoric even border on the hagiographic 
(see, for example, Osborn, 1989).
It has not been my purpose to denigrate King but only 
to show him the respect any great orator deserves by 
providing a serious, critical analysis of his rhetoric and 
its impact. I feel that by better comprehending the 
persuasive appeals underlying King's discourse, which have 
so shaped our thinking about the civil rights movement, we 
can come to a better understanding of where we are today in 
regard to race relations and how we got here. My research on 
Martin Luther King and the civil rights movement h a s , as any 
good research project should, not only helped me answer the 
questions I set out to answer, but also affected my personal 
intellectual development. I have come to have a great 
appreciation for Martin Luther King and his ideas. However, 
there has been a tendency in American culture to idealize 
and idolize Martin Luther King. In my opinion, this is a 
mistake. King should be seen as neither an idealized hero or 
a villain. He should be seen as a human being who was great 
not because he was perfect, but because despite his human 
imperfections he accomplished many great things. We owe him, 
and ourselves, an honest assessment of those
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accomplishments. David Garrow, America's preeminent King
historian, quotes Charles Willie, one of King's Morehouse
College classmates:
By idolizing those whom we honor, we do a disservice to 
them and to ourselves. By exalting the accomplishments 
of Martin Luther King, Jr., into a legendary tale that 
is annually told, we fail to recognize his humanity-- 
his personal and public struggles--that are similar to 
yours and mine. By idolizing those whom we honor, we 
fail to realize that we could go and do likewise 
(Garrow, 1986a, p. 625).
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